Recoding Life by Tamminen, Sakari & Deibel, Eric
 This book addresses the unprecedented convergence between the digital and 
the corporeal in the life sciences and turns to Foucault’s biopolitics in order to 
understand how life is being turned into a technological object. It examines a wide 
range of bioscientific knowledge practices that allow life to be known through 
codes that can be shared (copied), owned (claimed, and managed) and optimised 
(remade through codes based on standard language and biotech engineering 
visions). 
 The book’s approach is captured in the title, which refers to ‘the biopolitical’. 
The authors argue that through discussions of political theories of sovereignty and 
related geopolitical conceptions of nature and society, we can understand how 
crucially important it is that life is constantly unsettling and disrupting the established 
and familiar ordering of the material world and the related ways of thinking and 
acting politically. The biopolitical dynamics involved are conceptualised as the 
‘metacode of life’, which refers to the shifting configurations of living materiality 
and the merging of conventional boundaries between the natural and artificial, 
the living and non-living. The result is a globalising world in which the need for 
an alternative has become a core part of its political and legal instability, and the 
authors identify a number of possible alternative platforms to understand life and 
the living as framed by the ‘metacodes’ of life. 
 This book will appeal to scholars of science and technology studies, as well 
as scholars of the sociology, philosophy, and anthropology of science, who are 
seeking to understand social and technical heterogeneity as a characteristic of the 
life sciences. 
 Sakari Tamminen is an Adjunct Professor of Science and Technology Studies 
(Anthropology of Science and Technology) at the University of Helsinki, Finland, 
and co-editor of  Bio-Objects: Life in the 21st Century . 
 Eric Deibel lectures STS to engineering students at Bilkent University. 
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 Information and the biopolitical 
 The new Invitrogen™ GeneArt™ CRISPR Search and Design Tool allows you 
to quickly search our database of >600,000 predesigned CRISPR guide RNAs 
(gRNAs) targeting human and mouse genes or analyze your sequence of inter-
est for  de novo g RNA designs using our proprietary algorithms. Up to 25 gRNA 
sequences per gene are provided with recommendations based on potential off-
target effects for each CRISPR sequence. Once you’ve selected the optimal gRNA 
designs, you may purchase your gRNAs and other recommended products for 
genome editing directly from the Web tool. 
 – www.thermofisher.com/ 
 But as we go into some combination of outer and inner space, ourselves a com-
bination of carbon- and silicon-based life, we still have questions pertaining to 
the manner in which we will pursue our explorations. Will we be a well-stirred 
homogenous ‘optimal’ monoculture, or will we be a cacophonous anarchy of self-
experiments – or something in between? 
 – George Church, in  Regenesis: How Synthetic 
Biology Will Reinvent Nature and Ourselves 
 Introduction 
 Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, has been a contested object of exploration, espe-
cially since the conclusion in 1953 that it exists in the form of a double helix. It 
once was seen as the molecule that unlocks secrets of life that have vexed human-
kind since the dawn of time ( Fox Keller 2000 ). By the same token, however, the 
discovery of DNA quickly dislocated the idea of ‘life’ from its historically situ-
ated seat within the realm of the transcendental or divine, relocating it with the 
immanence of corporeal matter embodying informatic patterns and codes ( Doyle 
2003 ). While this development has been seen by many as a ‘reductionist’ one, 
we claim that the opposite is true: it is only today that the potentiality of life has 
proliferated and been released from the traditional forms and functions reserved 
to it within natural history and the life sciences. 
 Life is today escaping its confinement to the cell, the molecule, or the idea 
of the natural code and preferred patterns of expression shaped by evolutionary 
forces, for it has been relocated within a number of  new bodies. Life is found in 
new corporeal species bodies reconfigured through information and code, in the 
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social bodies of knowing and manipulating innovated life forms, and in the insti-
tutional bodies of governance reshaping the ways of composing our post-modern 
communities and ‘proper’ ways of living together. Together these are expressing 
the seemingly bottomless generative potentiality hidden in the idea of life – today 
expressed increasingly through the language of utility and exchange value. 
 As Thermo Fisher – a behemoth life sciences instrument company with annual 
turnover above 17 billion dollars and more than 50,000 personnel on staff, respon-
sible for, as an example, the Invitrogen genome analysis and editing tool and its 
marketing – suggests, searching for various genes and editing the code of life has 
become as easy as ‘surfing the Web’ and purchasing products on any given Web 
shop found online. The redesign of genes, perhaps of whole genomes in the near 
future, is made available for anyone with the interest and an accepted credit card. 
Below Thermo Fisher’s statement at the beginning of the chapter, we quoted a 
claim by George Church, one of the most prominent geneticists  cum molecular 
engineers and a professor at Harvard and MIT fellow. What it suggests is that we 
must soon take a stance on how we,  Homo sapiens , want to see ourselves as a 
species in the future. Are we going to edit genes or rebuild our makeup in a coor-
dinated effort to fashion a superior form of life immune to diseases and ageing? 
Or are we going to transcend our species boundaries and let self-experiments on 
genetic modification take over? Whichever path we choose, he suggests, the life 
of Earth is profoundly changing via genetic engineering or synthetic biology, and 
we are witnessing, as a result, nothing less than a total  regenesis of life. 1 
 There are constant reminders of the steps being taken towards this kind of 
regenesis, or at least the editing of the human genome. One of these is the UK 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), which in early 2016 
granted permission to edit genes in human embryos for research purposes to a 
team of UK scientists at the Francis Crick Institute, led by Dr Kathy Niakan. In 
February 2016  Nature reported as follows: 
 The HFEA has approved an application by developmental biologist Kathy 
Niakan, at the Francis Crick Institute in London, to use the genome-editing 
technique CRISPR – Cas9 in healthy human embryos. Niakan’s team is inter-
ested in early development, and it plans to alter genes that are active in the 
first few days after fertilization. The researchers will stop the experiments 
after seven days, after which the embryos will be destroyed. The genetic 
modifications could help researchers to develop treatments for infertility, but 
will not themselves form the basis of a therapy. 2 
 The editing of human genetic material had been under moratorium for several years, 
as no overarching consensus on ethical or philosophical principles has been found 
among biotechnologically advanced countries. Now, however, the UK authorities 
have decided that genetic editing for research purposes is ethically defensible. In 
the same article, the Crick Institute’s director, Paul Nurse, explained the value of 
the gene editing: ‘Dr Niakan’s proposed research is important for understanding 
how a healthy human embryo develops and will enhance our understanding of IVF 
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success rates, by looking at the very earliest stage of human development’. While 
embryo editing is now allowed only for research purposes, it is not difficult to 
imagine these techniques going beyond the laboratory or medicine, entering clini-
cal trials or other fields. This is to be expected if only because techniques such as 
gene editing are not regulated in many countries. Not long after the  Science piece, 
in July 2017, embryo gene editing hit the news in the United States, as the Oregon 
Health & Science University reported it had successfully edited embryo genes 
( MIT Technology Review 2017 ). One day later, the  New York Times reported how 
other scientists commented on this experiment and directly cited one prominent 
genetics expert, Dr. Eric Topol, director of the Scripps Translational Science Insti-
tute in La Jolla, California, who said that gene editing of embryos is ‘an unstop-
pable, inevitable science, and this is more proof it can be done’ ( New York Times 
2017 ). This makes the question posed by Church all the more pertinent. Will it be a 
rogue scientist group who claim to be making the first ‘perfect human baby’? Will 
we soon see DIY biologists engineer biopunk life forms in their garages? What will 
such life forms look like? And, perhaps, how should we as social collectives react 
to this? (See, for example,  Wohlsen 2011 ;  Delfanti 2013 .) 
 The recent developments in genetic engineering tools, knowledge, and their 
use in improving species of life are only the logical continuation of the historical 
trajectory of biology and biosciences. Gradually the question about finding the 
‘truth’ about life has shifted toward a question about the utility of such techniques 
in making life forms perform a particular task in a more efficient, optimised way. 
This is a result of ‘the century of the gene’ ( Fox Keller 2000 ), brought to us via 
new innovations for the manipulation of life both intra-cellular and extra-cellular 
and through particular biopolitics reframed around the optimisation of not only the 
individual and the species but the way in which individuals and species develop, 
perform, and regulate themselves (or not). Such biopolitics targeting life  not as it is 
but how it should be is a question of interests, or, rather, it is a politics of interests 
that fundamentally defines how the ‘code of life’ will be compiled and executed at 
intra- and extra-cellular levels across species and taxa (see  Foucault 2002 ). 
 This book examines how genetic engineering, synthetic biology, and differ-
ent life forms being generated constitute the emerging forms of life of the early 
twenty-first century’s global culture ( Fischer 2003 ). Here, ‘life’, and truth about 
life, is increasingly verified within a field of competing interests where their value 
and utility is premised on the fading of species bodies and their borders. Accord-
ingly, bodies of knowing, their techniques, their governance, and the very ways 
of speaking about life and its representation are reshaping the capacity for opti-
misation and their exchange value, many times called the sphere of the neoliberal 
‘bio-economy’ or, occasionally, biocapitalism (see  Sunder Rajan 2006 ;  Cooper 
2008 ;  Helmreich 2008 ). Life in the form of informational media ( Thacker 2003 ) 
should be understood as a newly framed matter of concern ( Latour 2004 ) that 
arises from how bio-objects are being assigned vital functions and powers holding 
utility value and, therefore, potential value in exchange ( Vermeulen et al. 2012 ). 
 All this is true, yet the framing and regulation of such emergent forms of life is 
always already a subject of a global politics of interest, wherein power is negotiated 
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through particular configurations entrenched in the deep will to explore the limits 
of life’s value. This signals a regenesis not only of life but of a global biopoli-
tics co-constituted through the  metacodes of life : revealed through its discourses, 
techniques, circuits, and their intersections alongside the interactions that support 
particular types of forms of research, exchange, and governance. 
 Exploring metacodes 
 The idiom of exploration is omnipresent throughout the life sciences, and there 
is always a multiplicity of objectives to accomplish and at stake. Crucially, the 
question of life – molecular, genetic, synthetic, and beyond – is fundamentally 
unstable. An example of this is how these objectives are imagined by the authors 
of the breakthrough report on the completion of the map of the human genome. In 
their celebratory article announcing the complete map, the International Human 
Genome Sequencing Consortium on Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the 
Human Genome quoted T.S. Eliot’s  Four Quartets (15 February 2001,  Nature 
409). Looking beyond their publication on the human genome, they concluded: 
 Finally, it has not escaped our notice that the more we learn about the human 
genome, the more there is to explore: We shall not cease from exploration and 
the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started. And know the 
place for the first time. 
 As expected, the initial completion of the map did not end the exploration. 
Instead, the decade and a half that has passed since has shown an exponential 
growth in mappings: numerous species of mammal, plant, bacterium, and so forth 
or microbial genomes containing billions of base pairs have been charted and 
mapped into databases. Moreover, the practise of mapping as a means of gener-
ating ‘basic knowledge’ has turned into a practise of modelling the increasingly 
complex behaviour of genes, proteins, and cells. Laboratories and infrastruc-
tures around the world are expanding, facilitating the exchange of information, 
instantaneously, for diverse purposes, in what is best characterised as an indus-
try informed by biological science and seeking to re-materialise the information 
through genetic engineering. 
 Therefore, it was certainly appropriate that the authors of the report claimed 
that there is always more to explore, but what they suggest is that the end is ‘to 
arrive where we started’. This refers to the subject of the exploration as life itself: 
its inner workings mapped and revealed by science imagined as a domain with 
a beginning that always already was an end in itself. In this sense, the advance 
of the life sciences moves from an ahistorical past towards a horizon that is con-
stantly being reached, moving towards the realisation of the promise of a future 
in which technique subdues life and nature. Such an exploration goes onwards 
(there is always more to explore) as if it is only a matter of time before the furthest 
extent of knowledge arrives where it started: it is premised on a transhistorical 
understanding that is a crucial feature of what we call the  metacode of life . In a 
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sentence, the metacode of life refers to the centrality of DNA in informatic for-
mats as the condition of the contemporary politics of how the biological informs 
the digital and  vice versa . 
 Maps are powerful techniques for representing worlds or spatiotemporal con-
figurations of specific relationships between human and other beings that are not 
created out of nothing or only life itself. Maps are exemplary, as already observed 
by Donna Haraway when she stated that ‘maps are models of worlds crafted 
through and for specific practices of intervening and ways of life’ ( Haraway 1997 , 
135). In this sense, the exploration imagined by the authors of the report on the 
human genome project – whose aim ‘to arrive where we started’ – suggests that 
once ‘life’s inner workings are mapped and revealed by science’, biology as the 
 logos of  bio will have been transformed, questioned, re-articulated once again. 
We will mark such transhistorical understandings as  metacodes of life , as a start-
ing point and structure from which to rethink DNA as information and embodied 
forms as they are explored and mapped in ways that mediate spaces, relationships, 
and actors through time. 
 The citation that marked the completion of the map of the human genome is 
particularly telling, as its lines taken from T.S. Eliot’s  Four Quartets refer to 
Dante and his story about the emissary of the living who was guided by Vir-
gil and Beatrice among the dead. The passage cited underscores the continuous 
nature of exploration and refers to a mystical interconnection of the past, present, 
and future. Such a perspective on the first completed map of the human genome 
implies an exploration that similarly breaks free from the boundaries of previous 
journeys. In this case, it is an exploration of ‘the human’ and its ‘limited-edition 
formats’ such as the ‘body’. The analogy changes the kind of exploration and what 
is at stake. It includes Inferno, Purgatory, and Paradise rather than an easy choice 
between heaven and hell or between salvation through the inventions of the life 
sciences and damnation through genetic engineering becoming like Frankenstein: 
‘a thing such as even Dante could not have conceived’ (Shelley [1818]  2006 , 61). 
 We are told, again and again, about how new technologies will deliver us more 
food, health, and wealth and improve the soil, even the weather. Soon everyone 
will win, when the life sciences realise their promise as drivers of knowledge 
economies – as a global bio-economy; a knowledge-based bio-economy; a bio-
based economy; or similar arrangements wherein ecology, economy, and biology 
find each other. Following these guides means that we are presented with a jour-
ney that is about genetic exploration that has as its end a sustainable future that is 
reached by realising the long list of innovations in every imaginable area that will 
guarantee employment and sustainability without compromising our agricultural 
productivity, global food security, focus on renewable energy, and potential solu-
tions to climate change (see  Chapter 7 ). 
 Sometimes this type of ‘end’ to the exploration is presented as a myth of ori-
gins: a return to the mists of time when everything was always already ‘bio-based’ 
rather than the fossil resources that power today’s industrialised civilisation. This 
is a painting of a lost Arcadia wherein only biological resources were used for 
food, shelter, transportation, and so on (see  Veraart et al. 2011 ). Mostly, however, 
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historical continuity needs to be re-established in the present, which invariably 
means that the commercialisation of the biological sciences is a premise for the 
extensive wish list attached to the usage of sustainable and renewable biological 
resources. 
 On one hand, the ‘end’ of the exploration is taking on the shape of a compre-
hensive alternative, with the life sciences as the driver of a systemic transition to 
a world wherein societies are revitalised after suffering economic crises, along 
with their citizens, who are in harmony with themselves, each other, and natu-
ral environments. On the other hand, the counter-narratives mirror the increasing 
magnitude of the story, as found in many of the policy documents on the life sci-
ences and the knowledge economy. Instead of harmony and the unity of science, 
society, and nature, this is a discourse of conflict and competition looming in the 
near future, when resources (such as water and land) will be at stake, new sec-
tors will displace others (as with fuel and food), and the fortune of nations might 
need to be guaranteed by various means as entire continents surge ahead or fall 
behind (discussed in  Chapter 7 ). Underneath the heavenly vision of new biologi-
cal, economic, and ecological harmony we find a hell that is populated with the 
same characters that are held responsible for the loss of nature’s integrity: new 
monocrops, big pharma, big data, and the plundering of biological wealth. 
 While two diametrically opposed conclusions are being drawn in looking at the 
biological future, both are narrated as a sweeping and dramatic epic with geopoliti-
cal consequences. In this sense, they are perfectly symmetrical in their focus on the 
need to overcome planetary constraints and in their agreement about how humans 
will have to act as a species, and at a scale that matches that of the numerous global 
crises of the present. At the centre of both stories we find a reverence for the desire 
and drive to overcome whatever limits there are to life as a technological creation 
and to redesign species bodies at will. After all, each appeals to a ‘return to nature’, 
which assumes that the journey has an end that, whether good or bad, is premised 
on a logical coherency that is simply not there, neither in the knowledge about 
DNA nor in the political philosophies about the natural world and human nature 
(see  Hayles 1999 ;  Žižek 1999 ; cf.  Fukuyama 2002 ;  Habermas 2003 ). 
 What could be more appropriate for the contemporary life sciences than how an 
emissary of the living is guided through the rings of hell, purgatory, and heaven? 
Certainly, the guides are different, but even without Dante and his guides, the end 
to the exploration is still a cosmological order wherein everything is assigned 
the right place – this time being reconfigured biologically, genetically, or by 
informatic patterns encompassing all living beings. Once again we get to bear 
witness to a renewal of practises of identifying, observing, classifying, ordering, 
representing, analysing, redoing, and rerouting life and death, the living and the 
non-living. This time we follow guides who suggest that there is a new era of tech-
niques of life, thereby establishing a type of continuity that spans from Dante’s 
vision to today, passing by Diderot’s  Encyclopédie and more recently Wikipedia 
and the human genome as a repository of knowledge of what humans are. Each 
in its own way has been an effort to incorporate all of the knowledge scattered 
over the surface of the earth, showing a continuity in technique, skill, tools, and 
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 techné – each pointing to technology as an enduring part of what it means to be 
 Homo sapiens , as individuals and as a species. 
 As an ‘end’ to the exploration we will seek to rethink the return to nature as a 
myth of origins that enables us to recontextualise how bio-objects are escaping the 
natural history of species. Such an exploration of biological entities (and knowl-
edge of such entities) does not shy away from notoriety – quite the opposite. We 
seek to affirm how controversy ends up being the norm with new techniques of 
life. Simultaneously, we are genuinely interested in the mapping, modelling, and 
programming practises that are characteristic of the rapid transformation of the 
contemporary life sciences. Ultimately, it is in this reconfiguration of life and bod-
ies that the contemporary cosmological order is performed, as a scientific practise 
and as a biopolitics that draws its strength from its intimate relationship to the 
desire ‘to optimize, enhance and renormalize what counts as biological’ ( Thacker 
2003 , 76). 
 Mapping information and the biopolitical 
 To present genome mapping as the core of an exploration of historical signifi-
cance establishes a historical comparison to the age of exploration: to the time of 
world maps that had gaps in the middle of familiar shorelines (see  Zwart 2009 ). 
 These maps are more familiar to most of us, as they occupy a large part of 
colourful picture-filled books on the history of mapmaking, which show, page by 
page, how natural harbours and inland rivers become visible, new spaces yield-
ing to explorers and missionaries and thereby revealing a world with unknown 
territories. Someday, the final pages of such photo books might depict the human 
genome or other species’ genomes. And why not? The latter deliver strange 
fruits and artefacts as well as tales of riches, miracles, and even exotic peoples 
whose very nature has been captured in beautiful photographs. Yet such meta-
phors, of exploration and mapmaking, are misleading when presented in isolation 
from how the language wherein biological life was traditionally understood was 
already becoming informationalised in the mid-twentieth century (see  Kay 2000 ; 
 Fox Keller 2002 ;  O’Malley and Dupré 2007 ;  Mackenzie 2005 ;  Doyle 1997 ). Such 
a historical analogy prioritises the pervasive language of life wherein DNA is 
code, to be programmed as if life were the equivalent of information that can be 
stored, transmitted, and shared. 
 With the application of database technologies to the biological record, priori-
tising the creation and usage of information resources and technologies has as 
its result a biological record that takes the database as its organising principle. 
As Geoffrey Bowker put it, biology and information each bootstrap the other 
(Bowker 2005). This is our perspective as well; a different type of reading of the 
history of biology takes precedence: one based on an underlying politics of sci-
ence and technology that takes its shape at the intersection of two fields built on 
shifting unstable configurations of life, facts, data, and artefacts that cut across 
conventional boundaries between natural and artificial, living and non-living (see 
 Vermeulen et al. 2012 ). It is in this register that we approach the intersection of 
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life and information in terms of ‘the biopolitical’. This term from the subtitle of 
the book refers to Michel Foucault and his explanation of the concept in the last 
chapter of  Society Must Be Defended ( Foucault 2003 , 240–263). 
 The concept does not refer only to politics of science and technology that hap-
pens to be about biology, imagined as a more or less singular frontier of knowl-
edge or moment of progress at which nature is overcome at last. Instead, our 
understanding refers to how ‘biopolitics deals with a problem that is at once sci-
entific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem’ (ibid., 245). 
 Foucault’s concern with biology is an element of his lectures on the transforma-
tion of the power over and rights of alive and dead. The point is, therefore, not 
that power and the biological sciences are indistinguishable; instead, ‘power’s 
hold over life’ is understood by distinguishing between, on one hand, how sover-
eignty emerged from early-modern traditions of political theory and, on the other, 
the emergence of techniques of power centred on the body in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. This is crucial; what it does is bring to the foreground that 
the emergence of new techniques of power is inescapably tied to processes of 
permeation and saturation whereby the relationship of sovereign rule with the 
multiplicity of men is dissolved to the level of individual bodies that can be kept 
under surveillance, trained, used, and – if need be – punished (ibid.). 
 Consider again the age of exploration and the analogy with the mapping of 
genomes. This time, we take a different beginning, starting with how ‘collecting’ 
received ‘the status of a science’ ( Parry 2004 , 20–22). As Bronwyn Parry explains 
in  Trading the Genome , within a specific cultural moment, the study, classifica-
tion, and categorisation of samples, specimens, and artefacts became more than 
the ‘culture of collecting’ it had been before. Natural history was shaped as a sci-
entific field through successive search missions to refine its focus and scope. The 
constant redefinition was possible as 
 each voyage brought back a systematically organized body of information 
about the coastlines, flowers, fauna, language, and cultures of distant peo-
ples. This information could be employed to recreate within particular dedi-
cated spaces in Europe – such as museums and laboratories – a scaled-down 
version of the world that could be surveyed panoptically. 
 (ibid., 20–22) 
 These voyages returned with knowledge about events and places elsewhere as 
well as with the materials that were to be concentrated in collections. Of course, 
not all materials were brought back in their original form; this was neither pos-
sible nor useful. A coastline, for example, was better translated into an artificial 
form such as a map’s surface. Similarly, there were botanical illustrations, stuffed 
animals, and tropical plants that could not be transported but could be described 
and categorised in a way that could effectively ‘stand in for’ or ‘represent’ the 
organism in question ( Parry 2004 , 23). Parry explains how the capacity to trans-
fer materials from the centre to the periphery was the function of many different 
Recoding life 9
technologies, ‘bringing natural entities – or at least some of their key properties – 
home’ (ibid., 23). For us, such an interpretation of the metaphor of mapmaking 
implies that the biopolitical is seen in terms of a different kind of historical conti-
nuity. The point is no longer that there was a golden age of exploration or a neo-
colonial nightmare; instead, the historical analogy revolves around configuration 
of techniques, knowledge, and life forms that are performed in specific settings 
and yet can be seen as global in scope. 
 More specifically, Foucault’s analysis envisaged power as exercised through 
interventions in the rate of birth, longevity, sanity, illness, reproduction, and so 
forth. It was only late in his life that Foucault started using the term ‘biopolitics’. 
It was introduced in the lectures dealing with biopolitics, found in  Society Must 
Be Defended (1975/6) and  The Birth of Biopolitics (1978/9), wherein he carefully 
distinguished his interpretation from conventional understandings of sovereignty 
in terms of the actions of nations as a foundational category or myth that can or 
should be identified with stable economic, political, and public interests. It is this 
relation to political theory that remains key, especially when one is concerned 
with emerging technologies. Not only do conventional notions of territorial sov-
ereignty remain powerful in their relations to the life sciences (see  Chapters 4 
and  5 ); the same applies to the technologies of power that emerged later. Also, 
these need to be understood in terms of how ‘pre-critical naïveté holds undivided 
rule’ (see  Foucault 2002 , 349–351,  2008 ). Understanding and demonstrating this 
type of naïveté is crucial since it permeates Foucault’s studies of power. It is a 
constant part of his discussions of the kind of power that was exercised in the 
nineteenth century through regulatory mechanisms tying the individual to the 
nation’s economy through statistical techniques, forecasts, or estimates or through 
overall measures that absorb geographical and environmental conditions into the 
well-being of the population. 
 We believe that this type of political theory and theorisation is invaluable when 
one invokes the biopolitical as a perspective on the practises and epistemologies 
of the life sciences. It is, therefore, by developing such a perspective that this 
book speaks to the biopolitical and the authors seek to think across diverse fields 
of bioscientific knowledge practices. We illustrate the theoretical perspective with 
a wide variety of cases that each paint a biopolitical terrain wherein power is 
exercised in line with informatic ways of thinking about life and nature. Engag-
ing closely with the naïveté arising out of early-modern thinking about sover-
eignty, social contracts, and international order, we are able to approach the rapid 
changes in the life sciences methodologically as well as critically. Indeed, we will 
show that it is in terms of early-modern naïveté that we can best understand the 
biopolitical in its relations to expectations surrounding how life is not only being 
known or decoded but also remade (or recoded) and re-materialised through bio-
informatics and material biotechnologies. This all happens within the context of 
particular metacodes – empirical positivities acting as guiding principles, mean-
ings, values, and practises – that frame what life is, can be, and is made to be 
through specific epistemic platforms they form today and in the future. 
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 Life, code, work 
 I would like to assure you that, in spite of everything, I really did intend to talk 
about biopolitics, and then, things being what they are, I have ended up talking at 
length, and maybe for too long, about neo-liberalism. 
 – Michel Foucault,  The Birth of Biopolitics (1978, 185) 
 As Foucault puts it, talking about biopolitics should not be exclusively tied to neo-
liberalism. By this we mean that focusing excessively on the status of the sciences 
within the context of ‘bio-capitalism’ does not get us very far in terms of theoreti-
cal or practical analysis. This would be a limitation, irrespective of whether this 
recontextualisation (attaching ‘bio’ to ‘capitalism’) would announce a ‘new epoch’ 
or diagnose a ‘symptom’ or merely would invoke the basic concepts of political 
economy, among them value, markets, and the commodity ( Sunder Rajan 2006 ). 
 We maintain that examining the biopolitical implies that there is no necessary 
choice to be made between a critique of neoliberalism and studying the life sci-
ences. As Kaushik Sunder Rajan explains, Foucault and Marx are comparable 
because the latter examines political economy as ‘a foundational epistemology 
that allows us the very possibility of thinking about such a system as a system 
of valuation’ (ibid., 7–13). This is also our position: the possibility of thinking in 
terms of systems of valuation implies studying facts, data, and objects that ‘act’ 
(bio-)politically and that perform socio-technical arrangements, wherein fluidity 
and perpetual motion undercut established materialities and socio-political order-
ings. Sometimes this includes situating the life sciences in the context of famil-
iar patterns of financial capital, trade, and industrial production (see Birch and 
Tyfield 2013). Other times, however, the (im-)materiality of science and technol-
ogy undercuts political forms of action, organisation, and thinking; leads to cred-
ibility being lost or gained ( Gieryn 1983 ); and is implicated in how relationships 
between science and society are constantly (re-)generated ( Latour 1993 ) and in 
established ways of thinking and acting politically that can be blocked, reinter-
preted, and transformed. 
 In other words, we maintain that no choice has to be made of whether to think 
of biopolitics in terms of life or in terms of capital. For example, Stefan Helm-
reich observes that biopolitics needs to be adjusted because of how the life sci-
ences ‘enable different biopolitical constellations, ones not so neatly organized 
around genealogy and birth, or for that matter through human bodies’ (Helmreich 
2009, 101). Yet in related types of analysis, the focus shifts back to neoliberalism. 
A key example is Melinda Cooper’s  Life as Surplus , which gives priority to how 
strategies of neoliberal biopolitics mirror the life sciences in embracing complex-
ity theories, thereby finding new ways to reduce the ‘extraeconomic’ to exchange 
value ( Cooper 2008 , 10). Both positions, however, are easily criticised in terms 
of how tenuous the hold of the transformations in the life sciences is over global 
capitalism. Only to a limited extent can the life sciences’ position with regard to 
global economic and geopolitical arrangements of neoliberalism explain the shap-
ing of bioeconomies (Birch and Tyfield 2013). 
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 The important point, to us, is that the very notion and need for priority setting 
in ‘bio-capitalism talk’ – capital versus biocapital, science versus markets, tech-
nology versus society, and so on – sits uneasily within a Foucauldian approach. 
Consider how Foucault examined the formation of fields of modern knowledge 
in  The Order of Things . He studied three histories in parallel: how wealth became 
economics, how natural history became biology, and how the study of language 
became linguistics. These pieces of epistemological terrain are shown to be mutu-
ally constitutive, which is to say that the science of life is misunderstood when 
represented by singling out a particular history or privileging one of the con-
stitutive parts over the others. Taken together, they demonstrate modernity as a 
space of representation that is grounded in the ‘rigorous and general epistemic 
re-arrangement’ of the nineteenth century ( Foucault 2002 , 180–182). 
 This is also the basis for his easily misunderstood claim that there could be no 
‘life’ in the modern biological sense of the term before this time. Famously he 
argued that ‘it is not so long ago – when the world, its order and human beings 
existed, but man did not’ (ibid., 349–351). Such life and such a human were 
inconceivable in classical science; it is only through the modern representation 
of life, language, and labour that a subject comes into existence that he calls the 
‘emperico-transcendental doublet’ (ibid.). What is relevant about this view is that 
it reveals how contemporary debates are premised on a defence or a celebration 
of how an original or logically coherent conception of the human subject is about 
to be displaced – to be lost or saved. It offers us an alternative to the way in which 
a choice between those two viewpoints ends up reaffirming that there is a post-
humanity or a post-nature that is soon to arrive as a consequence of the radically 
changing character of biological modification. 
 We remain interested in the very ability to comprehend ‘life’ and ‘economy’ in 
their modernist guises, as shaped by particular epistemologies that simultaneously 
are enabled by and, in turn, enable ‘particular forms of institutional structures’ ( Sun-
der Rajan 2006 , 14). This includes the third example of a modern field of knowl-
edge and the one that Foucault found most important, linguistics. Sunder Rajan 
refers to ‘a shifting grammar of life, towards a future tense’ (ibid., 14). Such an 
understanding of the metacode of life is linguistic in the ability to calculate, show-
ing how different grammars are at play in how living materials are exchanged and 
circulated as a series of coding operations wherein DNA gets transcribed into RNA. 
 Taken together, the three fields are each mobilised when digital practices and 
mapping metaphors give way to genetic engineering and the re-materialisation 
of information as food, medicine, energy, and other forms of living. Alongside 
its biology and its economics, this is a process that should be understood as 
profoundly linguistic in the sense that coding and programming are integral to 
processes of gene expression and regulation and to sequences that can be cut, 
spliced, and transcribed in various ways. Ultimately, this is a language that ‘not 
only contains digital instructions that make us who we are’ but is written down in 
ways that are strategically and selectively related to a wide range of ‘institutions, 
procedures, instruments, practises and forms of capitalization’, as Nicolas Rose 
put it ( 2001 , 13–15). 
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 The structure of the book 
 The biopolitical horizon opened in this book is no longer the one of nineteenth-
century disciplinary techniques nor a calculative biopower enabled by new life 
sciences. The new biopolitical reality is still in formation. Hence, the outline of 
this book echoes Gilles Deleuze’s closing observation on Foucault’s work some 
thirty years ago, wherein he finished by asking about the new forces beginning 
to take shape: 
 Biology had to take a leap into molecular biology, or dispersed life regroup 
in the code. Dispersed work had to regroup in third generation machines, 
cybernetics, and information technology. What would be the forces in play, 
with which the forces within man would then enter into a relation? 
 (Deleuze 1999, 109) 
 While the new biopolitical reality continues to refer to life (new forms of biosci-
ences), to language (code), and to labour (dispersed work) – a triptych that echoes 
the epistemic fields explored by Foucault in his  The Order of Things (Foucault 
[1966]  2003 ) – simultaneously there are new relations of force, acting on one 
another and through life, transforming what it means to be living today (see Dillon 
and Lobo-Guerrero 2009). 
 Charting out some of the first contours of this new reality is the goal for the 
next chapter ( Chapter 2 ), by which we seek to turn our position into an approach, 
detailing our rethinking of the biopolitical, theoretically, conceptually, and meth-
odologically framing the empirical analyses that follow. Starting with what Fou-
cault called ‘the problem of sovereignty’ in his later work, we retrace his steps to 
his early work and return to the question about the ‘modern space of representa-
tion’ and its epistemic underpinnings. Drawing from Foucault’s early work, we 
suggest a perspective on the biopolitical extended to the variety of ways wherein 
power is exercised through the shared and collective social bodies that enter into 
new relations in consequence of the bioinformatic reconfiguration of humans and 
non-human life forms. 
 Chapter 3 looks at the standardisation of biosciences through global digital 
infrastructures, categories, and methods of representation. The chapter provides 
background for the idea of a standard biobank language and points out how the 
dream of a standard biological language has always been one of the aims in the 
biosciences. Empirically, the chapter analyses the standardisation of the funda-
mental information model for the first EU-wide research platform, the European 
Biobanking and Biomolecular Resources Research Infrastructure (BBMRI-ERIC; 
work led by the Swedish Karolinska Institutet). In the chapter, we claim that the 
standardisation of a universal biobank language conceptually transforms also the 
objects of scientific enquiry – human biobanks (what they are) and the objects 
they hold (the concepts of ‘donor’, ‘sample’, and related ‘data’) – for purposes 
of developing an information model that is suitable for large-scale collaboration. 
 Chapter 4 examines the global politics of access, dealing with species of plants as 
a subject of international agreements and governance mechanisms. Rather than con-
sidering ‘access’ as a push back to the rules of ownership and the commodification of 
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life, the chapter shows how a new generation of ‘miracle crops’ is being launched as 
integral to an organisational model wherein global targets for environment-related 
policy making cannot be dissociated from the aspirations of the life sciences and 
sophisticated techniques. Not only is the model ineffective, but also thinking across 
the types of ‘access’ that are possible shows that exclusivity should be rethought 
in terms of high-tech forms of gifting, charity, and altruism that are becoming a 
global norm. The theoretical aim behind the chapter is to show how such a norm 
expresses a state of exception wherein life and law collapse amidst the constant 
need to guarantee access within the confines of the complex interplay of exclusive 
claims – of states over genetic wealth in their territory through intellectual-property 
protections, state-based regulation, and new governance mechanisms that dissolve 
earlier distinctions between public and private. 
 Chapter 5 continues the analyses of how the life and value of living beings has 
been reframed in recent decades in global political conventions. As were plants, 
animals used to be valuable as far as they could produce or provide physical 
goods or labour to humans. Today all living beings are seen as fleshly ‘function 
libraries’ for valuable jobs (immunity, chemical-secretion, greater productivity, 
etc.), easily accessed via bio-informatics and to be appropriated and used for new 
organisms and purposes. These ideas are codified in the widely recognised Con-
vention on Biological Diversity and Nagoya Protocol, signed by most countries 
in the world. Together, these global conventions have created a new and globally 
binding regime for ‘labour contracts’ affecting all (non-human) living beings. The 
chapter again foregrounds how today’s nature and non-human life are reduced 
to their coding components, such as ‘genetic resources’ to be globally indexed, 
stored, and ultimately put to work for the desired ends. In addition, however, it 
pinpoints how territorial sovereignty is performed in the context of these powerful 
global forces that are at play in transforming the materiality and information of 
genetic resources into objects of a new global nature politics. 
 The discussion of access continues with  Chapter 6 ’s examination of synthetic 
biology as the most influential extension of the idea and norms of ‘Open Source’ 
to the life sciences. The suggestion is that access and openness are needed to 
encourage collaboration, the sharing of knowledge, and further development of 
platform technologies. Yet this alternative mirrors a normative space situated at 
the intersection of informatics and the commodification of life. Digital platforms 
and genetic techniques underdevelopment are closely related to business models 
applied for delivering whatever synthetic compound might be in demand on the 
world market – plastics, chemicals, oil, and the like. After discussing what open-
ness means in its relation to the design community associated with the BioBricks 
Foundation (BBF), the chapter turns to re-imagining what a rigorous application 
of Open Source principles to genetic engineering might look like. To that end, 
we compare the ‘minimal-genome’ and ‘minimal-cell’ projects. Their differences 
enable us to go beyond rhetoric and into the underlying scientific practises to 
re-imagine whether an Open Source approach has potential to offer an alternative 
that extends beyond the desire to solve global problems through genetic engineer-
ing imbued with conventional ideas of property, ownership, and access to markets 
and resources. 
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 Chapter 7 engages even more directly with the life sciences as an alternative 
space of representation for key concepts of the new bioepistemic reality. First, 
the ‘global bio-economy’ is examined as a policy language and framework that is 
most powerfully advocating the life sciences as the drivers of a transition to major 
changes in society – that is, a transition to a world of sustainable societies. Invari-
ably, its many goals rely on the ability to engineer malleable biomass into a sustain-
able and renewable source of energy, food, and materials (e.g., bio-plastics), all at 
the will of the designer. Crucially, however, such a vision of the future is not solely 
an extrapolation from the promises of synthetic biology as to the global targets that 
it is employed to contribute to reaching; the visionary work is increasingly a reflec-
tion of an alliance of chemical companies and synthetic biology start-ups seeking 
to industrialise specific commodity chains that are to remain exclusive. It is within 
this setting that the chapter continues by comparing and contrasting ‘biohacking’ 
and ‘Open Source seeds’. The former is an effort to transform the life sciences by 
opening up the laboratory and making experimentation inclusive, while the latter 
approach represents seeking to remove the restrictions that are imposed on the 
usage of plants in agriculture, extending open licencing for seeds. Accordingly, the 
Open Source Seed Initiative (OSSI) does not seek to justify the existing restrictions 
or to mediate them by sharing knowledge and exchanging information; rather, they 
actively strive to develop new strategies to roll back the commodification of seeds. 
While this is difficult to accomplish, OSSI demonstrates that a counter-economy 
is entirely practical in one of the most contested life sciences domains, suggesting 
that a similar approach might be applicable to living and working with genetic 
materials in other formats and bioeconomies. 
 The concluding chapter returns to the notion of metacodes. As is noted ear-
lier, this concept refers to the question of new forces shaping the reality of our 
bio-infused present and the forces we as  anthropos are entering into relationship 
with. We suggest that these forces form new epistemic underpinnings that at once 
present a new challenge for understanding our reality and give new tools for cri-
tique and social change. Finally, they constitute fragments of an experimental 
theoretical discourse, a way of testing how well new politics, forms of living, and 
ways of governing work together. We summarise how our work fits within the 
wider academic context of popular theories today that have addressed the rise of 
the bio-economy, biocapital, and bioproperty (e.g.,  Sunder Rajan 2006 ;  Thacker 
2005 ;  Cooper 2008 ). Our argument, woven throughout the book, is that these do 
not fully account for what is happening to life today. We need to return to ‘dead 
theories’ (e.g., ideas of Rousseau, Hobbes, and Marx) out of which social science 
emerged to go beyond critique and thereby imagine a future that is grounded in 
the diversity of politics of nature as unfolding today, alongside an understanding 
of how the forces we are entering into relationship with are not so new after all. 
 Notes 
 1 Church’s vision is a rephrasing of Marshall McLuhan’s vision from the mid-1960s of the 
effects of new media technologies in enhancing our physiological and perceptual capaci-
ties, now in connection with the reengineered human body. While McLuhan claimed that 
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‘in the electric age we all wear all mankind as our skin’ (McLuhan 1964, 47), Church 
envisions the capacities of a biologically altered species. This perspective is elaborated 
upon fully in Chapter 3. 
 2  See www.nature.com/news/uk-scientists-gain-licence-to-edit-genes-in-human-embryos-
1.19270 (accessed on 1.12.2016). 
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 Rethinking the biopolitical 
 [B]eneath the dramatic and somber absolute power that was the power of sover-
eignty, and, which constituted in the power to take life, we now have the emer-
gence [. . .] of this technology of power over the population as such, over men 
insofar as they are living beings. It is continuous, scientific, and it is the power to 
make live. 
 – Michel Foucault,  Society Must Be Defended ( 2003 [1976], 247) 
 Introduction 
 ‘The power to make live’, an awkward translation for the French concept of  le 
pouvoir de faire vivre , is a fitting starting point for this chapter. It refers to the 
intervention in and regularisation of the life of the population but is also an apt 
description of how there are many ‘species’ of biopolitics that together can be 
seen as contemporary technologies of power with the ability to create new life 
forms that are alive and invented. 
 The passage quoted comes from the first pages of Foucault’s lecture at the Col-
lège de France, wherein the term ‘biopolitics’ was first used. He discusses the 
transformation of the power of the monarch over life and death, how monarchi-
cal sovereignty gave rise to the power to discipline the individual and the popu-
lation over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As Foucault 
explains, the emergence of new technologies’ power went from ‘man-as-body to 
man-as-living being, and ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species’ ( Foucault 2003 , 
242). This ‘if you like’ is a direct reference to Marx’s concept of species-being, 
derived from his 1844 manuscripts (titled ‘De l’homme-corps à l’homme-espèce’, 
sometimes rendered with ‘être générique’). The word ‘species’ in the English ver-
sion of this term suggests that it is a reference to biological nomenclature of types 
of life forms, which is not inaccurate, but in the original German it also denotes a 
general expression of a type or kind,  Gattungswesen (see  Fromm 1972 ). 
 Accordingly, Marx describes how labour is the means whereby man survives as 
an animal species and labour is the object of his life’s activity. Not only is labour 
about satisfying the need to sustain existence, but it is also integral to the produc-
tive life of a conscious being (see  Fromm 1972 ). Hannah Arendt explains the con-
cept in her own language, referring to the ‘devouring characteristics of biological 
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life’ and describing labour and its products as ‘incorporated’, consumed, and anni-
hilated by the body’s life process (Arendt [1958]  1997 , 101–103). Ultimately, it 
is the absorption of individual lives into the life process of mankind that occurs 
through the ‘liberation of the sheer natural abundance of the biological process’ 
(ibid., 255). Foucault, in turn, introduced the terms ‘biopolitics’ and ‘biopower’ 
as part of an explanation addressing how ‘man-as-species’ becomes the object of 
increasingly complex systems of coordination of and intervention in general bio-
logical processes, ‘covering the whole surface that lies between the organic and 
the biological, between body and population’ ( Foucault 2003 , 253). 
 Foucault explains in detail the relation between the organic/body and biology/
population as two sequential ‘seizures of power’ (ibid., 243). The first refers to 
the emergence of mechanisms, techniques, and technologies of power over the 
body ‘in an individualizing mode’ and as a ‘whole field of visibility’. The sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed gradual introduction of institutions 
such as schools, hospital wards, and workshops. Their introduction to the social 
fabric of public life imposed a system of subjection and gradual objectification 
of the individual bodies through surveillance, exercises, inspections, bookkeep-
ing, reporting, and so on. The second seizure of power is not addressed to bod-
ies but exercised over the life of the population. Rather than efforts to rule over 
a multiplicity of men, by controlling individual bodies, the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries saw the emergence of technologies of power directed at 
overall processes, such as birth rates, reproduction, fertility, longevity, sanity, and 
environmental conditions causing illness or malnourishment. Foucault called it ‘a 
biopolitics of the human race’ (ibid., 243–245). 
 Identifying these two seizures of power should not be interpreted to suggest 
that there is a breach between them, in the sense that one replaces the other or 
that either of them replaces the means by which power is exercised through a 
juridical system derived from monarchical sovereignty. Doing so is at the core 
of a common misunderstanding of the biopolitical, a viewpoint leading to claims 
that ‘disciplinary institutions have swarmed and finally taken over everything’ 
(ibid., 253). Rather, biopower came to exist alongside the power of the sovereign 
to decide who dies and who lives; ‘it, in contrast, consists in making live and let-
ting die’ (ibid., 247). Sovereign right ‘came to be complemented by a new right 
which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, permeate it’ (ibid., 
241–242). It implies a ‘new right’ that is not homogeneous; the emergence of a 
new technology of power does not replace its predecessors, ‘but it does dovetail 
into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infil-
trating it, embedding itself’ (ibid.). 
 This insight is significant for our book and our claims made in the next chap-
ters, particularly in that we are returning to the problem of sovereignty,  the power 
to take life , as a theoretical horizon. Such an understanding of power may seem at 
odds with today’s fully globalised world and with its criss-crossing circuits that 
allow easy travel of people, finance, media, lifestyle, and ideas across borders 
(flows facilitated by innovation in technologies, digital, and beyond). However, 
we maintain that examination of the problem of sovereignty is precisely one of 
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the blind spots in today’s discussion of new biotechnologies and bioeconomies 
operating across local, regional, and global levels. 
 Foucault insists in his lectures that the entire juridical edifice derived from 
the theory of right, the early-modern political doctrine of natural philosophy, is 
a problem, because it retains its hold over life even today when it is increasingly 
confronted by a heterogeneity of technologies of power. On one hand, it is a prob-
lem to be avoided, in the sense that sovereignty is a ‘theory we have to get away 
from if we want to analyze power’ and as ‘the great trap we are in danger of fall-
ing into when we try to analyze power’ (ibid., 34). On the other hand, the problem 
is that ‘logically the emergence of technologies of power should have led to its 
‘complete disappearance’ (ibid., 58). Yet it did not, and even in the completely 
globalised world of today, sovereignty persists as an organising principle, prompt-
ing the methodological question of how to examine the relationship between sov-
ereignty and ‘nonsovereign power’ when the latter is ‘impossible to describe or 
justify in terms of the theory of sovereignty’ (ibid., 36). 
 Accordingly, this chapter establishes an understanding of the biopolitical that 
keeps the problem of sovereignty as its theoretical horizon and grounds the ques-
tion of power. This is a methodological precaution leading to an analysis of the 
biopolitical that does not exaggerate what is new about the technologies of power 
in the context of life sciences surrounded by and constituted through futuristic 
affirmations and critiques. It is to this end that we start by describing the problem 
of sovereignty, or, rather, why sovereignty is a problem for our biopolitical pres-
ent. This is also why we will first discuss Foucault as an ‘anti-Hobbesian’, which 
requires us to bring together his (later) texts on sovereignty with the (earlier) texts 
on the symmetry of life, language, and labour – the three dimensions to the under-
pinnings of the modern épisteme that, we will show, are being reconfigured in the 
emergence of new biosciences. 
 The problem of sovereignty 
 Anyone who has a passing familiarity with Thomas Hobbes’s theory of sover-
eignty will most likely have encountered the cover of  Leviathan , showing a king 
whose body is made from countless figures against the backdrop of a city. The 
king wears a crown and holds a sword and sceptre, which illustrate the earthly 
and divine right to rule. The message is clear: only through monarchical power 
can the ‘body politic’ be unified, with the ‘sovereign individuality’ wherein royal 
power is the living embodiment (‘I the state’). It is in this sense that also Foucault 
invokes Hobbes. His concern is not ‘what the sovereign looks like from on high’ 
but about the bodies that are constituted as subjects by ‘power-effects’. The entire 
point, he explains, is ‘to do precisely the opposite of what Hobbes was trying to 
do in Leviathan’ ( Foucault 2003 , 28). 
 What does this mean, doing the opposite of  Leviathan ’s work? Aside from 
extensive analysis of that monograph in Foucault’s lectures, there are various 
times that Hobbes is mentioned in his discussion of technologies of power. For 
instance, Foucault considers his studies of madness and punishment, both of 
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which he uses as exemplars of the transgression of ‘right’ through power-effects, 
superimposed on the exercise of power to guarantee the cohesion of the social 
body (ibid., 33–37). Sometimes Hobbes is not mentioned explicitly but is the 
obvious reference point – for instance, in discussion of nuclear technology and 
the paradox of a sovereign who holds the right to kill and who, with excesses of 
sovereign power, could turn into ‘the power to kill life itself’ (ibid., 286–287). 
Hobbes features elsewhere too, notably in Foucault’s lectures on the birth of bio-
politics, wherein he discusses neoliberalism. Here his theory of the state is con-
trasted against the view that state power is maximised by creating freedom for 
the economy and against advocating for a state that continuously turns to the 
economy in the hope that ‘its freedom can have a state-creating function’ ( Fou-
cault 2008 , 91–95, 312–313). 
 While there are many more examples, these do not suffice for describing Fou-
cault as an anti-Hobbesian. After all, other philosophers are discussed frequently, 
and it is primarily in the lectures that there are constant and explicit references 
to Hobbes. That includes  The Order of Things , which was written more than a 
decade earlier. In it, Hobbes is mentioned only once, in a discussion of economics, 
to point out Hobbes’s view that it is the sovereign who authorises the circulation 
of money, giving it currency and animating its exchange ( Foucault 2002 , 195). 
Twice it is stated that law comes in many languages that ‘by covenant or vio-
lence were imposed upon the collectivity’ (ibid., 91). Entirely absent is the third 
domain, ‘biology’ (or, rather, ‘natural history’), which would be suitable in light 
of the fact that he traces the origins of natural history to the era in which  Leviathan 
began to circulate. 
 Yet this absence is not at all decisive. Most significant is how  The Order of 
Things is set up; it is there that we see why later on Foucault turns to Hobbes so 
frequently. From the beginning, ‘the problem of sovereignty’ and, therefore, by 
extension, also biopolitics was at the core of his concerns. Taking the early and 
the later work on these topics together is what provides us with a point of view 
not previously explored. 
 The classical space of representation 
 The introduction of  The Order of Things discusses  Las Meninas , the famous 
painting by Velázquez (ibid., 16–18), which was practically introduced to us in 
the same year as  Leviathan (1656–57). 
 The painting is typically seen as depicting the household of the royal family of 
Spain. Foucault calls it the ‘manifest essence’ of classical representation because 
the work ‘undertakes to represent itself in all its elements’ (ibid., 16–18). The 
canvas (shown in  Figure 2.1 ) presents a little girl in a white dress in the middle, 
surrounded by several other figures. She is not, however, the main subject of the 
painting – because of the reflection in a mirror of two faint images. This mirror 
reflects the Spanish monarchs and is surrounded by a self-portrait of the painter 
at work on a canvas, others in the royal household observing the monarchs, and 
an incidental observer looking through a door in the background. Crucially, this 
mirror is behind the figures depicted and does not reflect those who are directly 
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in front of it, as seen in the painting. Instead, the mirror shows the Spanish mon-
archs as a reflection that cuts straight through the rest of the representation on the 
canvas. Furthermore, any observers of the painting are likely to be in the place 
where the monarchs seem to be standing. Foucault explains that the ‘entire picture 
is looking out at a scene of which it is itself a scene’ (ibid., 16–18). 
 The mirror is there to ensure that ‘three points of view come together’ – the 
gaze of observers of the painting, that of the painter as he was painting this scene, 
and that of the Spanish sovereigns who are reflected in the mirror (ibid.). Taken 
together, these points of view form 
 a point exterior to the picture, an ideal point in relation to what is represented, 
but a perfectly real one too, since it is also the starting point that makes the 
representation possible. Within that reality itself, it cannot be invisible. 
 (ibid., 16–18) 
Figure 2.1  Las Meninas or ‘The Maids of Honour’, painted between 1656 and 1657 by 
Diego Velázquez
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 It is at this point that we can begin to rethink Foucault’s perspective on Hobbes’s 
power over life and how it is related to biopolitics. On one hand, biopolitics can 
be presented against the backdrop of the problem of sovereignty, which is to say 
that the edifice of right, once embodied by monarchs, remains at work in power’s 
hold over life. On the other hand, it is in these passages wherein he explains the 
classical space of representation that the distinction from the classical conceptions 
of rights and sovereignty is most pronounced. The latter suggests that the point 
is not only that the mirror draws sovereign power into representation, showing 
a space of representation that would be impossible without the presence of the 
Spanish monarchs. That would simply imply an analogy between the court and a 
civilised society as imagined by Hobbes: a representation of the living embodi-
ment of sovereignty. The crucial difference lies in the ideal point he mentions, a 
counterpoint that shows an ‘essential void: the necessary disappearance of that 
which is its foundation’ (ibid., 16–18). 
 Let us consider these terms in the context of the Hobbesian space, particularly 
his famous description of the human condition. Still today, Hobbes is ascribed 
the conventional political anthropology wherein man in nature is violent. In his 
terms, man’s life in nature is characterised by ‘continual fear, and danger of vio-
lent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes 
[1657]  1985 , Chapter XIII). What this famous phrase illustrates is how Hobbes 
needed to invoke what surrounds the sovereign presence – for example, he pres-
ents life in nature as an escape from the misery of the human condition. It is on 
this condition, this foundation, that Hobbes can argue that man has decisively 
transferred his natural rights to the sovereign and concluded a social contract 
wherein sovereign power is and should be unlimited. 
 Many other natural philosophers, before and after Hobbes, sought to re-establish 
authority through such a state-of-nature theory. There are few who did not. 
Althusser, for example, mentions as the only exceptions the earlier example of 
Vico and later Montesquieu’s histories (Althusser [1959]  1970 , 25). Also Foucault 
says as much, placing Hobbes’s theory of the state at the forefront in ‘opening 
up of a domain of non-juridical social relations’ and referring to Rousseau and 
Montesquieu as examples speaking to how history gradually became no longer 
juridical in its development, turning instead to the origin of civil society in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What follows the establishment of sover-
eignty, as derived from a state-of-nature theory, is a history dealing with the rela-
tions between civil society as a given category and the authority of the state to 
the extent of entering into a ‘completely different system of political thought’ 
(Foucault 2004, 308). 
 This secondary history included a dismissal of state-of-nature theories, some-
thing that continues with more recent liberal theorists of the social contract, who 
denounce said theories as ahistorical methods and teleological foundations that 
are unnecessary (see  Kymlicka 2002 , 60; Rawls [1971]  1999 ). For us, however, 
these natural foundations are not merely a static and defunct juridical device but 
exemplary of the origin myth at the core of enlightenment philosophy that aids 
in understanding the classical space of representation. Not only does monarchical 
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power sit at the centre of the judicial system of this era, but the exercise of power 
depends on ability to distinguish between order and disorder. The latter refers to 
man’s rights in nature, anchoring, and setting in motion a juridical order that is a 
precondition for civility, as shown in the painting and as a Leviathan by Hobbes. 
The mirror is surrounded by the civility of the Spanish court as a reflection of the 
Spanish sovereigns, and, similarly, natural rights give rise to a social space that 
emerges out of ‘one massive historical fact’, which is the juridico-political theory 
of sovereignty ( Foucault 2003 , 34). 
 What, then, does it mean that Foucault sought to study power outside of the 
model of the Leviathan? The answer is visible in  The Order of Things , where 
he approaches the problem of sovereignty contrapuntally, barely mentioning it 
while prioritising a painting that symbolises the transformation of how power is 
exercised and that relocates power to the space of representation that matches the 
sovereign’s right over life and death. Yet what the painting pushes out of such 
a space of representation is the Hobbesian disorder. When it restores ‘visibility 
to that which resides outside all view’ (the sovereigns reflected in the mirror), 
this leaves undetermined the instability of its foundations, thereby establishing an 
essential void ( Foucault 2002 , 8). 
 Perhaps this is exactly as it should be within the context of ‘the order of things’; 
we should keep in mind that the painting is shown as exemplary for the classical 
space of representation, and it is telling that we see the sovereigns who reside 
outside it. Yet we can now restore the state of nature to the space of representation, 
filling in for us the essential void that is needed to make representation possible. 
Today too, conventional theories of sovereignty are defined in terms of ‘order’, 
which is to say that ‘disorder’ continues to function as its foundation. Our aim, 
however, is not to describe disorder in terms of technology; attempting quite the 
opposite, we seek to take position against an overly historically naive drive to 
erase or normalise how the ‘sovereign right’ overflows and is saturated by con-
temporary technologies of power. The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to 
explaining how we will do this. 
 The modern space of representation 
 What does such a position imply for our reflection on the current state of biotech-
nology, new bio-objects, (bio)economy, and biopolitics? 
 Technoscientific progress has allowed for the proliferation of new engineered 
biological beings, which can be described as experimental and open to new man-
ners of appropriation, the capturing of economic value, and the like. However, 
whether globally, regionally, or locally, there are no uniform and clearly set rules, 
norms, or legislation by which newly engineered life forms and forms of life 
should, or even could, be brought under the power of the sovereign. Yet most of 
these novel objects are inevitably being made into subjects of the legislative pow-
ers of a sovereign state – that is, by current and emerging legislatures and political 
supporting institutions. Hence, the question is not simply one of order or disorder; 
it is one that requires understanding the ‘void’ described earlier, as it continues 
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to be operational every time sovereignty is at stake, whether in the functioning 
of national governments (see  Chapter 4 ), in relation to questions of global gov-
ernance and global bio-economics (addressed in  Chapters 5 and  7 ), or in rapidly 
changing biosciences (see  Chapters 3 and  6 ). 
 Also today, it is the frame of the picture that holds conventional sovereignty 
together, with an essential void needed for enabling affirmation of specific ways 
of exercising power in their relation to the body politic. Examining the implica-
tions of extending the perspective to this subject matter entails a need to return to 
the theoretical and normative arguments in Foucault’s lectures, which revolved 
around the need to ‘bypass or get around’ the problem of sovereignty ( Foucault 
2003 , 27). This is directly applicable to how the following chapters address 
the constant work involved in recreating this ‘outside’ for the new species of 
biopolitics. 
 This chapter concludes with observations on how this outside can be perceived 
as a counterpoint, a vantage point from which to analyse contemporary technolo-
gies of power, but first some methodological considerations are in order. The aim 
is to take the step from examining the past (as Foucault did) to today’s sovereign 
rights being permeated, saturated, and made possible by the embedding of new 
technologies of power. To that end, it is insufficient to understand merely that 
sovereignty is key to understanding today’s predicament or to argue that species 
of biopower (and bioeconomies enabled by them) exist alongside conventional 
sovereignty. After all, it is the very novelty of life that is the speciality of new 
biotechnologies and bioeconomies, and we want to examine  how it brings forward 
(into visibility) what is otherwise on the  outside of representation. 
 Firstly, Hobbes’s naturalism is an exception to the mechanisms via which the 
juridical formula that combined a state of nature with a social contract has lost 
much of its traction. The state-of-nature theories were immensely influential his-
torically yet became optional or superfluous in liberal theories once the rule of 
law could be seen in terms of its own history (ever since Montesquieu). Hobbes’s 
work is exceptional in that there has been no decline in the significance of his 
theory of sovereignty. Rather than forming the centrepiece of an argument about 
the monarchy as the living embodiment of ‘civilized society’, as opposed to a 
disorderly life in nature, Hobbes is inescapable today when one seeks to examine 
how power’s hold over life constantly generates an ‘outside’ and an ‘other’ as a 
precondition for re-establishing sovereignty and the rights that are derived from it. 
 In this sense, the ‘essential void’ of the classical space of representation is with 
us now in many fields in which disorder is prioritised as a means to consolidate 
sovereign power, most obviously with issues of war, terrorism, crime, and so on. 
We could put it in the terms of  The Order of Things thus: also today, the reflection 
in the mirror establishes how power is exercised, not only as a representation of 
sovereignty but by making visible the ideal point, the counterpoint, that was vis-
ible within the reality of the painting and that made the space possible. However, 
the conclusion as to the order of things could be interpreted as stating that Foucault 
argues that this position vanished at the end of the classical period. He writes that 
the ‘symbolically sovereign’ replaced royal power. Instead of actual monarchs, it 
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is the observers of the painting who find themselves in the place of the sovereigns. 
However, they have become the ‘enslaved sovereign’ and an ‘observed spectator’ 
who occupies ‘the place belonging to the king as was announced in advance by 
Las Meninas’ ( Foucault 2002 , 340–351 see Chapter 2.3.1). 
 In precise terms, man: 
 appears in the place belonging to the king, which was assigned to him in 
advance by Las Meninas [. . .] and as though by stealth, all the figures [. . .] 
(the model, the painter, the king, the spectator) suddenly stopped their 
imperceptible dance, immobilized into one substantial figure, and demanded 
that the entire space of the representation should at last be related to one 
corporeal gaze. 
 (ibid., 340) 
 This extract is from the conclusion of the book, which reinterprets the introduc-
tion, wherein  Las Meninas had been described as a representation of sovereignty 
in a classical space of representation. By the end of the book, following his 
detailed analysis of the history of science, he refers to ‘one corporeal gaze’ as 
having become characteristic of a modern space of representation. This gaze had 
become firmly established once natural history became biology, language became 
linguistics, and wealth became economics. What is corporeal about it is that these, 
as technologies of power, are established through practises and discourses, perme-
ating the social fabric and the body politic. 
 The first methodological precaution 
 A first methodological caution is that it would be a misinterpretation to reduce 
the scope of his book to an origin story: how all of the fields (biology, linguistics, 
economics) ‘freed themselves from the pre-histories’, leading to new concepts 
and methods that had been ignored for too long and that together shaped a purely 
scientific revolution (ibid., 274–275). Each field’s formation is meticulously 
documented but as an element of parallel and mutually constitutive events that 
resulted in the modern space of representation and the corporeal gaze described 
earlier. For example, linguistics did not come into existence because of the way in 
which the grammatical system of Sanskrit was discovered, biology did not appear 
as a result of how organs were documented anatomically, and economics did not 
get it right once barter was subsumed by the economic role of capital. Rather, 
each of these new sciences had distinct methods and techniques that brought to 
visibility new objects that could sustain the flawless unity of knowledge. And its 
consequences were profound when considered in terms of what Foucault called 
the problem of sovereignty in later writings, as it implies that what had changed 
was knowledge itself. 
 Foucault is empirical in his research yet always ensures that his perspective 
does not depend on isolated events, individual facts, their interpretation, or any 
single field of science. For example, he discusses the re-categorisation of gills 
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and lungs. It was well known in the Classical Age that both have as their function 
the respiration of species. Hence, there was nothing new about those functions 
being studied. However, the function of respiration did not govern, complement, 
or order the classical space of nature. Instead, Foucault emphasises, ‘things will 
be represented only from the depths of this density’, which in the instance of 
respiration refers to its function and how characteristics of very different species 
come to be seen as functional systems that exist one among many, each governed 
by others and seeking to govern life and nature (ibid., 274). He then refers to 
Cuvier’s significance for the transition from natural history to the establishment 
of the scientific field of biology (in the last decades of the eighteenth century). 
He shows how the relationship between gills and lungs is transformed into one of 
many examples showing how Cuvier ‘subjects the arrangement of the organ to the 
sovereignty of function’ (ibid., 287). 
 Such examples demonstrate the transition to what is ‘modern’ about the space 
of representation of the nineteenth century. The development of our understand-
ing of organisms had taken place within the confines of a ‘discreetly preordained 
table of possible variations’. Breaking out of these given possibilities required that 
‘life’ as a category become a ‘space crossed by lines which sometimes diverge and 
sometimes intersect’ (ibid., 295). The same applies to the other two fields. Wealth 
was no longer being conceived of as a system of equivalences, neatly listed in 
tables documenting its accumulation over time. Instead, ‘production’ and ‘labour’ 
establish constant measurement aligning the values of things, bringing ‘wealth’ 
into being, Foucault explains similarly that ‘the sphere of grammar took place 
in accordance with the same model’, replacing the form and sound of words in 
discourse with grammatical function and modifications that take place over the 
course of time (ibid., 305). 
 Taking these fields together is what shows the discovery of ‘the general prin-
ciple of an order’, which is ‘the constitution of a new space of identities and dif-
ferences’ (ibid., 296; see also 323). 
 Hence, there is no myth of origins or any other type of break with what came 
before. That applies directly to this book, as it shows how clearly we cannot shed 
the problem of sovereignty, make a clean break and move in a straight line to 
contemporary questions of life and technology, affirming a future that has freed 
itself from the past. If the corporeal gaze of the nineteenth century were ‘it’ – the 
end-point for the problem of sovereignty – we would have to concur with the mis-
conception of Foucault’s work as being part of a move further and further away 
from social wholes in a shift more and more toward the individual dissolved in 
an ineluctably advancing ‘micro-politics of power’ (see Said 1993, 336). We dis-
agree with these diagnoses, based as they are on a misunderstanding or misread-
ing of the concepts, isolating the lectures. His reading of the biopolitical should 
be seen in parallel to his earlier work, specifically how he describes the transition 
to the ‘modern space of representation’ of the nineteenth century as having come 
to pass. The problem of sovereignty is exactly that – a problem – not in the sense 
of a meticulously charted doctrine that regulates a social space but as procedures 
of law that are overwhelmed, crowded out, and prone to disorder in their relation 
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to the biopolitics of the heterogeneity of the new mechanisms and technologies 
of power and life. 
 The second methodological precaution 
 The second methodological precaution pertains to how our reading of the 
Hobbesian space is aligned with critical theory. For example, Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno appeal to, in  Dialectic of Enlightenment , a comprehensive 
transformation of modern thought that is taking on the appearance of a ‘nature 
that becomes visible in its alienation’ as a second nature calling itself, as in pre-
modern times ( Horkheimer and Adorno 2002 [1944];  Horkheimer 2003 ). 1 
 While this statement refers directly to the doctrine of natural philosophy as a 
whole, when considering its implications for technology we concur with Andrew 
Feenberg that it would be a misunderstanding to turn Frankfurt School critical 
theory into an attempt to revive a philosophy of nature in contrast to technol-
ogy. Rather than suggest a road ‘straight back to a teleological nature philosophy’ 
( Feenberg 1999 , 164), the point with this contrast is to provide an intellectual his-
tory for our self-understanding as subjects of technical action. 
 It is in this sense that Herbert Marcuse’s notion of one-dimensional man is about 
technology as materialised ideology, imposing a system of domination that subor-
dinates what human beings are and might be. What is one-dimensional is how ‘the 
prevailing modes of control are now technological in a new sense [as] the very 
embodiment of reason for the benefit of all social groups and interests – to such 
an extent that all contradiction seems irrational and all counteraction impossible’ 
( Marcuse 1991 , 11). While this amounts to a claim that the social is being annexed 
by scientific rationality, it is important to be precise. As Feenberg explains, for 
Marcuse ‘the blending of the technical and the social is not extrinsic and acciden-
tal, but is rather defining for the nature of technology’ (ibid., 165). Feenberg states 
that ‘just as technology is neither purely natural nor purely social, so the nature to 
which it is applied also confounds such abstract distinctions. Both are simultane-
ously causal mechanisms and meaningful social objects’ (ibid., 165). 
 While such a position is compatible with our own, there is a noteworthy dif-
ference in regard of how power is exercised. In our view, the exercise of power, 
through sovereign rights and through technologies of power, is not solely about 
a right to invade, as it were, about how technology is ‘colonizing the procures of 
the law’ ( Foucault 2003 , 38–39). The Foucauldian perspective is characterised by 
transgressions that multiply in the meeting of the heterogeneous layers of con-
stant confrontation. The second caution is, then, that the ‘new space’ we seek to 
describe is one of multiple transgressions, each of which can be examined against 
the backdrop of how Foucault’s description of the sciences and the modern repre-
sentation at every point makes explicit ‘the necessary disappearance of that which 
is its foundation’ (ibid., 38–39). Such necessity not only characterises the modern 
space of representation but generates a dynamic that can be investigated. 
 When we demonstrate that there is a contemporary space tied to the problem 
of sovereignty, we seek to show that it remains premised on ‘a primitive and 
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inaccessible nucleus, origin, causality, and history’ that is buried ‘deep down in 
the dense archaeological layers of the sciences’ (ibid., 275). Hence, the ‘second 
nature’, as mentioned by Horkheimer and Adorno, incorporates what has been 
buried and returns to visibility within the context of life as a technological cre-
ation. On one hand, our analysis is conventional in how we will track this devel-
opment over the decoding, recoding, and re-materialisation of life, approached as 
epistemic steps of (Latourian) translations. Each chapter touches upon scientific 
representation and the power it has to seem to be, for the rest of society, ‘clear 
mirrors, fully magical mirrors, without once appealing to the transcendental or the 
magical’ ( Haraway 1997 , 23–27; see also  Shapin and Schaffer 1985 , 39). On the 
other hand, this type of mirror provides a foothold for examining the problem of 
sovereignty and Foucault’s framework for examining life, labour, and language in 
the nineteenth century. 
 Each subject treated in this book shows a different dynamic but thereby can 
be seen as a component, a step, and a precondition for pursuit of the overall 
aim, which is to examine what we referred to in  Chapter 1 as ‘metacodes’. As 
an element of methodology, this concept refers to the Foucauldian project in its 
aspiration to approach the biopolitical without reducing it to an otherwise bewil-
dering heterogeneity of discourses, techniques, circuits, and types of research and 
governance. 
 Conclusion 
 The conclusion points toward some of the theoretical implications of rethinking 
the nature of sovereignty and its relations to biopolitics. A presentation of these 
before the analysis in the remainder of the book must be abstract by its very nature 
but could have been made much more concrete via imagination of the various 
chapters in line with Picasso’s fifty-four reinterpretations of  Las Meninas . 
 Regrettably, this proved to be impossible or, rather, possible only on condi-
tion that we pay for the use of a copyright that either is dubious (because Picasso 
made reproduction of a work that is centuries old) or undermines the doctrine of 
‘fair use’ (or ‘fair dealings’ in Britain). Other authors have described this par-
ticular copyright claim as an example of how intellectual property is a socially 
constructed concept ( George 2012 ), and previous nationally based publications 
in books by publishing companies have acknowledged that making critical use of 
the painting implies that doing so falls under fair use (e.g.,  Deibel 2008 ). Here, 
the argument for payment revolves around printing for global distribution. While the 
only requirement in most jurisdictions is that the use should not undermine the abil-
ity to profit from a copyright, one can appeal to the strictest conceivable copyright 
claim in cases of global publication, apparently without even the necessity of a 
particular legal system being proved relevant. Rather than acknowledge such a 
copyright, we chose to leave out the picture, which can be readily found on the 
Internet. 2 
 The image that should have been visible is one of Picasso’s variations. 3 Like 
the others, it is a composition filled with what are almost Cubist figures, which 
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are nonetheless easily recognisable as the princess, the maids of honour, the inci-
dental bystander, and the reflection of the sovereigns from Velázquez’s original. 
In this version, a mirror, a dog, the door, and the painter (who is shown as a huge 
figure with a face that mirrors only himself) constitute the space of representation. 
Each of them is in the same place in the composition as in the original but with a 
crucial difference: the mirror is not superimposed. It resembles the original even 
though the reflection of sovereignty has become only a faint hint of power, and 
yet it is still able – by way of its Cubism – to draw the observer into the repre-
sentation. These interpretations by Picasso, unlike the ‘enslaved sovereign’ that 
Foucault concludes with, foreground that it is possible to incorporate the distance 
in between the work itself and the original. It is the representation of this ‘in 
between’ that is crucial; it can be imagined as analogous to the formation of the 
modern space that precedes it, transgressive in its relation to the myth of origin, 
multiplying a disappearing foundation integral to power’s hold over life. 
 The comparison gives an impression of how we are to approach the subjects 
we will discuss in the subsequent chapter. The painting shows, through a Cubist 
rendering of the original, how the problem of sovereignty can be re-articulated, 
or how it can sustain a relation to the classical space of representation. We began 
by pointing out that the contrast between biopolitics and conventional under-
standing of sovereignty is misunderstood when seen as a breach or in terms of 
epochal interpretation. A better interpretation, we hold, is to see the transition 
from the classical to a modern space of representation as visible and continuous 
transcending of the limits of rights and power that become invested in real and 
effective practises, circulating, and functioning by passing through individuals, 
constituting subjects and subjectivity ( Foucault 2003 , 28). It is this transcending 
or even transgressing that characterises the implementation of ‘right’ through the 
‘multiple relations of power [that] traverse, characterize, and constitute the social 
body’ (ibid., 48). 
 It is exactly to capture this transgression that we diverge from the Marx-Foucault 
synthesis that is characteristic of much of the critical literature on the life sciences 
and related bioeconomies. What remains the same is that we also study how tech-
nologies of power that regulate the population are coupled with the ‘dynamics of 
labour and commodification that characterize the making and marketing of such 
entities as industrial and pharmaceutical bioproducts’ (Helmreich 2008, 464; see 
also Chapter 8). This combination of technology and political economy fits per-
fectly within our framework, and as a critique it is based on Marx’s species-being 
as the theoretical representative of the moment when critique began actively seek-
ing to ‘frustrate any attempt to isolate a state of nature separate from society’ 
( Thacker 2005 , 38; see  Deibel 2009 ). Simultaneously, this is one of many of the 
discarded theories, belonging to the classical space of representation, that form 
the disappearing foundation that we need to understand methodologically. Each 
of these theories gives us its own distinct perspective on the essential void that 
characterises the interplay of technologies of power. Hence, one cannot separate 
political economy from the study of science and technology or prioritise one over 
the other. Rather, we seek in our approach to sustain symmetry – among life, 
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labour, and language as well as among different types of technologies of power, 
or between technology as a variable as opposed to economics, or the language of 
life as opposed to its biology. 
 To do so, however, requires a biopolitical horizon that is anchored in the prob-
lem of sovereignty. This is not self-evident, as it implies an archaic doctrine in 
discussion of technologies of power, which often adopt futuristic language. The 
move we seek to make in each chapter is captured already in the two paintings. 
On one hand, we have Hobbes’s foundation, with  Las Meninas questioning what 
is visible in the mirror via the non-visible disorder that surrounds it. What is left 
outside, consigned to the disordered space, is the non-conforming elements of 
modernity, anxiety, and monsters and cultural catastrophes that threaten social 
order, thereby giving sovereign authority its legitimate grounding. On the other 
hand, we see a Cubist rendering of the modern space of representation, a new 
space of multiplicity that remains closely tied to the classical space of representa-
tion. At the same time, its recognisable contours show us the new space of repre-
sentation that is already here and coming after it. 
 Contemporary equivalents of states of exception and non-conforming elements 
causing modernist anxiety are easy to find, as a global state of war populated 
by failed states and terrorism but equally in declaring war on drugs, disease, or 
hunger. Even appeals for food security and safety are likely to speak to various 
insecurities, appealing to the sovereign to act in response to the risks of genetic 
engineering or climate change or to sanction, secure, safeguard, and monetise the 
genetic wealth and resources in the sovereign’s territory (see Chapters 4, 5, and 7; 
see also Deibel 2013). Theoretically we draw on a similarly diverse repertoire. 
For example, Hobbes can easily be replaced as the basis of sovereign legitimacy 
by drawing on how Rousseau turned the state of nature into a constitutive fiction 
(see  Chapter 5 ) or anchoring to Grotius’s ideas of international law as applied to 
the natural world on the outside of civilised societies (see  Chapter 6 ). These and 
other political theories are readily compatible with the thoughts of Hobbes and of 
Foucault as an anti-Hobbesian, disturbing very little within the classical episte-
mological arrangement while allowing us to rethink the disappearing foundation 
of the classical space of representation as the ‘essential void’ that continues to 
characterise how power is exercised. 
 To conclude the chapter with a demonstration, we can take one of the most obvi-
ous candidates, Locke’s theory of labour. What is obvious is that Locke’s theory is 
directly relevant for questions of biotechnology and particularly in regard of how 
difficult it has become to identify property and ownership with man’s possession 
of his body and its strengths. It is with Locke’s theory that the body and its labour 
became ‘the quintessence of all property’ ( Arendt 1997 , 112–115), although 
this did not last for very long. Obviously, today there are constant disputes over 
whose labour led to a particular breakthrough invention and hence who should be 
awarded the patent and associated privileges (see for example the CRISPR-cas9 
genome editing technology patent debate between the Broad Institute in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, and the University of California over intellectual-property 
rights to the potent technology). Similarly, identification of an invention with an 
Rethinking the biopolitical 31
individual or even a group of individuals is hardly ever straightforward in the life 
sciences. In this sense, bio-economics can easily be seen as a case highlighting 
how arbitrary it has become to hold that labour is derived from how individuals 
are in possession of their body. No such body will be found when ownership is 
contemplated in relation to seeds, organs, genetic wealth, and the process of bio-
logical reproduction as informatic resources to be acted and interacted with (see 
 Hardt and Negri 2004 , 187). In sum, the situation we are faced with is a constel-
lation of complicated and precarious claims, rights, and demands that need to be 
established in relation to processes of gene expression and regulation and also 
sequences that can be cut, spliced, and transcribed. 
 Returning to the problem of sovereignty, however, we are not done upon hav-
ing denounced Locke’s labour law and the paradoxes of contemporary ownership. 
Man’s possession of the labour of his body is not only a result of Locke’s famous 
dictum about the ‘innate rights of life, health, liberty and possessions’ (Locke 
[1689]  1970 , §6). Rather, the disappearing foundation lies in this: in Locke’s state 
of nature, man is as insecure as with Hobbes’s formulation, but for a different 
reason. While he is living freely and is healthy, the fruits of his labour are unsafe. 
It is to protect his possessions that he leaves nature, and, hence, the social contract 
does not grant the sovereign the authority to take his property away. As he never 
gave up his natural right to property, the sovereign has the duty to safeguard own-
ership. What difference does such an understanding make, aside from introducing 
different types of transitions between nature and society? Each instance gives us 
a distinct type of transgression that is ‘symbolically sovereign’ and that can be 
restored to visibility. In our case, we can examine the many relationships between 
information and the biopolitical, as transgressions that converge in how life and 
nature undergo an ‘involution’ much as space did – from the expansive to the 
interior aspects of the natural world, from an extensive to an intensive project of 
exploration, which is ‘nowhere more evident than in the emergence of contempo-
rary biotechnology’ ( Parry 2004 , 49). 
 In other words, the technologies of power that are constitutive of man-as-body 
and as a living species are turning into sources of its body anxiety experienced in 
recognition that a dream of a self-sufficient autonomous, nearly immortal body 
loses much of its meaning when realised as an informatic body that is contin-
gent and unstable, in need of constant monitoring, programming, and engineering 
( Thacker 2003 , 89). While we decry the notion of there being a positive condition 
of a transhistorical belief in a human and modern subject that might be displaced 
at any time along with its environment (as a human and modern subject with 
a defined beginning and ending), we seek to enrich the analysis of biopolitics 
as comprising multiple political theories of sovereignty in the classical space of 
representation. 
 By doing so, continuing with the theme of the body and diverging elements 
of power in subsequent chapters, we seek to think across the many distinctive 
transgressions of informatic ways of thinking about life and nature, each of which 
is visibly saturated with paradoxical and critical terms, conditions, and myths of 
origin surrounding the problem of sovereignty. In summary, each of the chapters 
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engages directly with the empirical heterogeneity, yet, we claim, in doing so 
brings us to a shared condition – to a larger picture of the biopolitical that we can 
understand in terms of ‘metacodes of life’. 
 Notes 
 1 The wording is translated directly from the German version on which the citation is 
based (see the title page of the cited volume). To be precise, ‘ natur, die in ihrer Entfrem-
dung verhehmbar werd ’ literally refers to ‘nature, that in its alienation becomes visible’, 
not ‘nature made audible as estrangement’. 
 2 The observation that this book qualifies as ‘global commercial distribution’ was the only 
argument offered in response to our observation that ‘fair use/fair dealings’ allows for 
a reproduction in support of a critical discussion of the painting. No further arguments 
were provided by the agencies involved, nor was any further attempt made to explain 
why fair use is not applicable nor why a copyright on this particular work exists at all. 
Usually, critical use in books is allowed under the fair-use doctrine if that use does not 
undermine the profitability of the copyrighted work. Here the only argument seems to be 
that there might be jurisdictions somewhere in the world in which there is no such inter-
pretation of fair use. It is our (the authors’) problem to figure this out, not theirs: we were 
simply forwarded to a royalty collection agency (interpretation based on personal e-mail 
communication by Deibel with the copyright-holders and related collection agencies). 
These types of practises are clear instances of contemporary equivalent to the enclosure 
of the commons (see Chapter 4) and should not be accommodated. 
 3 For any of the works that we might have used, search for Meninas and Picasso. The 
one we would have used is the most obvious one, found here: https://en.0wikipedia.org/
index.php?q=aHR0cHM6Ly9lbi53aWtpcGVkaWEub3Jn3dpa2kvTGFzX01lbmluYXN
fKFBpY2Fzc28p (accessed on June 2017). 
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Skin 
 In the electric age we all wear all mankind as our skin. 
 – Marshall McLuhan,  Understanding Media (p. 47) 
 In the late 1960s, Marshall McLuhan proclaimed that in a near future – in a future 
that resembles to a terrible degree our global contemporary present – the nar-
cissist tendency of humankind to continuously seek the most perfect image of 
itself would drive the species toward existential discontent. According to McLu-
han, this narcissist appetite would drive a desire to seek a constant ‘upgrade of 
the self’, which, in turn, would lead to an anthropological narcosis manifested 
through a numbness of the primary senses. This numbness, then, would be a con-
sequence of the different technologies developed to extend our senses beyond 
what the body normally would be capable of doing, experiencing, and expressing. 
His underlying suggestion was that technologies create and operate within a space 
of the new media that is a reaction to a deep existential discomfort, experienced 
through the pains and sicknesses of the body – an anthropological experience of 
deep-running dissatisfaction. For him, diverse technologies developed to enhance 
our senses and the functions of the body would equate to technological prostheses 
and amputation of the primary bodily functions – and, more generally, our inten-
tions as embodied beings. 
 The flickering face on the water, as the story goes, was so captivating that all 
else in life seemed meaningless for Narcissus. A similar tendency of autoeroti-
cism can be witnessed in the bioscience research pursuing the ultimate truth about 
various species via their genetic makeup, in the technoscientific enterprises driv-
ing the development of the bodily and informatic capacities of our species body. 
And the face is not just reflected but also subjected, such that for the first time 
we become aware how we, as individuals and species, are equipped with a large 
number of technological  extensions of the body. At the same time, and beyond 
extensions, we also have developed externalised  intentions placing our identities 
outside our embodied being – our mind is being increasingly redistributed in its 
material and informatics senses ( Hutchins 1995 ), while our bodies are extended 
with numerous technologies of life. 
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 This dual recognition stems from the fact that biological bodies themselves are 
both a medium of coded functions that run inside cells, guided by instruction sets 
(in DNA), AND a source of numerous unknown bits of information to be decoded 
for new biotechnological pursuits 
 [b]y putting our physical bodies inside our extended nervous systems, 
by means of electric media, we set up a dynamic by which all previous 
technologies that are mere extensions of hands and feet and teeth and 
bodily heat-controls – all such extensions of our bodies, including cities – 
will be translated into information systems. Electromagnetic technology 
requires utter human docility and quiescence of meditation such as befits 
an organism that now wears its brain outside its skull and its nerves out-
side its hide. 
 ( McLuhan 1995 , 57) 2 
 The anthropocentric figure of Narcissus, and  Homo sapiens as its own species 
body, thus became quiet reflections of an extended organism, an extended sense 
of being in which  we all wear humankind as our skin . Skin – as the outer physi-
cal boundary of our bodies and embodied individuality – still marks the difference 
between individuals. New technologies are generative in relation to the media 
they are embedded in, but this generative vitality is an outcome of our embodied 
human experience that has a profound capacity to reach out, extend, and redis-
tribute our sensing capacities through information systems, even though the body 
itself might be physically delimited by the skin ( Bateson 1972 ). At the same time, 
 skin serves as the boundary site for inscribing in our bodies new attributes, capac-
ities, and dreams of the whole of mankind, mediated through global information 
networks. Skin works as the physical human–world interface between the indi-
vidual and mankind, body and information, function and intention, now newly 
articulated in relation to an ‘extended nervous system’ at global scale, as McLu-
han saw it – the Internet. 
 McLuhan’s proposition as to how media and their constant transformation 
beyond known formats and circuits – text to film to electric lighting – concentrated 
on rethinking what we should consider to be ‘information’ and how bodies will be 
capable of carrying, communicating, or transmitting any of that. With the biomo-
lecular revolution ( Kay 2000 ), the cybernetic movement of ‘in-formation’ during 
the important decades of the mid-twentieth century ( Hayles 1999 ), and the idea 
that DNA is information contained in the medium of bodies – code of life to be 
not only decoded but also encoded and now recoded ( Thacker 2010 ) – our bod-
ies have become transformed into several distinct media formats that together 
Eugene Thacker calls ‘biomedia’. For him, 
 biomedia is a constant, consistent, and methodical inquiry into the technical-
philosophical question of ‘what a body can do’ [. . .] particular mediations 
of the body, optimizations of the biological in which ‘technology’ appears 
to disappear altogether [. . .]. The apparent paradox of biomedia is that  it 
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proceeds via a dual investment in biological materiality, as well as the infor-
matic capacity to enhance biological materiality .  
 (ibid., 52–53; italics in original) 
 The enhancement of biological materiality is, on one hand, driven by primary 
and practical goals of  healing that are rooted deeply in the core of the  anthropos 
itself. This also renders new information about the body valuable, both as direct 
interventions with the body and indirectly in the practises by which the body can 
be healed, re-balanced, or enhanced. At the same time, the question of the ‘body’ 
and what it can do becomes newly articulated and pertinent to a vast array of 
industries, institutions related to the generation, processing, and application of 
the new biomedia. Here, the question is at once pragmatic and philosophical, and 
value becomes recast in terms of economic and experiment-oriented idioms. 
 While the informatic paradigm of life suggests that ‘life itself’ and natural 
beings are all born out of evolution, it suggests also that evolution and diversity of 
life at their core are fundamentally an error, 3 a copying error that generates indi-
viduals through variation brought into the code of life. But when ‘life’ is recast as 
information evolving through error and mutations in the code, also ideas related to 
biomedical interventions with the body – for example, healing and enhancement – 
are re-articulated in terms of how to go about these interventions. Georges Can-
guilhem, a French historian of science and philosopher, pondered this question in 
the 1960s era and asked: 
 How is evolution to be explained in terms of genetics? The answer, of course, 
involves the mechanism of mutations. One objection that has often been 
raised against this theory is that many mutations are subpathological, and a 
fair number lethal. So the mutant is less viable than the original organism. To 
be sure, many mutations are ‘monstrous’ – but from the standpoint of life as a 
whole, what does ‘monstrous’ mean? Many of today’s life forms are nothing 
other than ‘normalized monsters’, to borrow an expression from the French 
biologist Louis Roule. 
 ( Canguilhem 1994 , 318) 
 Understanding living beings as producers, transmitters, and receptors of vital 
information borne by a copying error – and resulting in greater diversity of func-
tions and applications, some lethal and some just monstrous – allows one to focus 
on the question driving current biomedical practises that go beyond the idea of 
expansion of the senses and proliferation of biomedia. These drivers manifest 
themselves today in the global efforts centred on reading, writing, and optimis-
ing ‘the code’ (for example, embodied today as versions of optimised functions 
manifested through novel synthetic life forms; see  Chapter 6 ). The idea of read-
ing, writing, and optimising is related to that of the ‘normal’ and ‘baseline’ per-
formance in relation to the errors in the code at the individual and species-body 
level – and to the question of the monstrous as Canguilhem phrases it. But this 
new business of optimisation requires a way to speak about living beings through 
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new forms of biomedia, to operationalise and transmit information in the right 
bundles to enable biotechnologically assisted intervention, along with a way to 
pool this information together so that we can ‘wear all mankind as our skin’. Let 
us explain. 
 Tongue 
 Biology, as an early-nineteenth-century epistemological configuration, has been 
obsessed with objects of various sorts throughout its history. Examples are fleshly 
objects, physiological structures, and evolutionary forces. From the middle of the 
twentieth century, with the discovery of DNA and with the development of cyber-
netic approaches, biosciences have increasingly turned to informatics and patterns 
as the sources of discovery. And in a shift that began in the early 2000s, the life 
sciences have become dependent on computation power to crunch large datasets 
and thereby identify and characterise phenomena related to underlying biologi-
cal mechanisms, pathways, and systems. As biologists ‘think bigger’ than ever 
before, their work’s appetite for data grows ever more voracious ( Hadley 2004 ). It 
demands gathering and administration of large collections of samples and related 
data; however, this is not an endeavour for individual biologists, single projects, 
or smaller research institutions, nor can it be, on account of the high costs (in time, 
technological resources, and funding) involved. Biology in itself has become ‘big 
science’ ( Vermeulen et al. 2013 ), with institutional collaboration and geographi-
cally distributed forms of endeavour. 
 Accordingly, biomedical researchers have themselves started to envision how 
science of biology is dependent on a ‘science of biobanking’, a science that is 
‘meta’ to the actual bioscience itself, one that acts as an enabler for the bioscien-
tific discovery through biobanks and contained therein. And this is through not 
only  a biobank but  all biobanks and their data on the human condition on global 
scale. Biobanks hold biomedia – organs, tissues, samples of all kinds, data, and 
diagnostics (increasingly in digital format) – and by doing so, they take part in 
shaping the global vision of informatic  anthropos and its condition of being, the 
metascience of biomedia. 
 For example, in an article titled ‘Toward a Roadmap in Global Biobanking for 
Health’, published in 2012, 25 well-known biomedical researchers from across 
the EU described why a metascience is needed ( Harris et al. 2012 , 1110): 
 The science of biobanking itself is as important to develop and fund as the 
science that uses biobanks. Because the science of biobanking is very closely 
linked to the development of an enabling infrastructure, it requires scientists 
to work more closely with each other and with funders than has historically 
been the norm in biomedical science. In this, biobanking resembles more 
the situation typical for large-scale physics, which is characterized by close 
collaborative, pre-competitive relationships among workers in the field to 
construct, develop, and maintain the necessary research infrastructures while 
embracing healthy competition in the undertaking of both hypothesis-based 
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and free research using these infrastructures. Developing this kind of culture 
and spirit will be essential for the success of large, cross-institutional bio-
banking efforts. 
 The key idea is to generate a large-scale infrastructure of biomedical samples that 
are made readily accessible so that biomedical research can develop further. Thus, 
the vision of large-scale bioresearch infrastructures, of connected biobanks, also 
introduces a vision of a new social and institutional organisation, or, as the quote 
puts it, a new culture and spirit of research. Biobanks have become the source and 
site of many a biomedical datum, demanding that individual scientists, funders, 
and institutions join efforts and work closely together, though in a state of ‘healthy 
competition’ – a research paradigm that is contextualised in liberal, individualis-
tic, and capitalist culture. This new culture and spirit are found at the heart of the 
new science enabling bioscience: the science of biobanks, or the ‘metascience’ of 
biomedical discovery. 
 This science of bioscience, complete with the enabling biobank infrastructure 
operating under a new culture and spirit, is itself dependent on one very important 
feature: interoperability. To stress this point, the twenty-five researchers developed 
a ten-item list of considerations underpinning a roadmap for global biobanking. 
The first and most important of these was a call to ‘foster biobank interoperability 
through the development and maintenance of enabling technologies, procedures, 
networks, and compatible ethico-legal frameworks’ ( Harris et al. 2012 , 1110). 
Interoperability is key, because within the ‘big science’ paradigm, collaboration 
requires mutually agreed policies, standard operating procedures for sample col-
lection, and common standards for information’s representation and sharing. In 
other words, collaboration requires a common language and set of core practises, 
with shared epistemic and ontological commitments underpinning the common 
research infrastructures now being developed around the globe.  In other words, a 
mother tongue for biological samples across studies, collections, and collabora-
tion boundaries is needed . The urgent need for a native common language seems 
at the outset to be a minor feature in the midst of larger efforts involving ‘real 
science’, informatic-system development as a reflection of organisational policy 
renewal. However, at a closer look, it becomes clear that this is the definition of 
a common language, a mother tongue for biobanks that enables all of the science 
of biobanks to evolve and makes large-scale biobank-based bioscience possible 
in the first place. 
 Life scientists and policy makers have been aware of this challenge for a long 
time. The European Science Foundation reflected on this problem in  2008 and 
wrote, in a report on population-wide biobanks, that 
 [g]ood, inter-operable Information Technology (IT) systems are required 
so that information contained in the different datasets can be adequately 
mined by integration or, at least, interfacing, and efficiently linked to rel-
evant information from other sources. The fact that many biobanks or bio-
banking networks use different IT platforms and different message formats 
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and terminologies represents a significant obstacle to communication with, 
within, and between biobanks. 
 ( European Science Foundation 2008 , 8) 
 A native language allowing biobanks to talk with each other at the technical level 
(for messaging formats, terminology, and databases) has been missing for a long 
time. Instead, we have many competing ways to represent biological samples 
and related data. Over the years, there have been attempts at various levels to 
bring together one standardised way to talk about vital matters. These efforts 
have ranged from regional and international organisations’ 4 promotion of prin-
ciples such as quality standards to science and infrastructure initiatives 5 offering 
large-scale networks of partnership for bioresource tools and databases: 6 tools 
and repositories for data. However, the efforts to standardise (or even to ‘harmon-
ise’ the ways of talking about biological samples, genetic databases, or any other 
form of data belonging to biobanks) have encountered severe challenges related 
to making things more interoperable. 
 When interviewed on the topic, a leading scientist working on some of the larg-
est coherent biobank datasets at a national health institute in the Nordic region 
described the challenge thus: 
 There are so many institutions, databases, practices around, and almost as 
many persons wishing to harmonise the biobanks and other repositories into 
a single effective way of working together that I don’t know what’s going 
to come out of it. I’ve been saying that somebody ought to  harmonise the 
harmonisers! 
 (Interview in December 2014) 
 To illustrate how language – and phenomena related to differences in languages 
between cultures, computers, and domains of the ‘bio’ – is inherently tied to the 
way in which large-scale biobank research infrastructures work, we will review 
the development of the standard BBMRI information model called Minimum 
Information about Biobank Data Sharing, or MIABIS ( Norlin et al. 2012 ). The 
model is intended to provide a standard for integrating biobanks across Europe 
into a common trans-Europe virtual network of biobanks. It is a working imple-
mentation of the proposed biobanks standard, the first attempt to provide an 
informational backbone for the large-scale biomedical infrastructure platform 
envisioned by European research policy. 
 MIABIS was developed to facilitate the Biobanking and Biomolecular Resources 
Research Infrastructure (BBMRI) envisioned as becoming the key scientific 
research infrastructure for European life sciences. The pan-European BBMRI 
vision emerged from the political recognition that keeping up with developments 
elsewhere, most notably in the United States, necessitates integrated European 
research. Development of a pan-European infrastructure is driven by the vision 
of bringing together geographically dispersed research communities and distinct 
life sciences disciplines (as in biology plus medicine) with the aid of a specific 
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branch of information science fundamentally informing radical transformation of 
the research practises: bio-informatics ( European Strategy Forum on Research 
Infrastructures 2006 , 23). 
 Large-scale infrastructures are notoriously difficult to build and to manage, 
and governing them is rife with challenges. Large-scale infrastructure aimed at 
translating political decisions and statutes into reality is even trickier to imple-
ment. Building large-scale infrastructure such as the BBMRI poses a number of 
challenges for bio-informaticians implementing work toward the political goal, 
most importantly in the building of a technical platform that could successfully 
integrate the disparate information models already in use. The integration must 
link sample collections and studies, deal with natural languages’ barriers and dif-
ferences in lexicons, and address legal provisions related to protection of privacy. 
 What the analysis that follows shows is that it is not science but ‘metalan-
guages’ that render it possible to standardise the language of life (samples, medi-
cal records, and other information) throughout the EU. Life is primarily known 
not through DNA, biological samples, or any other material corporeality but 
through a metalanguage that ties together the complexity of life forms and forms 
of life as known by biomedical sciences. The native tongue of the biosciences – 
the ‘metalanguage’ drawing large-scale biobanks and other biomedical platforms 
together – has a very particular bearing with regard to the original living bodies. 
The native tongue of any informatics platform directly informs the way biomedi-
cal bodies are shaped, made to perform, and known. 
 Body 
 This integration standard will make a great contribution to the discovery and 
exploitation of biobank resources and lead to a wider and more efficient use of 
valuable bioresources, thereby speeding up the research on human diseases. 
 –  Roxana Merino-Martinez et al. (2016 ) 
 Developing a native tongue for biobank harmonisation and standardisation depends 
on how this language correlates with the bodies it depends on. The question about 
the body – the species body, the sovereign or national body, and the body of the 
individual and of the institutions it inhabits – has been one of the vexing questions 
drawing together biology, the social sciences, economics, and various threads of 
psychology and philosophy. Population and its characteristics, the governance of 
multiplicities of bodies, the perception of the body, and its institutional inscrip-
tions (through productive qualities, gender, race, class, sexuality, or biomedi-
cal properties) have all been key concerns for anthropological enquiry since the 
beginning, although systematic treatments have been ‘sporadic throughout the 
history of the discipline’, as  Margaret Lock (1993 , 133) notes. 
 Bodies are the central object and problem for biomedical science and biobank-
ing efforts, mainly for the same reason that they have been for researchers in the 
other fields. As soon as one starts to describe the qualities of a body, it dissolves 
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and translates into several other concepts: skin, organ, cell, molecule, DNA, and 
single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP, a type of genetic marker). There are many 
alternative epistemologies of the body within biomedical sciences, rendering bod-
ies ontologically unstable objects and subject to objectification within particular 
and localised practises such as diagnostics, correction, and care ( Mol 2002 ). Sim-
ply put, there are no common definitions circumscribing what a body consists of 
and what a body should be or do on a bio-informatics-driven biomedical research 
platform. Within biobanking, for example, one can easily distinguish clinically 
based and population biobanks. The former consist of a large mass of population 
data and are geared for epidemiological research (derived as they are from bod-
ies that can be used as markers of predisposition and population-level exposure 
to external risk factors), while the latter focus on biomarkers for disease (e.g., 
derived from bodies used for prognostics, predictive analysis, and sources of per-
sonalised medicine) ( Harris et al. 2012 ). 
 To develop a universal language that speaks in the name both of populations 
and of individual bodies, external risk factors, and pathogens, one must, how-
ever, consider also other kinds of bodies. There are sovereign and national bod-
ies at stake here, and the language of biobanks needs to capture these too. For a 
common European research infrastructure such as the BBMRI, one of the key 
challenges in dealing with the multitude of bodies – national populations of all 
kinds – is their political representation through language. 
 First, the bodies biobanks hold are represented by natural languages that might 
not be translated easily one to another. Swedish and English, for example, have 
different words used to describe what the objects in a given institution are. Sec-
ond, these bodies – the ‘specimens’ or ‘samples’ – and, at a more precise level, the 
organs, the fluids, and the information attached to them might reside not in a legal 
entity called a biobank but in a repository for biomedical samples. The leader 
of the standardisation efforts in Europe, who leads the Swedish bio-informatics 
group working at the Karolinska Institute, commented on this issue in the follow-
ing manner: 
 One of the issues in Europe is language. You see, the terms and definitions 
you use for biobanks are a sort of a problem because there are so many dif-
ferent borders with BBMRI and everyone [has] their own terminology that 
differs from each other. So we have created a lexicon. The current version 
default [for the database information standard] is English, but what we did 
was to provide the information and the service in 10 different languages. 
 (Interview from 21 November 2013 ) 
 If the concept of biobank in each EU language denotes a specific local, country-
level configuration of sample collections, data, and study information, how can 
a scheme make sense of them all? The Swedish bio-informatics group explicitly 
anticipated the issue of terminology and created a lexicon of biobank-related con-
cepts, providing its own translation of these between ten European languages. 
Thus, standardisation between languages was deemed the first translation required. 
42 Read, write, standardise
However, this standardisation can only occur within the BBMRI context. The def-
inition of biobanks is not only a matter of providing inter-language equivalence 
for the EU’s various medical communities. This is because the concept of biobank 
can differ in content also within the various epistemic communities in a particular 
member country. One medical community may have its own working definition of 
‘samples’, while a similar community in a neighbouring country might entertain 
another. 
 These new lexicons, crucial as they are to the biobanking practises, transform 
the way in which bodies and the discursive institutions they inhabit are articu-
lated at local levels. Establishing a language that is universal for inter-cultural 
discourse about the objects held in biobanks – for example, samples, fluids, and 
information – cuts across borders between national lexicons and between states. 
 The state and its sovereign power to name, intervene in, and organise its popula-
tion and individual bodies is disrupted at the level of universal language. A powerful 
two-pronged move in favour of ‘interoperability’, powered by an agency proceed-
ing from the scientific vision of a common, standardised European biobank data-
base, was prepared by a group of bio-informaticians in Sweden. The database and 
the lexicon, (see Figure 3.1) as its ontological grounding, transform the European 
Figure 3.1 BBMRI wiki for global biomedical research
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bodies into standardised samples. They become organs removed from their politi-
cal bodies and rerooted in the technical discourse of the European biobank. This 
is the starting point for a new ontology of biobanked life in Europe. 
 Organ, tissue, fluid, and their harmonious recontextualisation 
 How exactly new biobanks, samples, and information can be banked without bod-
ies is a question that cuts to the heart of modern medicine. Organs and tissues have 
been studied and conserved far longer than their half-century history of clinical 
transplantation might suggest ( Guibert et al. 2011 ;  Watson and Dark 2012 ). How-
ever, while the organs and tissues have been (as they still are) an object of great 
interest for medical treatments and pathological diagnostics, they have become 
much-sought-after objects of informatics-heavy biomedical science, together 
with other biomedical samples. Fluids, tissues, and organs are important assets 
insofar as they are removed from bodies and recontextualised within a field of 
information (pertaining to the central characteristic features of the samples, the 
conditions of harvesting, location, etc.). 
 Biobanks are an innovation in the recontextualisation and regrouping of objects 
previously found within the body and limited by the skin. New tongues such as 
the lexicon presented earlier only create the conditions, the informational ecosys-
tem where the decontextualised objects can be reinserted and revitalised. What is 
required, however, is precisely a ‘harmonisation’, or a harmonious body of infor-
mation that couches the sample and its informatic representation. The MIABIS 
model is based on the premise of ‘minimal information’, the idea that there exists 
an informational content to all vital objects that every biomedical researcher (and, 
beyond the biomedical field, all researchers of the ‘bio’) can agree upon. But how 
does one agree on that minimal body of information to recontextualise the organs, 
tissues, and fluids? 
 When interviewed in August 2014, the individual responsible for MIABIS 
coordination recounted the group’s way of tackling the problem: 
 The logical first step to connect the biobanks is to know what they are and 
what they contain, and this is what we aim at here. I think we are successful 
because we were first with making a ‘minimum dataset for biobanks’ that 
could be adopted by all biobanks, around the world, by asking ourselves what 
the information is that all biobanks have in common. 
 The minimum, however, ended up being the minimal set of descriptive data on the 
donors, the samples, and the studies in which the biobank material is collected – a 
meta-ontologisation of the living bodies actually embodying all of this, in and as a 
sovereign person living within a sovereign country within the EU (see  Figure 3.2 ). 
 Here we could extend the words of Foucault, who once identified the cre-
ative power of governance with the context of biodata. With the harmonisation 
(definition of the core dataset that describes biobanks and their samples), inten-
sification of the data on the vital objects previously bound by individual bodies, 
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with problematisation of health and its operational terms, ensued in the BBMRI 
project (cf. Foucault 1970, 122–123). This applied a logic of biopower and gov-
ernance that pools and aggregates data on populations of choice, and here the 
population gathered is a novel collection of organs, fluids, tissues, and other vital 
samples from human beings. This is a governance logic typical of modern power, 
one wherein individuals are valuable insofar as they are recorded and can be seen 
and identified as part of a population-level aggregate. It also represents a new 
way of managing biobanks, wherein the aim no longer is to bank large numbers 
of people for one purpose, on population level and governed with one model. 
Rather, the individual is ‘debunked’ and the contents of that individual’s body 
are laid bare, decontextualised, and ultimately recontextualised in new organ, 
sample, or fluid-sample populations. The logic of population is not based on 
the human, the sovereign, or the organism. It hinges on ‘sample’, at the same time 
smaller than an individual human being and larger than an entire human population. 
 As with the question of ‘sex’ in the Victorian era, addressed by Foucault (ibid.), 
the idea of linking biobanks found a new manner of expression, now in mutated 
form. Again, instead of directly using medical-registry data on patients and their 
samples, the biobanks started using aggregated data, thereby intensifying the data 
on life and health. These involve not one biobank, sample collection, or study 
but several at once. Today, MIABIS covers three core datasets, describing bio-
banks, sample collections, and studies, complete with thirty-seven attributes by 
which all of these are characterised in detail in a manner that enables implemen-
tation via a general standard for integration of Europe’s biobank databases. This 
information model is centred on ‘metadata’ that include details of biobanks, the 
Figure 3.2 MIABIS 2.0 core
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sample collections they hold, and studies performed on the sample collections at 
an aggregate level. Thereby, the model escapes the restrictions of legal provisions 
for protection of personal data issued at national and European level. It thus pro-
vides a perfect, ‘meta’ bank for biodata. 
 The example of MIABIS shows nicely what is happening to our old ideas of 
wholes, actors, and sovereignty in the composition of tomorrow’s life. The domi-
nant model for human life no longer involves a person made of a head, torso, 
organs, and so on, and the same is true for the entire institutional way of imagin-
ing, putting together, and governing a nation in the globalised world. But, as does 
the database of biobanks, the data about European population show that there are 
no sovereign bodies at individual or population level. Organs do not compose 
sovereign bodies anymore; rather, populations and individuals as the objects of 
biopower are transformed into ‘samples’ that regroup to new populations because 
they are couched in new informational bodies that are standardised (e.g., under 
MIABIS standards). Hence, the metalanguage of today’s life is not the state, the 
sovereign. Life today is articulated within the biobank, and population is articu-
lated not internally to state boundaries but in HTML. 
 Metacodes and technologies of the body 
 Biology in its essence is a technology itself bundled in bodies and separated from 
other bodies by the skin, or, as Robert Carlson puts it: 
 Biology is the oldest technology. Throughout the history of life on Earth, 
organisms have made use of each other in sophisticated ways. The ances-
tors of both plants and animals co-opted free-living organisms that became 
the subcellular components now called chloroplasts and mitochondria. These 
bits of technology provide energy to their host cells and thereby underpin the 
majority of life on this planet. 
 ( Carlson 2010 ) 
 The redoing and reconfiguration of  anthropos at will – the skin of mankind we all 
wear today and that we are due to shed in the future for an even better skin – is 
performed by metacodes that draw the line between the newly co-opted man-
kind of the twenty-first century and  Homo sapiens sapiens . The face of the man 
once drawn in the sand of a quiet beach ( Foucault 2002 , 422) has been erased, 
but remaining fleshy materials and embodied information are put in service to 
the machinery as a sex organ for an ultimately connected new species. Our skin, 
tongue, and organs are all becoming fully connected, and by that development we 
are becoming the wealth and technology that we ourselves optimise through our 
bodies – as individuals, socially, and institutionally: 
 Physiologically, man in the normal use of technology (or his variously 
extended body) is perpetually modified by it and in turn finds ever new ways 
of modifying his technology. Man becomes, as it were, the sex organs of the 
46 Read, write, standardise
machine world, as the bee of the plant world, enabling it to fecundate and to 
evolve ever new forms. The machine world reciprocates man’s love by expe-
diting his wishes and desires, namely, in providing him with wealth. 
 ( McLuhan 1995 , Chapter 4) 
 The wealth and problems generated by these kinds of machines, platforms of 
accumulation, and mechanisms of proliferation are what we turn to in the next 
chapter, where we consider them in the context of genetic resources beyond 
human species. 
 Notes 
 1 This chapter is adapted from a previous version, which was published in: Tamminen, S. 
(2015). Bio-objectifying European Bodies: Standardisation of Biobanks in the Biobank-
ing and Biomolecular Resources Research Infrastructure.  Life Sciences, Society and 
Policy , 11, 13. http://doi.org/10.1186/s40504-015-0031-1 
 2 Physiologically, man in the normal use of technology (or his variously extended body) is 
perpetually modified by it and, in turn, finds ever new ways of modifying his technology 
( McLuhan 1995 , 46). 
 3 There are multiple readings of this idea of ‘error’. One is that of celebrated philoso-
pher of the life sciences Georges Canguilhem, who developed a whole philosophy that 
secretly celebrated the creativity of life through error, in a vitalist approach. Another 
conceptualisation takes on error as a source of generative control, of biopower; here, the 
‘error’ of our species is at the same time individualising and subjected to control by the 
modern state ( Talcott 2014 ). 
 4 Examples include the Forum for International Biobanking Organizations, the Interna-
tional Agency for Research on Cancer, the International Society for Biological and Envi-
ronmental Repositories, and the Public Population Project in Genomics (P3G). 
 5 For example, the European Biobanking and Biomolecular Resources Research Infra-
structure, the Biomarkers Consortium, the Human Variome Project, and the UK DNA 
Banking Network. 
 6 For example, the Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes, the Encyclopedia of DNA 
Elements (ENCODE), the International HapMap Project, and the Open Biological and 
Biomedical Ontologies. 
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 4  Crossing boundaries 
 The global politics of access and 
plant as species of life™ 
 Introduction 
 A new generation of ‘miracle crops’ is being engineered and launched globally. 
Expectations could hardly be any higher: crops are needed to feed the poor, cure 
the ill, resolve the planet’s biodiversity crisis, and improve the weather. Such 
expectations are the norm; increasingly, the language of global targets refers to 
billions of people and the promises span decades. 
 The most obvious places to locate such marketing are the polished advertise-
ments of global agri-business. The product is showcased through its identification 
with agricultural landscapes and families eating together while the voice-over 
might tell us that a better tomorrow requires innovations that help farmers grow 
crops that meet ‘the challenges of a hungry planet’ (as in the rhetoric of Bayer 
crop science). Variations of this narrative point to the naturalistic foundations of 
innovation by recalling how ‘from the very beginning, food is more than just a 
meal’ (e.g., Monsanto) or pointing to the future as a chance to bring ‘a new dawn’ 
(e.g., DuPont). Such a future depends on ‘collaboration between business and 
humanity’ (Dow Chemicals) and will take the shape of a return to nature that 
depends on corporations that ‘bring plant potential to life’ (Syngenta). 1 These 
slogans are those of a sector wherein a few companies compete over the global 
markets for improved seeds and agricultural chemicals. Mergers and take-overs 
have been going on for decades, with the resulting conglomerates buying up plant 
breeding companies and each other. In 2015–2016, Syngenta rejected an offer 
by Monsanto to accept another offer from ChemChina, a state-owned chemical 
company. In turn, Monsanto rejected an offer from Bayer, while Dow and DuPont 
are merging. The amounts reported are never below the tens of billions, and this 
has been the case for decades in a dynamic that has been anticipated and well-
documented since the late 1970s and early 1980s, revealing a pattern of corporate 
concentration and integration of commodity chains for crops, plant biotechnolo-
gies, and chemicals ( Mooney 1979 ;  Yoxen 1984 ; Goodman et al. 1987;  Wield 
et al. 2010 , 349). 
 What has changed, therefore, is not that such ‘plant-branding’ reflects the scale of 
the global markets involved but that the slogans match how innovation has become 
a privileged solution to inter-governmentally agreed sustainability goals, whether 
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related to biodiversity, food, health, climate, or otherwise ( Deibel et al. 2014 ). It is 
this species of ‘plant-branding’ that we set out to examine in this chapter. The idea is 
captured in the trademark sign (‘™’) in the subtitle. On the one hand, the trademark 
points to the continuation of the commodification of plants, in a by-now-familiar 
process that should cause little surprise to anyone. Accordingly the trademark is one 
of many types of intellectual property that have been introduced to the life sciences 
in an attempt to guarantee a return on investments in crop science and plant bio-
technology, along with stock trading, venture capital funding, asset management, 
etc. ( Cooper 2008 ). On the other hand, the analysis in this chapter departs from 
the trademark as a symbol that refers to marketing and branding as integral to the 
mixing and hybridising of attempts to overcome the biological limits of plants in 
the life sciences and the notion that there might be ecological limits beyond which 
mankind should not go. 
 By now, it has become insufficient to simply document how it has become 
exceedingly complicated to establish who owns a plant and who decides about 
its usage. While this is true and lamentable, it is also ever more secondary as a 
concern to how the global environment of treaties and governance mechanisms 
has, over the last 15 years, combined the rules that enable the commodification 
of plants with voluntary commitments and non-binding targets as the preferred 
method for coordinated action on sustainable development and climate change. 
In fact, species of plants are exemplary in this regard. They are iconic of the com-
modification of life as a long-standing and heavily contested subject of global 
treaties alongside genetic engineering and related issues such as industrial agri-
culture and patenting, which have been debated since the 1980s. 
 In this regard, the title – ‘Crossing boundaries’ – refers to the transgression of 
biological limits in the life sciences, as well as in the specialised ‘boundary work’ 
that transforms plants into species of life™ (see  Haraway 1997 , 60;  Halffman 
2003 ;  Gieryn 1983 ). Within this context, the subtitle invokes the language of 
access, as it performs a type of boundary work that facilitates continuous nego-
tiation over the possibility of exceptions to the exclusive rights over biological 
resources that have been established as the norm for global environmental gover-
nance. Such a ‘global politics of access’ is then about how exceptions are being 
made to the commodification of life or, rather, how certain types of activities are 
eligible to be exempted from protection of intellectual property or the various 
sovereign claims to genetic resources ( Safrin 2004 ). 
 Exceptions are being made to the established language of rights that establish 
state authority and ownership. Increasingly ‘access’ refers strictly to the usage 
of plant materials as genetic resources in the context of the life sciences and the 
development of related technologies. In such instances the language of access is 
invoked for arguing that a contribution is made to reaching global targets and ful-
filling UN mandates. Considered together, however, the instances wherein excep-
tions are possible can be shown as, in fact, a norm; the language of access is a 
species of biopolitics. By establishing ‘how’ plant materials are being governed, 
we will argue that these are not simply exceptions – a marginal project of dubious 
effectiveness – and that they demonstrate a feature of a global ‘state of exception’ 
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( Agamben 2005 ). What is key is how advocacy of ‘access’ is turned into a means 
whereby ‘legal determinations – and above all the very distinction between public 
and private – are deactivated’ (ibid., 23). 
 The first section that follows elaborates on the discussion to make observations 
on the relationship between, on the one hand, the materiality of plant biodiversity 
and the embodied know-how about living and working with multi-species envi-
ronments and, on the other hand, the juridical understandings of concepts such as 
commodity, enclosure, commons, and access. Continuing with this perspective, 
the subsequent section recontextualises and re-materialises the internationally 
negotiated texts and related governance mechanisms dealing with plant materials. 
The discussion addresses established topics such as ‘access and benefit sharing’ 
but also less well-known treaties and governance mechanisms wherein access is 
negotiated in regard of the usage of plant materials as technological resources, in 
initiatives, projects, and governance networks. 
 The conclusion reinterprets the analysis. Thinking across the examples in this 
chapter makes it possible to reconsider the commodity in a context wherein high-
tech forms of gifting, charity, and altruism are privileged by how they are situ-
ated between law and life. The analysis shows that biological resources only to 
a limited extent are being incorporated into the body of the state – as its living 
embodiment, a foundation for its constitutional ordering of nature and the basis 
of the wealth of nations (see  Tamminen and Brown 2011 ). While it is certainly 
true that the interplay of sovereignties is becoming more complex in consequence 
of the governing of biotechnological resources, the exception turns into the norm 
(through continuous negotiations of access) as congruent with biogenetic ways 
of thinking and acting. The key point, however, is to observe how the exercise of 
power comes to rely on and revolve around the ‘opening up of a fictitious lacuna’ 
( Agamben 2005 , 31). It is through fictions that we can understand the consolida-
tion of the detachment of global environmental governance from the materiality 
of the natural world as a ‘zone of anomie’ (ibid., 50). This zone is more and more 
exclusively inhabited by ‘species of life™’ that have become unabashed in imag-
ining their own accomplishments through their association with global targets, 
as seen in UN sustainability partnerships and increasingly delirious attempts at 
plant-branding. 
 Access and enclosure 
 Robinson Crusoe as a myth of invention 
 ‘the Concern I had been in for my own Preservation had taken off the Edge of my 
Invention for my own Conveniences; and I had dropp’d a good Design, which I 
had once bent my Thoughts too much upon; and that was, to try if I could not make 
some of my Barley into Malt, and then try to brew myself some Beer: This was a 
really whimsical Thought, and I reprov’d my self often for the Simplicity of it; for 
I presently saw there would be the want of several things necessary’. 
 Daniel Defoe,  Robinson Crusoe ([1719]  2007 , 142) 
Crossing boundaries 51
 The quote from Daniel Defoe’s  Robinson Crusoe is about a tragedy that is in 
sharp contrast to the familiar economic interpretations of the story of a man alone 
on an island. Such economics tend to omit how Crusoe spends most of his time 
and invests much of his labour in his ‘designs’, losing the edge of his inven-
tion when he becomes too preoccupied with defending his life and the posses-
sions that he needs for his survival. This is a tragedy: innovation stopped once 
the island was accessed and he felt himself unsafe and compelled to work on 
his enclosures. Famously, Marx and Engels interpreted the story about a man 
stranded on an isolated island by pointing to his labour and the use-value of the 
things he makes, turning him into a model of pre-capitalist. This means that self-
preservation – the principal natural right of life for Hobbes, Locke, and most other 
natural philosophers – is seen as lost in the context of the civilised world and 
the bourgeois economic system ( Marx 1990 [1867],  Capital Vol. 1 Section IV). 
Simultaneously, this kind of use-value consideration, ascribed to Crusoe on his 
island, should be seen solely in the context of his isolation, his isolation from the 
rapidly consolidating colonial world of empires. After all, Crusoe’s labour, includ-
ing his ability to invent new techniques and breed crops, belongs to the world of 
cash crops, spices, and many other valuable commodities that were already being 
distributed between continents (see  Kloppenburg 2005 ;  Parry 2004 ). 
 From this perspective, his inventiveness and his enclosures are part of an 
expansion of a global network that successfully enrolled new agents, artefacts, 
and distant peoples by interlinking dedicated spaces, such as plantations, model 
farms, and botanical gardens. This includes his independence, which should be 
understood as the mirror image of the exploitation of the labour of those who 
sooner or later found themselves caught up in the expansion of the European 
world. Hence, Crusoe on his island needs to be seen critically, as exemplifying 
the values of the British Empire and its projection of the power of colonial man 
over the natural world. The story, in this version, is exemplary of how white males 
are threatened by those who lived outside their societies, subjecting them into a 
labour force stripped of their natural rights as human beings (see, for example, 
Joyce [1912], cited by  Barry, 2012 , and Said, 1993). 
 Obviously, such a critique of colonialism remains valid; after all, Crusoe’s 
story famously dehumanises the threat and violence of the savages who surround 
him by introducing us to Friday. Soon after the encounter, Friday puts his head 
on the ground in gratitude – ‘with all the possible Signs of a humble thankful 
Disposition’ – and Crusoe makes him ‘know his Name should be Friday’ in mem-
ory of the day that his life was saved. After a short while, Friday becomes like a 
‘child to a father’ and wants to tell his fellow savages ‘to live Good, tell them to 
pray God, tell them to eat Corn-bread, Cattle-flesh, Milk, no eat Man again’ ( Defoe 
2007 , 189). With Friday’s conversion to a more civilised life, they proceed to pro-
tect themselves from those who would threaten them by enclosing more terrain and 
by beating and sifting corn. Soon after, Crusoe observes with approval that Friday: 
 soon understood how to do it as well as I, especially after he had seen what 
the Meaning of it was, and that I was to make Bread of; for after that I let him 
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see me make my Bread and bake it hot, and in a little Time Friday was able 
to do all the Work for me, as well as I could do it my self. 
 (ibid., 179) 
 In sum, Friday is made to acknowledge the value of becoming ‘civilised’ so that 
he can be voluntarily put to work in support of Crusoe’s designs. Our version, 
however, explores this tragedy by not only considering the narrow-minded man-
ner wherein Crusoe puts Friday to work, but also pointing to how the events on 
the island foreshadow the liberal myth of the individual genius as the avatar of the 
global knowledge economy. We return to the figure of Robinson Crusoe precisely 
because he sits between the celebration of his work as a type of pre-capitalist use-
value and innovation as the only recourse for the West in the age of globalisation. 
In this version of the story, the history of innovation is a tragedy, and Crusoe giv-
ing up on his inventions stands for our own predicament with industrial agricul-
ture, beginning with Crusoe as a figure who belongs to the long history of plant 
breeding and the loss of crop diversity as indissociable from the rise of science-
based plant breeding and plant biotechnology. 
 Access, insecurity, and enclosure 
 There has been a constant demand for and necessity of resistances to disease and 
adapting to changing soil and weather conditions ever since the beginning of 
agriculture. Crops are innovations that are the result of how seeds are selected 
and saved by farmers every harvest, reproducing only those plant varieties that 
show the most desirable traits. Notably, Crusoe is one of them, a breeder-brewer-
inventor who represents the historical relationship between the distribution of 
crop diversity across the world, especially in the colonial age, and the ongoing 
accumulation of varieties and traits. Together, these processes resulted in the vari-
ety of food crops that were adapted to and that shaped the diversity of human 
practises and ecologies, in forests, wetlands, pastoral lands, irrigation systems, or 
otherwise. However, this wealth did not last, just as Crusoe had to give up on his 
inventions when no longer in isolation. The book tells us of Crusoe the breeder/
brewer/inventor who labours until he finds a footstep in the sand. He had survived 
the decades left to himself after his shipwreck by getting involved in breeding and 
brewing with the barley he had salvaged. He stops inventing, however, when rec-
ognising that there are others: he repeats several times that it is ‘on the account of 
the Print of a Man’s foot’ that he leaves behind his earlier designs (ibid., 130–132). 
He starts planting rings of trees in hedges that become so thick and strong that they 
are as walls of fortifications wherein he could hide himself and enclose himself, 
his crops and the cattle that are his immediate supply of milk and meat. He admits 
to himself that this ‘Wall I was many a weary Month a finishing, and yet I never 
thought my self safe till it was done’ (ibid., 136, 137). After he finds the footprint 
in the sand, he asks himself: ‘[what] if it should happen so that they should not 
find me, yet they would find my Enclosure, destroy all my Corn, carry away all 
my Flock of tame Goats, and I should perish at last for meer want’ (ibid., 132). 
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 There are three key moments from Crusoe’s tragic history of innovation that 
are the starting point for turning to our own predicament: the rapid extinction of 
native crops, local cultivars, landraces, and wild relatives that are cultivated in 
more variable environmental conditions. These are the moments of (1) access (to 
his island by others), (2) insecurity (about his ability to survive), and (3) enclosure 
(labouring to protect himself and his possessions). In the remainder of the chapter, 
we will examine the interplay of these three terms in a triangle of pivotal moments 
that can be recontextualised to understanding the political dynamic of how plants 
are being transformed into ‘species of life™’. 
 Seeds and the island-empire 
 The most iconic example of ‘plants as a species of life™’ is probably the bag 
of seeds that is sold with several conditions attached. These conditions are pos-
sible because of the patenting of DNA and have increased the scope for capturing 
profits; for example, there might be a type of insecticide that becomes mandatory, 
or it may be illegal to replant the variety after its cultivation or use its seeds for 
breeding. The consequence has been corporate concentration and intensification 
of the transformation of farmers into customers. 
 How can we perceive such commodification in terms of how Crusoe ended up 
enclosing his possessions? Crusoe stopped innovating even though he remained 
convinced of the potential of his innovations – were it not for ‘the terror’ he was 
in, he would have ‘undertaken it, and perhaps brought it to pass too’ (ibid., 142). 
Instead, he feels unsafe after finding the footprint, which resembles how the free 
flow of plant materials has been undermined. Jack Kloppenburg, in his seminal 
‘First the Seed’, a classic history of plant improvement, uses the metaphor of an 
‘island-empire’ to explain how the agricultural sector historically lay outside the 
‘capitalist mainland’ ( Kloppenburg 2005 , 280). Kloppenburg discusses the new 
plant biotechnologies as following a historical trajectory that mirrors and intensi-
fies the earlier focus on crop sciences, which in the twentieth century had opened 
up ‘a whole new frontier of accumulation’ and constituted a ‘breach’ of the bio-
logical barrier that had prevented more than a bare minimum of private invest-
ment in crop improvement (ibid., 11). This, then, is the footstep, the moment of 
access, that is followed by what he calls ‘the construction of bridges’, intensifying 
of access through the subsequent development of plant biotechnologies. After the 
island has been opened to outsiders, bridges begin to be built that would perma-
nently connect the island to the capitalist mainland (ibid., 279). What is crucial is 
that enclosure follows access. On the one hand, constructing enclosures is condi-
tioned on the potential for opening up the ‘island-empire’ to investments from the 
mainland. On the other hand, such access needs to be consolidated in regard of the 
remainder of the island-empire, which represents untapped potential, a common-
wealth to be commodified. Accordingly, it is through the transformation of plants 
into species of life™ that access is consolidated, that the remaining limits are to 
be overcome. Plant-branding is most significant in a context wherein there are 
limits to the access that has already been established: when bridges have been 
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built, there remain obstacles and resistances that undermine the capturing of value 
and the message that it is just a matter of time before, eventually, the expectations 
are met and science will deliver on its promises about resistance to disease, toler-
ance of any kind of weather or soil conditions, and whatever other biochemical 
properties might be in demand on the world market. 
 In other words, agency is identified with technological change, driving the 
integration of plant materials into the commodity system and establishing as 
incontestable that new crops are of greater value than dynamic usage of breeding 
resources and locally specific improvement trajectories that are still around. The 
latter need to be devalued if the potential for profits is to be realised and if access 
to the common-wealth is to be kept secure. For example, such devaluation can be 
seen in how the complexity of crops is presented as a mere setback, deliberately 
underestimated in the discussions of biotechnological change. Similarly, the rules 
and regulations establish that there should be no meaningful competition, eco-
nomically or morally, with farmers who might choose to continue as breeders of 
their own plant varieties and as competitors to the commodification of plant vari-
eties. As Crusoe did, many choose enclosure when faced with the insecurity that 
arises with a footstep, and with the subsequent constructing of bridges from the 
mainland. The point here is not that science-based crops essentialistically threaten 
an Arcadia that is unexplored and unknown, where the diversity of plant life exists 
beyond ownership. Instead, it should be clear that only certain types of agricul-
tural commodities are being traded globally and are valued through eco-financial 
speculation, while other types of crop cultivation are continuously devalued in 
combination with their relations to the livelihood of millions or even billions of 
people. 
 Plants and global treaties 
 From access and commons to enclosure 
 If science-based breeding is the footstep, than the best candidate for Kloppen-
burg’s ‘bridges from the mainland’ is the patent. Just as Crusoe came to fear for 
his possessions, the patent is the mechanism that represents how new claims to the 
biogenetic wealth of the island-empire could be made, to be countered in various 
ways by securing of its resources, either economically or as integral to the well-
being of society and its relationship with nature. 
 Such a response is visible in the failed attempt to declare that plant materials are 
common property or, rather, a ‘common heritage of mankind’. Patents on DNA 
were authorised in the early 1980s, which explains why the opening statement of 
the Food and Agricultural Organisation’s (FAO) 1983 International Undertaking 
on Plant Genetic Resources announced that ‘plant genetic resources are a heritage 
of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction’. 2 This treaty 
was not a denouncement of patents; it was primarily an attempt to recognise the 
moral or material value and utility of the labour that farmers have been expending 
in the development and regeneration of crop genetic diversity. 
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 To be specific, farmers do not receive any benefits when the varieties they pro-
duce are taken up for commercial use, yet they are expected to purchase the vari-
eties developed by corporations as exclusively owned products at higher prices. 
There has never been and is no reciprocity between farmers and the seed com-
panies that are obtaining and using the shared crop genetic resources, receiving 
a surcharge on the sale of proprietary varieties. Crops are a natural resource that 
cannot be depleted through usage, while their survival depends on open access 
and non-exclusion as the norm in farmers’ fields ( Brush 2005a ,  2005b ). Accord-
ingly, the loss of crop varieties is an excellent example of failure to govern the 
commons, as any varieties that are not used by farmers go extinct. The rate of 
extinction of crop biodiversity in the twentieth century is directly related to the 
use of science-based varieties in industrial agriculture ( Gepts 2004 ;  Hughes and 
Deibel 2006 ;  van Dooren 2007 ,  2009 ). 
 Farmers always look for new traits in response to diseases or act on changing 
conditions, which implies that seeds with characteristics that are in demand are 
more valuable. However, this dynamic of demand, value, and scarcity of resources 
is very different from what we find when considering the same concepts in the 
context of the introduction of new intellectual property incentives. There are 
not only patents, but also ‘plant variety rights’ and ‘plant breeders’ rights’ were 
already introduced to conventional plant breeding in the mid-twentieth century. 
The conflict between the two types of economics has as its result a ‘paradox of 
plant breeding’ that has to do with the creation of new varieties by crop scientists 
and how these have ‘historically undermined the very genetic basis on which 
[crop science] rests’ ( Gepts 2006 , 2281;  Deibel 2013 ). 
 This paradox was the premise for designating plant materials as a common heri-
tage of mankind, which affirms that diversity is sustained through the usage of 
crops. This was a remarkable episode in international law because other examples 
that are sometimes seen as a common heritage involve resources that were freely 
available only as long as they could not be claimed in any practical sense. Enclo-
sure is impossible until it is within reach, which is to say that claims begin to 
be made after polar expeditions start going to Antarctica, when satellites go into 
space, when submarines start exploring the deep sea-bed, and so forth (see  Shack-
elford 2009 ). The latter are commons without commoners, neither the irresponsible 
types personified by Garrett Hardin’s herdsmen who overuse their own commons 
nor those who know better than to plunder the resources on which their liveli-
hood depends. In Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’, access to the shared resource 
results in its destruction (see  Hardin 1968 ). A popular response to this type of 
tragedy is to observe that common property is often the most sensible alternative 
to the failures of privatisation and state-led forms of policy making. Such ‘gover-
nance of the commons’, a term coined by Elinor Ostrom, who received a Nobel 
Prize in Economics for it, is regularly used in referring to communities’ preserva-
tion of plant biodiversity as an example of successfully managing a common-pool 
resource by strengthening local decision-making processes ( Ostrom 1990 , 2005). 
 The problem, however, is that by showing the limits of Hardin’s view, we 
find that there are many co-existing types of common property, without a clear 
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perspective on how we inevitably end up in a situation wherein one type ‘may 
need to be protected at the expense of another’ ( Harvey 2011 , 102). Giving prior-
ity to certain types of commons rather than others might not be what commons 
theory intends at all. Nevertheless, this is the implication of how exactly crop 
biodiversity is being considered as a commons that is threatened with enclosure. 
Should crop biodiversity as a common-pool resource be prioritised, or is it sec-
ondary to the ‘knowledge commons’, which has increasingly gained traction as a 
theory of innovation? This refers to ‘the tragedy of the anticommons’, in which 
innovation slows down when too many parties hold exclusive rights to access 
knowledge or technological resources. The result is that the usage of technologies, 
resources, and the production of knowledge is obstructed and innovation is frus-
trated ( Heller 1998 ;  Heller and Eisenberg 1998 ). Originally, the argument about 
the anticommons was about how the patenting of DNA is discouraging innovation 
in the life sciences, which implies a critique of patents and a defence of how many 
technologies are managed as common-pool resources. Conflict ensues when plant 
materials are valued primarily as a technological resource that needs to be shared 
to encourage innovation in the life sciences. 
 The question is, therefore, ‘how’ genetic resources need to be shared. This 
includes ‘how’ to set the criteria for successfully managing common-pool resources 
but also ‘who’ needs to be prioritised as the commoner. In that regard, it is key 
to begin by recognising that crops have always belonged already to those who 
used them, long before plant materials came to be considered as technological 
resources within the context of sophisticated techniques for the breeding of plant 
varieties. Their usage was vital to the creation of plant biodiversity that survives 
within a context of distributed and communal activities that display the regulated 
character of ‘continuous sharing of many physical resources on informal rules and 
customs that are developed and adapted over long periods of time’ ( Drahos 1996 , 
12;  Hess and Ostrom 2003 ). 
 Yet this is not what happened when DNA was declared to be a technical domain 
through the introduction of patents in the 1980s. Not only were temporary monop-
olies over inventions authorised in the life sciences; its implication was that the 
DNA was no longer legally a ‘manifestation of nature’. DNA would henceforth 
be a ‘product of ingenuity’ and a ‘composition of matter’ (see  Parry 2004 , 85, 86; 
see  Carolan 2010 ;  Calvert and Joly 2011 ). This is than the response to finding 
the footprint: the moment when exclusively owning DNA became possible coin-
cided with the transformation of how the usage of plant materials was valued. The 
future of the diversity of plant life, from that moment on, would be seen primarily 
through a lens that shows the potential return on investments in the life sciences. 
The decades that followed have seen such eco-financial speculation become 
‘a highly profitable – indeed rational – enterprise’ ( Cooper 2008 , 24–28). The 
remainder of the discussion will demonstrate the implications of what is meant 
with eco-financial speculation, describing a socio-technical setting wherein the 
accumulation of biological futures is normalised as the step that succeeds the 
ability to enclose the ‘very principle of generation, (re-)production itself, in all its 
emergent possibilities’ (ibid.). 
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 We observe the same logic when examining ‘global environmental gover-
nance’, which increasingly deals with farming and biodiversity in terms of the 
establishment of knowledge commons as the model for the nexus of human prac-
tises and ecologies, whether as seeds, forests, wetlands, pastoral lands, and irriga-
tion systems or otherwise. 
 Access and sovereignties 
 The international undertaking of the early 1980s was unsuccessful; it marked the 
only international treaty to have made the suggestion that plant materials should 
be free of private property and state sovereignty. Now there is the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (henceforth the Plant 
Treaty) from 2004, which is itself remarkable in that it is based on the recognition 
that access to plant materials is a benefit that depends on being shared. 
 The notion that plant materials were to be ‘free to all men and reserved exclu-
sively to none’, which was put forth briefly in the 1980s, was removed quickly as 
a result of a provision that was added to the next treaty of the FAO, the Undertak-
ing of 1991. This text highlighted that there is no incompatibility between plant 
breeding and the conservation of crop diversity, and the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity (CBD) was anticipated by making explicit that it is within govern-
ment’s jurisdiction to restrict the free exchange of materials in order to conform 
to national and international obligations ( Brush 2005a , 86). By the early 1990s, 
there was no longer a mandate for the FAO to identify the development of high-
performance crops and their commodification with the loss of plant biodiversity. 
Furthermore, the CBD, which was ratified in 1992, did not make any special ref-
erence to plant materials in agriculture, while agriculture became part of the man-
date of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1993 in parallel to Trade-Related 
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement ( May and Sell 2006 ). 
 The first article of the CBD calls for the fair and equitable sharing of the ben-
efits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources (art 1. CBD). On the one 
hand, the CBD is a framework convention for several international treaties of 
relevance to species and ecosystems conservation. Its negotiation took ten years, 
and the end-result was a treaty that has its premise that quick financial returns on 
the destruction of natural resources need to be replaced with economic incentives 
that allow governments to focus on biodiversity (see  Boisvert and Vivien 2012 ). 
On the other hand, the references to market- based conservation are explicitly 
imagined as a response to the development of plant biotechnology. This is shown 
by how the text focuses on ‘genetic resources’ with ‘actual or potential value’ as 
the basic material of the life sciences (Article 2 of the CBD; see  Hayden 2003a , 
 2003b ;  Gepts 2004 ,  2006 ;  Hamilton 2006 ). 
 Accordingly, many governments have interpreted the CBD as assigning them 
the responsibility for biodiversity found inside their territory and the authority 
to create regulatory frameworks to prevent the unauthorised and uncompensated 
exploration of biodiversity as commercially valuable genetic and biochemical 
resources ( Reid et al. 1993 ). This is called ‘bio-prospecting’, and many countries 
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have taken measures to address what they see as shortcomings in intellectual 
property rules in areas such as unauthorised access, insufficiently strict review of 
patent applications, and the duty to share benefits with stakeholders ( Hoare and 
Tarasofsky 2007 ). International negotiations over ‘access and benefit-sharing’ 
have continued within the context of the RIO+20 framework, within the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and at the request of the FAO. The 
discussion has become increasingly technical, as the focus primarily lies on the 
obligations for intellectual property holds and the benefits that are to be given to 
specific groups without any legal rights being granted to those who live and work 
in biodiversity-rich areas ( Lesser et al. 2007 ). 
 This includes the ratification of the Plant Treaty in 2004. It is unique as an 
environmental treaty that has been ratified while taking the position that access 
is the main benefit to be shared. Accordingly, its preamble states that access is 
vital for an adequate response to concerns over food security, the conservation of 
agricultural biodiversity, the sustainability of farming, and so on. However, the 
kind of access that can be arranged in the Plant Treaty still must be compatible 
with TRIPs and the CBD. 
 Following the ratification of the CBD, numerous national representatives began 
arguing that access to agricultural biodiversity could be restricted nationally, which 
meant that negotiations had to be started on a new multilateral system for plant 
materials in agriculture ( Coupe and Lewin 2007 ). One of the results is that the 
arrangement of access refers to the content of seed banks under the authority of 
participating governments, the FAO, and the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Hence, there are no obligations imposed on com-
panies and governments to remove any restrictions on the usage of plant materials 
by farmers. 
 The FAO continues to call on governments to respect farmers’ rights (to the 
saving, selecting, and replanting of seeds) but no longer considers these to be 
‘vested in the International Community, as trustee for present and future genera-
tions of farmers’ (FAO Res. 5/89). The Plant Treaty has changed the landscape: 
farmers’ rights are now something that governments might or might not act on. 
Furthermore, much of the discussion on access and benefit sharing is aimed at 
generating revenues for the FAO on the basis of a small percentage of the com-
mercial value of finished plant varieties that restrict the accessibility of the crop 
varieties stored in seed banks. In other words, access is not guaranteed but taxed. 
The FAO collects revenues when plant materials in the system of seed banks 
become unavailable for research or breeding (ibid.;  Gepts 2004 ;  Safrin 2004 ). 
 The transformation of global governance 
 Before we continue with the analysis of the global politics of access, it is crucial 
to make an observation on the transformation of the wider setting for global envi-
ronmental governance wherein the response to the ratification of the CBD and 
TRIPs took shape. 
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 As explained, the legal framework for market-based conservation has set in 
motion the corrosive interplay between the patent-based and the sovereignty-
based system of ownership ( Safrin 2004 , 642). Expectations were raised about 
the potential to redistribute some of the value of genetic resources, and the nego-
tiations over access and benefit sharing have dissociated concerns over the loss of 
plant life from market failures or excesses. Simultaneously, environmental gover-
nance became increasingly voluntary and non-binding through the UN’s endorse-
ment of the formation of partnerships. These are flexible governance mechanisms 
among various state and non-state stakeholders that are intended for bridging 
the public–private dichotomy, and represent a co-operative form of organisation 
wherein the rationales of various sectors can be applied efficiently ( Bäckstrand 
et al. 2010 ;  Andersen 2008 ). 
 Hundreds of partnership agreements have come into effect, and they cut across 
various levels of governance of nearly every issue that was on the environmental 
agenda after the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). At 
that time, sustainability partnerships were declared ‘the way forward’ (as ‘type-II 
outcomes of the summit’), and many commentators in fields tied to plant materi-
als echo the optimism surrounding their formation by adopting policy- oriented 
language of ‘best practices’, ‘lessons to be learned’, and ‘success factors’ (e.g., 
 Spielman et al. 2010 ;  Ferroni and Castle 2011 ;  van Berloo et al. 2008 ). Many oth-
ers, however, have doubts about the effectiveness of the ‘partnership regime’ at 
global levels and vis-à-vis the promised goals ( Biermann et al. 2007 ). Accordingly 
there has been a general lack of success of the ‘partnership regime’ in regard of the 
various goals and the need to address governance deficits ( Pattberg et al. 2012 ). 
 The formation of a UN partnership needs to be sufficiently agreeable to all 
parties involved, and it needs to serve the interests of all stakeholders, who are 
left free to identify their activities with the realisation of sustainability goals as 
they wish. This is because the WSSD did not result in a partnership regime that 
includes standards on the relevancy of stakeholders (businesses and NGOs), what 
the aim of partnerships should be (implementation versus participation), or how 
they should be screened and monitored. There are many examples; UN partner-
ships operate as platforms for controversial technologies being rebranded as 
sustainability projects, among them nuclear energy, PVC products, and water-
purification chemicals and so on ( Mert and Chan 2012 ). Other examples are less 
controversial but highlight how corporations are assumed to have a neutral if not 
benevolent role in respect of the realisation of sustainability goals. Examples 
include Dow Chemical sponsoring of the Blue Planet Run to ‘bring safe drinking 
water to 1.2 billion people’. The Coca-Cola Foundation and Procter and Gamble 
promote the provision of a water disinfectant and ‘behavior change techniques 
directed towards improved hygiene’ in water-deprived poor countries, while 
Royal Dutch Shell is involved in the Clean Air Initiative to enhance air quality 
and reduce emissions. 3 
 Similarly, there is no need for Monsanto’s actions to be endorsed in interna-
tional texts when it gets involved in a partnership that attempts to contribute to 
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mitigation of ‘the threat posed by invasive species’ (UN CSD 2008). It is not 
needed for a UN partnership’s mission to be endorsed in international texts, which 
would in this instance clearly show tension between Monsanto’s business model 
and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety wherein the protection of biological 
diversity requires that measures are taken to control the risks of biotechnology. 
Furthermore, this example is an indication of the kind of plant branding reflected 
in the countless adverts, websites, and advertisements promising that the Great 
Outdoors might be saved when companies pledge to donate a percentage of the 
cost of flying across a green-blue planet, driving an SUV through a pristine forest, 
or eating a Happy Meal with ingredients that depend on soy-based animal feed or 
other elements of industrialised agriculture (see  Büscher 2012 ). Environmental 
governance has now become fully compatible with plant-branding and actively 
engages with efforts to raise expectations about the economic and social value of 
corporations’ products and services. 
 The point is not that there were no contributions being made by individual part-
nerships to achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or any 
of the goals set after these expired. Rather, the type of access to plant materials 
that is possible reflects a logic of environmental governance wherein conflicting 
and controversial practises can be acted upon without formal endorsement at the 
UN level (see  Biermann et al. 2007 ;  Mert and Chan 2012 ). This is essential con-
text considering that the Plant Treaty was ratified at around the same time as the 
endorsement of partnerships. Many commentators have noted how this has led 
to UN organisations partnering with corporations that are driving controversial 
fields such as genetic modification, patents, and industrial production of food 
( Hisano 2005 ;  Kaan and Liese 2010 ;  Hatanaka 2009 ; Poulton 2012). 
 Furthermore, the restrictions that were put in place during the 1980s and 1990s, 
as in TRIPs and the CBD, are naturalised through the creation of closely related 
governance mechanisms that settle the logics (practises, actions, and language) 
derived from the previously negotiated texts (see  Mert 2009 ). Its implication is 
that international organisations were transformed into partners in governance 
networks wherein they have to persuade others to remain or become embedded, 
relevant, and central to policy making. Such a logic of environmental gover-
nance continues to take its shape in response to developments in the life sciences. 
Access to knowledge (abbreviated as A2K) is widespread in the form of the cross-
licensing of patents, the creation of joint ventures, private consortia, and partner-
ships of various kinds. 
 On the one hand, the advocacy of access is often described in terms of knowl-
edge commons, or intellectual commons revolving around the successful man-
agement of common-pool resources (see  Burk 2002 ;  Boettiger and Burk 2004 ; 
 Opderbeck 2004 ;  Allarakhia and Wensley 2007 ;  Overwalle 2009 ;  Hope 2008 , 
 2009 ). This includes occasional references to enclosure in an historical analogy to 
Marx’s description of the enclosure of the English commons (see  Harvey 2011 ), 
for instance in James Boyle’s ‘second enclosure movement’ and Christopher 
May’s ‘new enclosures’ ( May 2000 ;  Boyle 2003a ,  2003b ,  2008 ). Such critiques, 
however, tend to celebrate the commons in contrast to enclosure and in isolation 
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(as ontologically distinct) from the intricate institutional balancing act of access 
and restrictions that is re-orienting global environmental governance to refer to 
very different sets of activities. On the other hand, our contrapuntal reading of 
the history of plant breeding gives us a position from which we can challenge 
and infiltrate the premise of a common world of shared, compatible, and global 
targets (more food, more health, etc.). In what follows, we discuss those gover-
nance mechanisms that show how the arrangement of access privileges follows a 
technoscientific rationale wherein experts are mobilised to work on strategically 
isolated exceptions to restrictions as a general rule for everyone else. What this 
demonstrates is the suspension of the relations of the juridical order of sovereignty 
as authorised through global treaties. Significant is ‘how’ this suspension is acted 
on, taking shape in response to the complex legal relations that have accompanied 
how global markets and technologies transformed the usage of plant materials. 
 Access to genetic resources 
 One of the most prominent examples of market-based conservation in the time 
following the ratification of the CBD was the Diversa corporation, which was 
actively trying to establish a business model aimed at bio-prospecting. Crucially, 
however, the company no longer exists, and its successor operates on a very dif-
ferent idea of what genetic resources are, what they are for, and where it is in the 
life sciences ‘that value resides’ (see  Helmreich 2008 ). 
 Firstly, Diversa’s website used to refer to its activities as revolving around the 
accessing of 
 a wide variety of extreme ecosystems, such as volcanoes, rain forests, and 
deep sea hydrothermal vents, to collect small samples from the environ-
ment to uncover novel enzymes produced by the microbes that dwell there. 
Because the harsh temperature and pH conditions in which these ‘extremo-
philes’ live often mimic those found in today’s industrial processes, they are 
a rich source of potential products. Through the use of proprietary and pat-
ented technologies, Diversa extracts microbial DNA directly from collected 
samples to avoid the slow and often impossible task of trying to grow the 
microbes in a laboratory. We mine this huge collection of microbial genes, 
numbering in the billions, using ultra high-throughput screening technologies 
with the goal of discovering unique enzymes. 
 (www.diversa.com/ as accessed in May 2007; 
off-line July 2007; see  Deibel 2009 and 
also  Helmreich 2009 , 142) 
 On the one hand, this statement is very comparable with the CBD in how it 
highlights the value of biodiversity as raw material for industrial processes and 
potential products. The company specialised in accessing ecological and ethno-
botanical knowledge that can focus or re-direct the screening of enzymes. To 
that end, the extremes of biodiversity have to be screened, sequenced, and turned 
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into databases; profits are made once the information is re-materialised as food, 
energy, medicine, or other valuable commodities. On the other hand, Diversa’s 
website began automatically redirecting to ‘Verenium: the nature of energy™’ in 
July 2007. The new site explains their aim is to make ‘biofuels’ ‘from low-cost, 
abundant biomass’ and create speciality enzyme products. 
 The name change is significant; no longer is any relationship being suggested 
to bio-prospecting. The website refers to ‘new, greener methods to produce the 
fuels and other industrial products that are the lifeblood’ and ‘the building blocks’ 
of ‘our 21st century way of life’. What this re-phrasal of the more familiar ‘black 
gold’ suggests is that the disappearance of the Diversa corporation has to do with 
a devaluation of the ‘green gold’ in the life sciences, which suddenly is turned 
into an ‘abundance’ of biomass. In other words, profiting from bio-prospecting 
turned out to be more complicated than Diversa’s mission statement suggested. 
The screening of samples and the commercialisation were neither easy nor quick, 
which is reflected in how many other pioneers of the field went out of business 
(e.g., California-based Shaman Pharmaceuticals) and in reports that suggest that 
the larger companies allocate a much more limited amount of their research fund-
ing to prospecting (Boisvert and Vivien 2012;  Firn 2003 ). 
 Most reviews of bio-prospecting foreground the complexity of the contrac-
tual relations. Access to volcanoes, rain forests, the deep sea, and other extreme 
ecosystems are examples of the type of locations where numerous parties are 
involved and where it is going to be politically sensitive to determine and legiti-
mise which communities to involve in the deal. For example, Stephan Helmreich 
has described at length how native Hawaiians’’ notions of ownership and innova-
tion conflicted with Diversa’s approach and how the former objected to its bio-
prospecting activities ( Helmreich 2009 , 110–130). Furthermore, this case mirrors 
the most iconic and controversial instance of bio-prospecting, that of the well-
known deal in 1991 between Merck & Co. and INBio, a not-for-profit private 
organisation (the Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad) under the control of the 
Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines of Costa Rica. This NGO man-
aged a park in Costa Rica where Merck hoped to identify natural compounds with 
interesting gene candidates for pharmaceuticals. 
 Notably, the INBio deal involved a substantial amount of money and resources, 
which to some has qualified it as a success, suggesting potential for more direct 
and decentralised models with flexible norms as a ‘value-added approach’ to 
market-based conservation ( Safrin 2004 ). Others, however, have pointed out that 
the payments went towards the training and equipment necessary ‘to access, iden-
tify, classify, and collect biological materials on Merck’s behalf’ and that it is 
‘difficult to underestimate’ the significance of this example for the implementa-
tion of the CBD as it took ‘on the force of fact on the basis of little more than 
hypnotic reiteration’ ( Parry 2004 , 120–122, 216, see also  Brush 2005b , 19–20; 
 Boisvert and Vivien 2012 ). Here, however, the lack of convincing examples of 
bio-prospecting and its demise as a business model is more relevant. It demon-
strates the difficulty of maintaining sovereignty as the norm in relation to the 
potential to derive wealth from genetic resources. To suspend the norm is, then, 
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not a violation but a means to uphold the complex interplay of sovereignties in its 
relationship to the transformation of the usage of DNA (see  Agamben 2005 , 23). 
While ‘access and benefit-sharing’ is likely to retain broad support in international 
legal negotiations, the naturalisation of intellectual property can be followed from 
market-based conservation to the arrangement of access in the life sciences as 
integral to the process wherein the information extracted from living materials is 
rematerialised as food, health, energy, and so on. 
 Access to crop diversity 
 The Global Crop Diversity Trust 4 has taken on the nickname ‘the Arctic Vault’ 
because its seed depository is located close to the North Pole. Since late 2007, 
the vault has ensured the conservation and availability of millions of seed sam-
ples from around the world that are copies of the samples from the major crop-
diversity collections of gene banks all over the world. It was established by the 
FAO and the CGIAR shortly after the ratification of the Plant Treaty. Financial 
contributions came from government agencies, international organisations, multi-
national foundations, and corporations (including Syngenta, DuPont, and the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation). 
 The coverage in the popular press at the time of its foundation was frequently 
Biblically evocative or otherwise measuring up to that scale, calling it the ‘dooms-
day vault’ and the ‘ark of Noah’. The President of the European Commission at 
that time called it a ‘frozen garden of Eden’, and Carry Fowler, its director, termed 
it an insurance policy for the world’s food supply, while critics have called it a 
‘giant icebox’ with 4,5 million seeds. 5 Indeed, one of the reasons for the location 
was that it guarantees a temperature of -2 degrees Celsius due to the surrounding 
permafrost, even without electricity. Furthermore, this storage facility has as one 
of its objectives to act as a back-up for seeds and crops lost in natural disasters 
such as tsunamis and hurricanes or man-made disasters such as the wars that have 
destroyed gene banks and crops in Sierra Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. 
More practically, it insures the conservation of seeds against mismanagement and 
underfunding by governments that do not make crop genetic diversity a priority. 
 Accessing the collection closely mirrors the terms of the Plant Treaty as a 
multilateral system wherein access is the benefit to be shared. The FAO and the 
CGIAR can refer to the Arctic Vault as an example of its implementation, and it is 
often mentioned that everyone can access the collection – whether farmers, breed-
ers, seed companies, or biotech multinationals. Indeed, the compensation scheme 
of the treaty contributes to the funding of the Arctic Vault. However, Genetic 
Resources Action International (GRAIN) argued immediately that the logic of the 
vault is to ‘remove crop genetic diversity from farming: as people’s traditional 
varieties get replaced by newer ones from research labs – seeds that are supposed 
to provide higher yields to feed a growing population – the old ones have to be put 
away as ‘raw material’ for future plant breeding’. 6 
 The point is valid in the sense that a displaced community will not benefit 
any longer from their seeds having been frozen, as they no longer farm under 
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conditions matching those local varieties. Also in other circumstances, the utility 
of re-introducing seeds hinges on the knowledge and skills of the farmers who 
use the variety. Once local varieties are no longer being used, their reintroduc-
tion becomes unlikely. To re-introduce rare varieties requires communities that 
have safeguarded the adaptive capacity of their food systems and kept working 
with crops as ‘embodied know-how’ of generations of farmers as a composite of 
‘associations, practices and ecologies’ ( Van Dooren 2007 , 85). In this regard, it 
is much more likely that crops are lost because of the introduction of monocrops 
with traits that are valuable on the world market, which means that their stor-
age no longer serves as a back-up for local seed usage. For example, climate 
change is one of the disasters that is mentioned, as it is expected to lead to the 
loss of crop biodiversity and also a decline in agricultural production. The vault 
is presented as a climate change safe house for genetic diversity that is integral to 
the development of ‘climate-ready’ crops for the areas that are most threatened, 
on behalf of a ‘world [that] is changing faster than seeds can adapt in nature’. 7 
Hence, a discursive relationship is established between the loss of crops’ diversity 
and a wider sense of global insecurity. On the one hand, the Arctic Vault mirrors 
the Plant Treaty with a logic of governance wherein the rationale is that access 
is the main benefit to be shared, on the mistaken and persuasive belief that if a 
resource is open to all, it will be equally exploited by all ( Sunder 2007 , 106; see 
also  Chander and Sunder 2004 ;  Boyle 2003a ,  2003b ). On the other hand, the 
vault is remarkable in its affirmation of a dystopian future – unique as a global 
governance mechanism that prepares for insecurity rather than aiming to reach 
global targets. Accordingly, a limited type of access is universalised in how it 
suspends the exclusive claims (of sovereigns over their territory’s genetic wealth 
as well as intellectual property protections). In other words, the norm is affirmed 
by the exception: enclosure continues, and no restrictions on the usage of seeds by 
farmers are removed. Furthermore, the exception to the norm is an indication of 
how innovation is privileged in environmental governance. No longer is it simply 
the case that expectations are made in regard of the commodity. The commercial 
value of crops is extended to the usage of plant materials everywhere else. Enclo-
sure no longer is only about the rush to patent the genetic traits of crops when 
access refers to genetic diversity as a treasure hoard that requires maximum secu-
rity at the ends of the earth against a disaster that is to occur in a near or distant 
(biological) future. 
 Access and innovation 
 Universalising access for exceptional cases and circumstances occurs often with 
the UN’s approach to sustainable development. This includes the international 
system for the management of plant materials, and the examples are indicative of 
a decline in plant materials as a common heritage. The aim is to arrange access to 
high-performance crops as a form of global altruism, and a new kind of ‘romance 
of the commons’ is affirmed through the adoption of humanitarian licences 
whereby techniques to work on high-performance seeds are donated to scientists. 
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 The field of biofortification is one of the strategic areas of investment of the 
CGIAR and has gained prominence in recent years for its potential solution to 
malnutrition. The most well-known example comes from the late 1990s, when 
Golden Rice was launched and attracted great publicity because of the genetic 
modification of the traits of rice to express higher levels of vitamin A. Deficien-
cies in vitamin A cause blindness, especially among the poor in East Asia. The 
technology is still under development (e.g., it expresses insufficient quantities 
of the relevant substance, beta-carotene), and the work is now coordinated by 
the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), one of the CGIAR centres. The 
project is one of many wherein plant improvements are made available using a 
‘humanitarian licence’ guaranteeing that the technologies are available to ‘subsis-
tence users’ around the world and to researchers on subsistence crops who cannot 
afford to licence biotechnologies. 
 On the one hand, the Golden Rice project shows how genetic engineering is 
being identified with environmental governance. As mentioned, this is not for-
mally endorsed by the UN, and the CGIAR does not have a clear policy on plant 
biotechnologies. Traditionally, there are strong reservations about molecular 
biotechnology within the UN system and among the international representa-
tives on the CGIAR board, and the policy of the CGIAR centres had been that 
germplasm, technologies, and research results should be available in the public 
domain. Golden Rice, however, was invented by scientists working for public 
institutions who struck a deal with AstraZeneca – now Syngenta – which holds the 
commercial rights. Golden Rice technology was covered by too many patents for 
its further development; reportedly, it involved some seventy process and prod-
uct patents, held by thirty-two companies and universities ( Kryder et al. 2000 ). 
A partnership agreement was negotiated wherein the companies guaranteed the 
distribution of the rice on a royalty-free basis to marginal farmers who live in 
developing countries, as well as sublicensing to public research institutions. The 
CGIAR licence mentions that a technology may be used, made, and sold without 
royalties for trade or business that results in monetary income of less than €10,000 
a year per business. 
 Golden Rice set a precedent. For example, the HarvestPlus project (like Golden 
Rice part of the Generation Challenge programme) aims to improve nutrition 
and health by focusing on ‘simple and efficient’ screening of criteria for ‘the 
micronutrient content of the seed’ (see  Brooks 2011 , 185). The project involves 
iron-biofortified rice research, which is an example of the enhancement of sta-
ple crops through biological processes with the backing of the CGIAR as well 
as donors that include the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the World Bank, 
the Syngenta Foundation, governments, research institutes, and several non-
governmental organisations (see  Ferroni and Castle 2011 ). What is noteworthy is 
that earlier attempts at biofortification had struggled for funding at the margins of 
the CGIAR. Until recently, trials of fortified varieties had been considered unsuc-
cessful because of the complexity of the relationship of nutrition and health with 
the enrichment of staple crops. This changed when the testing of ‘high-iron rice’ 
in the Philippines was presented as having resulted in a ‘biologically significant 
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effect’ in human subjects under experimental conditions. This was interpreted as 
a ‘proof of concept’ that requires further investments, similar to Golden Rice (see 
 Brooks 2011 , 185). 
 The problem with biofortification in the 1980s and 1990s was not solely that 
there was a shortage of investments; rather, the association of research into iron-
rich rice with the MDGs was seen as side-lining the interactions among soils, 
crops, and human bodies. The likelihood of reaching similar experimental results 
elsewhere is therefore being overestimated when not including that the line of 
varieties needs to be cultivated under real-world conditions. Sally Brooks explains 
that the original testing of high-iron rice was accepted as successful because the 
experiment within which it was employed was ‘designed to make it so’ (ibid.). 
Subsequently, the experimental results became part of a policy agenda in which 
they were identified directly with the realisation of the MDGs and part of a pro-
gramme that assumes a centralised, goal-driven research model wherein the mate-
riality of rice is considered an obstacle to overcome (ibid., 186). In other words, a 
narrow focus on experimental results is turned into a project wherein crop scien-
tists are working as part of global research communities and toward a new set of 
research goals that link nutrient targets to the MDGs. What this means is that the 
zinc content of a rice variety is privileged as a vehicle through which to improve 
health and nutrition at a global scale, which overestimates the ability to move 
from global successes to local circumstances. 
 This is also the case when considering the attempt to turn plant genetic diver-
sity into a resource that can be used to create improved germplasm for breed-
ing activities with selected crops (e.g., cassava, maize, rice, sorghum, wheat and 
tropical legumes, and cereals). This is the aim for another of the (Challenge) pro-
grammes of the CGIAR, which has partnered with scientists working on func-
tional and comparative genomics in order to create databases that can be analysed 
with micro-arrays and molecular markers by multiple laboratories anywhere at 
any time. Hence, these crops can become a part of already ongoing comparisons 
of various crop genomes, and it would supposedly become possible to identify 
gene candidates and create a toolkit of genetic techniques that enable a more spe-
cific selection of genotypes. 
 Also in this instance, the experimental targets are selected in terms of their con-
tribution to reaching a global target, and humanitarian licencing is used to ensure 
access to sophisticated techniques and the information that is produced. Accord-
ingly, the CGIAR needs to enter into negotiations with companies and universities 
whose general policies are focused on patent applications. In this case, this means 
that the CGIAR must collaborate with partners who have their own patent strate-
gies, which requires confidentiality to ensure that the novelty criterion for patents 
is not violated. This is significant since the involvement of partners has no lim-
its at the level of the UN, while working with genetic diversity requires secrecy 
clauses to make it possible to work with the private sector, where patenting is the 
rule and the public domain is the exception. 
 Each of these examples shows how the ability to gain control over the agency 
of seeds is overestimated and the relationship to the environments in which seeds 
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are planted and consumed is side-lined. Access is, then, not so much a solution 
to the problem of plant breeding and plant biotechnology requiring complex con-
tractual arrangements with other stakeholders; the partnership agreements and 
humanitarian licences consolidate exceptions to patenting as strictly defined in 
terms of a group of beneficiaries of limited scope. It is not the complexity of 
who decides about the ownership and usage of seeds that is considered the aim in 
arranging access; rather, experts are mobilised to work on high-tech solutions to 
reach the MDGs as the centrepiece of joint rights and responsibilities in the name 
of the victims of malnutrition and those farmers who are expected to gain from 
cultivating this new category of high-performance crops. 
 Conclusion 
 Our primary objective here was not a critique of the new ‘miracle crops’, the 
language of global targets, or even the new organisational model of global gov-
ernance. Certainly these are features of the commodification of life, but what we 
wished to demonstrate is how species of plants are exemplary because of ‘how’ 
the transformation into species of life ™ opens up a biopolitical horizon. 
 Increasingly, the exception and the incorporation of genetic resources into 
the framework of sovereignty, as its living body, are becoming indistinguish-
able. In this regard, Robinson Crusoe provides us with a suitable setting: an 
island that the sovereign individual inevitably leaves behind when a decision 
is forced upon him and his temporary reprieve between nature and society has 
ended. Such a metaphor of a no-man’s land dramatises, in a sequential narrat-
ing of events, the moment of access and the loss of invention as an activity that 
is in harmony with nature. The story mirrors how creativity, entrepreneurship, 
and start-up culture are presented to us as a natural inclination of contemporary 
societies. One should keep in mind, however, that Crusoe could not remain in 
nature and rejoin the colonial world simultaneously: his fear for his life after 
seeing a footstep in the sand led him to stop innovating and turn to enclosure in 
defence. He saw this as the only course of action for a sovereign individual in 
nature, which was about to be overwhelmed by the uncivilised from the com-
mon world. 
 This is no arbitrary fictional counterpoint, juxtaposing a story to reality, intended 
to provide us with a convenient moral lesson. Rather, Defoe’s story was much 
admired by Jean Jacques Rousseau, who modelled his state-of-nature theory on 
it. It was his favourite novel (Rousseau [1762]  1993b , 187), and it features in 
‘Emile’ – a political treatise and an educational fantasy – as the only novel that his 
ideal pupil is allowed to read. The relationship is direct: Rousseau’s child-savage 
had to be independent as long as possible, but ‘to try to remain in it when it is no 
longer practicable, would really be to leave it, for self-preservation is nature’s first 
law’ (ibid., 187). 8 Obviously, this applies to Crusoe, giving up his inventions and 
leaving the island without having a choice in the matter. For Rousseau, however, 
it is as a fiction that his state of nature theory has the same status as the hypothesis 
of scientists. 
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 As he explains it, 
 the investigations we may enter into, in treating this subject, must not be 
considered as historical truths, but only as mere conditional and hypothetic 
reasoning, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain 
their actual origin, just like the hypothesis which our physicists daily form 
respecting the formation of the world. 
 (Rousseau [1755]  1993a , 50, 51) 
 Natural philosophers of an earlier generation, such as Hobbes and Locke, had 
either entered into heated disputes with the first experimentalists or acknowledged 
the notion that science had a privileged relationship with nature. Taking a position 
in this regard reflected directly on the content of the social contract in its relations 
to the sovereign and his power over life and death ( Shapin and Schaffer 1985 ; see 
chapter 2 on the significance of state-of-nature theories). Rousseau’s solution is 
both elegant and provocative, claiming a similar privilege for his fictional state 
of nature, in the shape of Crusoe’s adventures or those of his fictional pupil. Each 
of these enjoys the same relation to nature as the scientific hypothesis, which is 
to say that the birth of the modern novel (another of his pastimes) begins a long 
tradition of such fictional counterpoints. Soon after, Crusoe and Rousseau’s sav-
ages turned into science-made monsters, chased by Doctor Frankenstein to the 
Arctic (Shelley [1818]  2006 , 61). More recently there is Aldous Huxley’s  Brave 
New World , whose main character is named John Savage and who comes from 
the Savage Reservation. Eventually he chooses death and the horror of the last 
remnants of life in nature over the man–biology rationality that rules the world 
( Huxley 1967 ;  Deibel 2009 ). 
 Our conclusion is not that there is a straight line from Crusoe via Rousseau to 
the Brave New World. Nor do we suggest that the contemporary life sciences are 
simply leading us into an age of instrumental reason or similar types of dystopian 
futures ( Horkheimer and Adorno 1983 ). Rather, these fictions provide us with 
a counterpoint to how order is suspended through a ‘fictitious lacuna’. Crusoe 
might be a character in a novel, but our reading helps us understand that the lan-
guage of access is not simply about a number of exceptions. It has to do with a 
lacuna that is 
 not within the law [ la legge ], but concerns its relation to reality, the very pos-
sibility of its application. It is as if the juridical order [ il diritto ] contained an 
essential fracture between the position of the norm and its application, which, 
in extreme situations, can be filled only by means of the state of exception, 
that is, by creating a zone in which application is suspended, but the law [ la 
legge ], as such, remains in force. 
 ( Agamben 2005 , 31) 
 What Agamben is describing here is the contemporary predicament as situated in 
between life and law: a zone of indecision between, on the one hand, sovereign-
ties that are neatly aligned through treaties that affirm a variety of claims and 
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exceptions and, on the other hand, global concerns over plant materials given 
meaning and substance through their association with technoscientific win-win 
narratives. In turn, the essential fracture in the application of the norm is where 
this zone is situated, suspending its relation to reality, which we examined as 
a detachment of global environmental governance from environmental crisis in 
regard of the displacement and devaluation of the breeding of crops as a slow but 
steady accumulation of varieties and traits ( Gepts 2004 ;  Brush 2005a ,  2005b ). 
 This concept of the fictitious lacuna is part of his explanation of the global 
‘state of exception’ ( Agamben 2005 ). Accordingly, the state of exception is not 
strictly speaking about martial law, constitutional emergency powers, or a state of 
siege. Rather, Agamben argues that the state of exception is the dominant para-
digm of government in contemporary politics (ibid., 2). He turns to Walter Benja-
min to argue that this implies that there is an outside to law where the sovereign 
sanctions violence, and this implies an account of sovereignty where its power 
derives from the ‘ultimate undecidability of all legal problems’ (ibid., 55). Such 
indecisiveness is to be contrasted against the conventional view of the state of 
exception, which is preoccupied with how it is through making decisions that the 
sovereign maximises its own ability to exercise power. 
 The difference is fairly straightforward when we remind ourselves of how 
Robinson Crusoe is imagined as a sovereign individual in nature, where he is 
surrounded by savages coming to his personal island-kingdom. This formula is 
identical to the Hobbesian view of sovereign power as situated in a common world 
that is riddled with the fear of insecurity, whether through war, terror, failed states, 
or natural disasters. Contemporary equivalents are easy to find, including savage 
dictators with biological weapons, the threat of new genetic techniques falling 
into the wrong hands, or simply the intimate relationship between the life sciences 
and defence departments. Similarly, governments are constantly reminded that 
decisive action is needed in response to a wide range of insecurities, including 
environmental crisis, food shortages, and otherwise. 
 Our analysis, in contrast, foregrounds sovereigns becoming ‘constitutively inca-
pable of deciding’ in the sense that such actions result in the suspension of the 
constitutive order that is the basis of the capacity to act (ibid., 31). The relation-
ship of the sovereign power to nature is one of transgression, in the sense that its 
authority is overwhelmed in its application to reality – indecisive in its relation to 
the ‘fundamentally unstable’ relationship of the biological with the social ( Pálsson 
et al. 2011 ). In our version, we meet the romantically defined scientists-altruists 
as they find themselves in a situation similar to that of early-modern colonial 
voyagers such as Crusoe. Also we only perceive glimpses of how a lasting legacy 
of deeply entrenched patterns of domination, dispossession, and exploitation is 
being created, inevitably as deeply invested in the tradition of Western biocolo-
nialism and in relations of modern science and society ( Kloppenburg 2005 ;  Parry 
2004 ; Bonneuil 2002). 
 To be precise, our analogy to Crusoe begins with a footstep set on a farmer’s 
fields and a little later the enclosures (patents, UPOV 91, etc.) are in place. 
Increasingly there is a demand for protection from such insecurities, even 
though there were few buyers for genes with price tags attached. Plant genetic 
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resources have been legally turned into materially bounded and discrete entities 
that can be stored, conserved, saved, secured, and so forth. Such a historical 
analogy affirms neither the responsible commoner nor the destruction of the 
commons. Rather, these perspectives co-exist within the context of the triangle 
of access, insecurity, and enclosure that is materialised in the shape of heavily 
negotiated exceptions for certain types of strategic resources mobilised around 
new commodity chains. 
 Accordingly, we see a global politics of access that enforces how staying out of 
the networks surrounding moral economies means ‘not to win’ and being excluded 
from the wider configuration of state/non-state interests and environmental/
humanitarian causes. In this context, the usage of licencing and the appeal to 
social contracting is being imagined in terms of global targets and co-operative 
models that work in proximity to the experimental practises of the life sciences 
where DNA is expressed in digital or electronic form. For example, the CGIAR’s 
activities have already showed how access is established as a feature of the usage 
of new genetic techniques and the need for cheap, efficient, and high-quality 
access to interactive software and databases on genetic diversity in informatic 
formats that can be downloaded, accessed, copied, searched, and/or circulated 
by researchers around the world. This is only one example, which opens up the 
biopolitical horizon of the increasingly complex and fragmented understanding 
of DNA-based code that should be understood in terms of the ‘technological and 
economic management of information – that is, as a political economy’ ( Thacker 
2005 , 94;  Pottage 2006 ). 
 The conclusion is therefore not that there is an ‘island empire’ being lost in the 
mist. Countless avenues (re-)appear for epistemological viewpoints that no longer 
rely on access, enclosure, and commons as pre-given categories, units of analysis, 
and fixed referents. This chapter has demonstrated exactly this in respect of the 
ambiguous moral work of high-tech forms of gifting, charity, and altruism – only 
through claiming a fictional counterpoint are we able to point out how heavily the 
advocates of access and closely related experts are invested in a future in which 
the commons has been detached from the conservation of threatened species of 
plant life on the basis of affirming cultural diversity as a basic condition for the 
protection of nature. 
 There is, of course, a next step. What remains, if one chooses to be really prac-
tical and realistic rather than engaging in plant branding, is to do the critical and 
interpretive work. Either we continue (re-)contextualising and (re-)materialising 
the common world in terms of how new and old biological entities can be mobil-
ised in support of the lives of others or we leave any possibility of a genuine alter-
native behind, stuck in the laws of nature, frozen in time, and passive recipients 
of compensation schemes, bio-prospecting contracts, public–private partnerships, 
humanitarian licencing, and ever more grandiose social contracts. 
 Notes 
 1 Of the big five seed/chemical companies, the only exception is BASF, which simply 
points to farming as the biggest job on Earth and to the importance of high yields (see 
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www.youtube.com/watch?v=6-oGEY4WJuI). The rest are typically sweeping in their 
ads or claims. 
 (1) Bayer ‘leave a better world’ (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=NtxwV4fzJSs). 
 (2) DuPont state that they realise potential (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=ufrSBEx
QNmU). 
 (3) Dow’s 2015 sustainability goals echo these ideas (www.dow.com/en-us/science-
and-sustainability/2025-sustainability-goals/2015- sustainability-goals). 
 (4) Monsanto state that ‘food is love’ (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-jUytA-7ac). 
 (5) A Syngenta brand video uses the phrase ‘bring plant potential to life’ (see www.
youtube.com/watch?v=fEgf6Y-Pry0). All links were current as of April 2016. 
 2 International undertaking on plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, 23 Nov. 
1983, Art. 11. Resolution 8/83, from the 22nd Session, on 5–23 Nov. 1983. Material 
accessed on 1.12.2016 from www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/IU.htm. 
 3 The examples are, in the order of the discussion in the paragraph: 
 (1) UNOP (2010) A Selection of Partnership Initiative (see www.un.org/partnerships/
partnership_initiatives.html accessed on 25.11.2010). 
 (2) UN CSD Partnerships Database (2004) Safe Water System Program (available at 
http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/partnerships/94.html, accessed on 
25.11.2010). 
 (3)  UN CSD Partnerships Database (2008) Invasive Species Compendium Consortium, 
Available at http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/partnerships/2354.
html, accessed on 25.11.2010. 
 (4) Clear Air Asia annual report (accessed at http://cleanairasia.org/wp-content/uploads/
portal/files/documents/Clean_Air_Asia_Annual_Report_-_FINAL.pdf in Decem-
ber 2016). 
 4 See www.croptrust.org/ (accessed on May 2016). 
 5 Some articles are the following: Mellgren, Doug (27 February 2008) ‘Doomsday’ Seed 
Vault Opens in Arctic. From the Associated Press via msnbc.com. Retrieved on 3 July 
2011, ‘Noah’s Ark’ of Seeds Opens in Norway, by Elizabeth Weise, in  USA T oday. 
(See www.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/2008-02-26-seeds_N.htm m). See 
also GRAIN’s piece titled ‘Faults in the Vault: Not Everyone is Celebrating Svalbard’ 
(www.grain.org/es/article/entries/181- faults-in-the-vault-not-everyone-is-celebrating-
svalbard, accessed on May 2016). 
 6 Ibid. 
 7 See www.planttreaty.org/’s Section 3, on innovative partnerships (accessed on 1.5.2016). 
 8 Rousseau’s claim that men are naturally good is often misunderstood. Crucially, it 
applies only to man in nature until the encounter with others. Hence, ‘to say that man by 
nature is good is to say that man was good while he remained natural’. Rousseau’s man 
cannot be natural when living with others; therefore, ‘he is corrupt and corrupts all he 
touches’ (Cooper 1999, x, 2; see also  Rousseau 1993b , 205). 
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 5  Animal genetic resources as a 
global matter of concern 1 
 Over the last decade, animal genetic resources (AnGRs) have become a topic of 
renewed interest in the international politics that takes agricultural species as its 
object of concern. We can point to several reasons for this, which are mutually 
intertwined. The first has to do with the unclear legal status and the scope of regu-
lation stemming from biodiversity agreements that target a wide range of animal 
species from wild to agricultural, their biological materials, and various genetic 
resources within the global politics of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. 
 Here, states, nations, and indigenous communities have newly become key 
stakeholders of genetic resources, as they have been granted sovereign rights 
over territorially bound, native ‘ in situ ’ resources via the text of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, 2 signed by more than 150 states in 1992. The sovereign 
rights over genetic resources (GRs) have since been re-enforced with the adop-
tion of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing entering into force on 
October 2014. The Nagoya Protocol is a legally binding protocol guiding in how 
to interpret and act on the genetic-resources issues presented in the CBD more 
than twenty years earlier. The second of the inherently nested interests is related 
to the way in which access and animals could or should be regulated internation-
ally within biodiversity frameworks. Debate can centre on how various kinds of 
genetic resources, from plants to animals and from wild to agricultural species, 
differ from each other and how the differences may have to inform the practical 
execution of their global governance. 
 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations established the 
Commission on Plant Genetic Resources in 1983 to deal with policy, access, and 
benefit-sharing issues related to plant genetic resources. The FAO did broaden 
the mandate of the Commission in 1995 to cover all aspects of it after the CBD 
entered into force and after recognising ‘that broadening the coverage of the 
Commission would allow the Organization to deal in a more integrated manner 
with agrobiodiversity issues’ ( FAO 1995 , 66). Two years later, in 1997, the Com-
mission also established separate working groups for animal and plant genetic 
resources, followed by one expert group for forest genetic resources. All these 
committees – specifically established for different types of genetic resources – 
demonstrate how difficult the policy, ownership, and access- and benefit-sharing 
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issues related to GRs, especially AnGRs, are to understand, let alone to manage 
in practise. 
 Three examples from international analyses from the last ten years will clarify 
some of the tricky aspects of global agreements and governance of agricultural 
AnGRs and will open up good questions as to how AnGRs became such politi-
cally contested objects of agricultural nature. 
 First, we can consider a report from 2006 exploring policy options for the 
‘Exchange, Use and Conservation of Animal Genetic Resources’, commissioned 
by the FAO and funded by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland. This recognised that a fundamental tension between the 
traditional ownership of AnGRs and new global conventions had emerged ( Hiem-
stra et al. 2006 ), and this tension needs to be resolved on the international level. 
Going through various options for AnGR regulation, tellingly the report ended 
with a summarising paragraph claiming that ‘[c]lassical ownership’ of AnGR 
includes physical ownership and communal ‘law of the land’ affecting livestock 
keeping and breeding. There is an increasing tension with developments in the 
realms of biodiversity law and intellectual property rights protection. Demar-
cation of these different rights systems and maintaining equity among different 
stakeholders is crucial to avoiding conflict and increased transaction costs. In this 
context, it is important to consider the rights of livestock keepers/breeders vis-à-
vis national-level sovereign rights, as well as obligations between patent holders 
and breeders/livestock keepers ( Hiemstra et al. 2006 , 37). 
 The report had been commissioned because the FAO wanted to clarify the 
options for navigating the post-CBD world of new political and legal frameworks 
for AnGR management. Three years later, another expert report on AnGRs raised 
a concern that is related to the fact that all types of ownership relations now faced 
a potential disruptive element: 
 Private or communal ownership of AnGR, is potentially at least, challenged 
by national sovereignty over genetic resources. Individual owners may find 
that their rights to sell breeding animals or other genetic material, particu-
larly across national boundaries, are restricted. Those seeking to buy specific 
AnGR may find that they are unable to do so, or that they can only do so on 
terms that are acceptable not only to the owner of the resources but also in 
compliance with national legislation. 
 ( Commission on Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture 2009 , 29) 
 Finally, in November 2014, the Intergovernmental Technical Working Group on 
Animal Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture concluded after its meeting 
that more work on AnGRs is needed but that at least the types of their  utilisation , 
the criteria and approaches in assessment of the  country of origin of AnGRs and 
 access- and benefit-sharing policies all need further clarification, although at 
global level several internationally binding legal treaties do exist ( Commission on 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 2014 , 19–25). 
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 For a long time, animals, breeds, and their genetic resources were governed 
solely via rights that were based on physical access and use rights to animals, as 
animals and breeds were seen as ‘wholes’, whether living animals or recorded 
breeds. A mix of private, semi-private, and common ownership models for agri-
cultural and farm animals has been in use, and these have also generated much 
discussion about the forms of entitlement over the life of the animals and the best 
possible ways to organise these relations ( Hardin 1968 ;  David 2011 ). However, as 
the biotechnologies used in animal production have developed – increasing ani-
mal growth rates and affecting carcass composition, enhancing disease-resistance, 
and improving hair and fibre production ( Wilmut et al. 1992 ;  Wheeler et al. 2010 ; 
 Wheeler 2013 ) – the value of an individual farm animal, or even that of a breed, 
has become calculated not just in direct relation to the output of agricultural goods 
(e.g., meat or milk) but also by its value within the social system of breeding. 
Thus, farm animals and breeds have become valuable also for their capacity to 
produce particular kinds of offspring or to transmit valuable features encoded 
within their DNA. This capacity can be codified either in rough ideas of maintain-
ing a pure breed type or within sophisticated algorithms used on modern farms for 
calculating the ‘estimated breeding value’, which are based on the development of 
the herdbook, an innovation that enables population management through precise 
recordings made in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
 Given that the two sources of value in farm animals have been recognised for 
more than 200 years, it is surprising that at present, the global community deal-
ing with AnGRs has ended up in a situation wherein matters of access, ownership 
rights, and benefit-sharing – issues that for a long time remained unchallenged – 
have become a source of global concern and of slowly proceeding political pro-
cesses for which there are no easy resolutions. The ‘sovereignty’ over all types 
of genetic resources as described in the major international agreements gives the 
signatory states relatively free hands to develop and implement national laws and 
regulations. In fact, to fulfil their sovereignty over AnGRs, for example, the states 
must decide what types of entitlements and relationships to AnGRs they should 
implement and how this is related to the national rights that farmers have over 
their animals, for example. 
 This chapter continues the analysis in the last chapter by examining two ques-
tions about the nature and status of the AnGRs in the post-CBD world. First, why 
are the issues of AnGRs for agriculture debated alongside more general issues of 
biological diversity? Are the animals not reducible to biological diversity? Sec-
ond, how should we understand the idea of sovereignty over genetic resources 
given to the signatory states of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol in the context 
of AnGRs? The answers to these questions are painting a picture of novel global 
biopolitical terrain, at once dominated by the idea of ‘sovereign’ and by ideas of 
nature that point to it as being mankind’s common heritage for open access by all. 
 The first question builds on an institutional trajectory – an institutional 
metacode – manifested through the cultural history of AnGRs’ movement in politi-
cal institutions, most notably the FAO. We claim that early warnings about the 
need for conservation and coordinated management of AnGRs for agriculture did 
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not lead to action; instead, they failed to mobilise larger communities to action. 
This, in turn, led the animal geneticists affiliated with the FAO and other interested 
parties to join forces with the environmental conservation movement, especially 
the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), for soliciting international 
support for responding to the issue of conservation, then seen as an agenda priority. 
 Second, and following the first institutional trajectory, the way in which the 
CBD and to certain extent the subsequent Nagoya Protocol defined and under-
stood genetic resources owes much to the world of plant genetic resources (PGRs). 
Defining the rights and obligations of signatories through PGRs leads implicitly 
to the world of plant breeding, which operates differently from that of animal-
breeding practises, the key economic relations, and related biological processes. 
This is also why the key articles and provisions of the biodiversity conventions 
are couched in strong terms under national governments’ sovereign powers. This 
is the second metacode element for understanding why animals are turned into 
genetic resources and why ownership issues are so hard to resolve in relation to 
questions about the animal. 
 This has resulted in a world in which we have moved from a system in which 
animals were part of a seamless universal nature, without political boundaries, to 
a world that is a collection of discrete ‘national genetic landscapes’ safeguarded 
by state policies and legal provisions and by the ‘sovereign’. This is the new bio-
political terrain explored in the previous chapter. The difference, however, is that 
this chapter focuses on the transformation of farm animals and breeds into nation-
ally recognised genetic resources, approached again via an institutional explora-
tion of incommensurable biopolitical philosophies. The latter have resulted in a 
global but fragmented epistemic space implied or even formed by the metacodes, 
comparable yet different, as will be explained in detail. 
 The question of the animal and its institutional trajectory 
 The management of farm AnGRs became topical immediately after the establish-
ment of the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization; however, the 
concerns related to genetic resources were identified initially as a challenge for 
developing countries. The negative consequences of modern animal production 
aimed at increasing animal productivity started to raise doubts within the scientific 
community, and the first calls for genetic conservation followed quickly. Ralph W. 
Phillips, the first Deputy Director-General of the FAO, remembers how he, as the 
first employee of the animal section of the FAO, had for his whole career ‘already 
carried out activities relating to animal genetic resources [. . .] and the Organiza-
tion’s involvement in this work dates back to 1946’ ( Phillips 1981 , 5). From early 
on, the worry was about losing local breeds to extinction in developing countries. 
Local animals were replaced with globally homogenised, more productive breeds 
that became easily available and were adopted at a fast pace. Despite the early 
warning calls, little to no action aimed at conservation ensued at global level even 
if the FAO did produce a number of scientific reports and hosted a series of meet-
ings about the issue between the early 1950s and the 1960s. 
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 It was only after the widespread negative impacts of the Green Revolution 
became evident in the 1960s that AnGRs became truly a global matter of concern 
also for scientists working in developed countries. This was the direct result of 
unmanaged use of new breeding techniques in combination with shrinking and 
homogenised ecological habitats. For example, at the 1969 regional meeting of 
the European Association for Animal Production, the issue of ‘gene pool losses’ 
had been clearly articulated by  Kalle Maijala (1971 ), who also identified the root 
cause for these losses: ‘The present era of frozen semen [. . .] has reactualized 
the problem of gene losses [. . .]. The problem arises mainly from the fact that an 
effective utilization of the best animals of today automatically means setting aside 
the poorer animals, strains, breeds and even species’ (ibid., 403–444). 
 In response to these developments, the FAO and UNEP launched a joint project 
in 1974 with the title Conservation of Animal Genetic Resources. It had as its key 
objective to ‘prepare a list of breeds of farm animals in danger of extinction together 
with an account of any measures which have been recommended or taken to prevent 
this extinction’ ( Mason 1981 , 17). A Consultation Report followed ( Mason 1981 ), 
with a review of the work achieved by the project through the participating regional 
and national organisations. This made recommendations for future action. 
 The report was presented at a workshop for animal geneticists working with 
genetic resources and was framed with opening words from Phillips that simultane-
ously exhibited hope and exasperation with the current state of affairs. He proclaimed: 
 I am pleased to bid you welcome here, on behalf of the Director-General. 
It is indeed heartening to see such a distinguished group of animal geneti-
cists assembled to consider the problems of identification, conservation, and 
effective management of animal genetic resources. This is a matter critical to 
man’s future, yet it has had little recognition and little real attention. 
 ( Phillips 1981 , 2) 
 This opening speech betrays how, by the early 1980s, while the animal scientists 
had been awakened to the dire straits of genetic resources, political support for 
addressing the issue was still weak. More generally, the matter was still unrec-
ognised as a global political issue. It did not appear on general global agendas as 
did other issues related to modernisation and increased production, such as those 
targeted by the environmental movement, which had already in the 1970s started 
to attract more political attention and rapidly gain political weight in the interna-
tional political arenas. As a result, the issue of farm AnGRs did not spur action or 
attract funding for conservation efforts ( Boyazoglu and Chupin 1991 ). 
 Fast-forward a decade to the early 1990s, and one finds more explicit frustration 
with the slow progress of conservation efforts and the lack of coordinated interna-
tional action. Explaining the issue and the need for AnGR conservation ( Hodges 
1990 ), a senior officer with the FAO wrote that ‘the time for technical talk is over. 
The issues are clear. What is now needed is an effective international decision 
to provide funds to do what all agree is now necessary [at] the global, regional 
and national levels’ ( Hodges 1990 , 153). AnGRs needed more political support, 
but this proved to be hard to gain without rethinking and reframing the issue and 
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joining forces with other institutional actors. International action did finally fol-
low a few years later, in 1992, when the FAO joined forces with the UNEP and 
co-organised the Rio Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This was a histori-
cal moment for AnGRs. The summit was the place and the time at which genetic 
resources became newly articulated as parts of nature, as they were linked directly 
to the recently introduced concept of biodiversity, the key theme of this global 
meeting for the world’s leaders. 
 At the meeting, the UNEP and FAO introduced the global CBD, a conven-
tion aimed at saving biodiversity, to the larger public and opened it for signa-
tures. It was signed by some 160 countries in Rio de Janeiro, and more than 30 
more followed suit in the next few years. Several of the articles in the Convention 
addressed the issue of genetic resources directly and introduced an obligation to 
identify, report, and take appropriate actions to conserve genetic resources. The 
lengthy follow-up work finally resulted in the Global Plan of Action for Animal 
Genetic Resources (GPA), adopted in 2007, and the Guidelines on the Preparation 
of National Strategies and Action Plans for AnGRs, published in 2009. 
 Given the half-century history of AnGRs as a matter of concern for animal 
geneticists and the long wait for political action, the key question is why the broad 
political traction to save genetic resources emerged only with the introduction of 
the CBD, leading to the global and national action plans and guidelines specific 
to AnGRs over a decade later. 
 Early failures in valuation 
 The reason the FAO and regional institutions such as the European Federation for 
Animal Science (EAAP) failed in gaining political traction with their early alerts 
about the need for conservation measures is related to two shortcomings in the 
definition and the valuation of AnGRs. 
 The first shortcoming was the lack of consensus in scientific definition, valua-
tion, and prioritisation of AnGRs that could lead to simple and uniform action rec-
ommendations. The question of what it is exactly that needs to be conserved and 
how to prioritise the required conservation actions was left open, or at best was 
illustrated through cases of a few particular breeds. The more important short-
coming was the failure in global political and legal identification of the respon-
sible parties and beneficiaries of any value derived from the costly conservation 
actions. This, in turn, is linked to the fact that, until the CBD, AnGRs had been 
treated as a mixture of ‘private’ and ‘commons’, or as ‘club commons’ (David 
2011) to be shared and used, subject only to individual farmers’ and breeding 
associations’ property-right regimes and explicit regulations at country level. 
 After the introduction of the CBD, the legal status of AnGRs changed globally: 
they were politically identified as falling under the sovereign power of the signa-
tory parties to the Convention. This marked a major change and complication in 
access- and benefit-sharing relations that was later affirmed by the GPA in 2007 
and later by the Nagoya Protocol. Understanding the latter is especially important, 
since this understanding exposes the new overarching paradigm under which the 
value of most AnGRs today is to be governed. 
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 The failure to provide a clear direction for conservation is related to the argu-
ments about the overall role of various kinds of AnGRs in animal production. 
When the concept of AnGRs was first introduced among animal scientists, they 
were framed in and through two distinct means (both scientifically informed) for 
demonstrating the role of AnGRs in animal production. In both means – involving 
‘utilizationist’ and ‘conservationist’ standpoints – the value of AnGRs in animal 
production was literally assigned in two incommensurable ways (and to some 
extent this debate continues even today). The earlier-mentioned report on genetic 
resources explained the main differences between the two approaches: 
 The utilizationist’s primary concern is the immediate usefulness of available 
genetic resources to improve livestock populations [. . .]. The loss of breeds 
as distinct identities is not generally a concern, as long as the genes that make 
these breeds potentially useful are retained in the commercial stocks . . . 
The preservationist’s primary objective is long-term conservation of genetic 
resources for future use. This view emphasizes the value of preserving the 
widest possible spectrum of genetic diversity to be prepared for unpredict-
able changes of future needs. The greatest possible number of breeds are to 
be preserved as purebreds. 
 ( Hodges 1984 , 2–9) 
 The differences in these two views boil down to conserving ‘the known useful 
genes’ in one form or another versus conserving the ‘genetic diversity of whole 
animal breeds’ to hedge the uncertainty stemming from unknown future needs. 
The first approach is intended to save the sliced and diced, functionally valuable 
component of animals, no matter the ‘breed’; the other involves also the animal 
breeds in pure-bred form and maximising diversity as an insurance policy against 
future unknowns. Although it is analytically distinct from animals or breeds, 
the animal scientists first presented the issue of AnGR conservation as a choice 
between  isolated genetic components of immediate utility in the production of 
high-performance animals and the maximisation of genetic diversity via conser-
vation of  local breeds in their animal forms . In these two approaches, AnGRs 
are conceptually presented as different objects of conservation and seen as valu-
able for different purposes. 3 
 In addition, the failure to identify the parties responsible for conservation irked 
conservationists, since this is related directly to the economics of conservation or, 
more generally, to the political economy of global animal production. The prob-
lem was captured in a report produced by the United States Board of Agriculture 
National Academy of Science (1993, 3): 
 The concept of conservation [. . .] is complex. One can think of live animals, 
being preserved in situ, or in some semi-artificial situation; alternatively one 
may think of cryogenic storage of sperm or fertilized ova or other tissues or 
gene segments. The economic problems are difficult with both live animals 
and with haploid or diploid cells. Who is to pay? There are also questions of 
how many to preserve, for how long, and where. 
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 Although plant varieties and their genetic material had been protected by vari-
ous intellectual-property systems since the 1930s (see  Kloppenburg 1988 ), 
AnGRs were used by farmers and breeder associations alike without generalised 
or specified rights and restrictions imposed at global level. Since there was no 
definition of the ownership rights to genetic materials of animals, the global 
assignment of conservation responsibility through political processes proved 
to be impossible without more specific consideration. Yet the ownership and 
responsibility questions have been more straightforward with regard to pigs and 
chickens. This reflects what  M. Tvedt et al. (2007 , 8) note about the legal pro-
tection of farm animals (and their protection in general) and of chickens and 
pigs in particular: 
 ‘For farm animals there are strong biological and physical means of protec-
tion available: The owner of the animal can more easily than the plant breeder 
have an overview and control over who is receiving genetic material from 
his animals or his population. For poultry and pig breeding, however, where 
farmers often buy hybrids whose genetics are more difficult to reproduce. 
The sale of hybrids is thus an important strategy for maintaining physical 
control over the genetic material by physical control over the material. For 
other breeds, in particular cattle, the physical ownership is often combined 
with a register, a herd book that maintains a protocol for the generations of 
animals fulfilling the criteria for registration’. 
 This is why the various claims about the value of AnGRs and the need for their 
conservation, made by both the ‘utilizationists’ and ‘conservationists’, rang on 
deaf ears outside animal-scientist circles. The failure to spur action was not born 
out of the scientific challenge to demonstrate the value of AnGRs in animal pro-
duction or the lack of consensus on setting the priorities for conservation. Instead, 
and above all, it was a problem of political economy: who is to pay? And even 
more importantly, who is to benefit? 
 Global reframing of animal genetic resources 
 The Food and Agriculture Organization remained active on AnGRs since the FAO/
UNEP consultation programme in 1980; established its Committee on Agriculture, 
which kept reminding about the issue at the FAO Council level; and designed an 
FAO expert consultation round on AnGRs in 1989 and in 1992 ( FAO 1990 ,  1999 ; 
 Steane 1992 ). What became clear over the years was that a global binding frame-
work was needed. 
 Anticipating the global political agreement on AnGRs, Hartwig  de Haen (1992 ), 
Assistant Director-General of the Agriculture Department of the FAO, wrote in 
1992 that 
 it is clear that there is a greater awareness that a framework for the manage-
ment of global animal genetic resources must be established. It is most appro-
priate that this Expert Consultation is taking place now in the context and 
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timing of the Earth Summit, the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) to be held in Brazil in about eight weeks’ time. 
 ( de Haen 1992 , 3) 
 The first reframing of the AnGRs came in the form of the global CBD a few 
months later. The Convention had been long in preparation, and the FAO had been 
involved in its drafting phases, influencing, among other issues, the inclusion 
of genetic resources in the text and their definition. There were two important 
reframings in the Convention. First was the definition of the genetic resources, 
as genetic material of ‘actual or potential value’ (CBD, Article 2). This definition 
bridged the two views on the valuable material to conserve, or the ‘utilizationist’ 
and ‘preservationist’ standpoints. Genetic resources become genetic material that 
can be ascribed demonstrable or imaginable value. But the question then arises of 
who has the right to link any value claims to AnGRs. 
 The other reframing answered this question. Under the definitions in Article 2 
and Article 15, genetic resources found  in situ within the territory of a signatory 
were identified as belonging under the sovereign power of signatory states rep-
resenting the nations of the world, reframing their ownership relationships glob-
ally. This is how the CBD enacted an important political redefinition of genetic 
resources: previous problems with definition of the value of non-human life were 
re-articulated through the politics of nationhood, in the idea of national differ-
ences found within the CBD’s vision of genetic nature. 
 With the CBD, also AnGRs became tightly nested within the sovereignty of 
nation-states and their geography. A reversal of the old idea of nations being 
rooted in natural differences of human populations took place – non-human 
populations, conceptualised as ‘genetic resources’, could now be identified and 
placed under national or international jurisdiction in terms of their geographi-
cal location and the political powers representing the nationhood that governed 
that geographical area. A global cartographic demarcation of non-human life took 
place as these novel objects of nature were grafted to the foundations of national 
sovereignty. They became a new part of the body of nations, a novel form of non-
human nationhood. 
 The Convention assumes that a significant amount of power over AnGRs and 
their governance rests with the signatory nation-states.  Tvedt et al. (2007 , 24) 
interpret the Convention and its provisions in the following manner: 
 The CBD presupposes the right of a country to exercise sovereign control 
over its AnGR (accompanied by a number of responsibilities). From the per-
spective of an exporting country, one of its main concerns is to maintain any 
property rights it may wish to retain over the AnGR after the resources have 
left the country. Similarly, it may wish to ensure that the rights of the exporter 
are respected by the buyer/importer of the AnGR. The most prominent ratio-
nale for a country to regulate export of AnGR would be to secure a right over 
that particular material in the future, including preventing that countries or 
companies gain control over these resources (e.g., through patenting or other 
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forms of intellectual property rights), which might reduce the value of it in 
the exporting country. 
 This reframing introduced a whole new system wherein the value of any animal 
breed will be decided by the signatory nations but without any common reference 
as to what constitutes a legitimate value claim over the material, except the condi-
tion ‘ in situ ’. In the CBD, this refers to the ‘conditions where genetic resources 
exist within ecosystems and natural habitats, and, in the case of domesticated 
or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they have developed their dis-
tinctive properties’ (CBD, Article 2). The  in situ condition for valuable genetic 
resources has had tremendous effects on how AnGRs are seen in the post-CBD 
world, especially because AnGRs thereby became divorced from the idea of being 
freely circulated or tradable objects of nature. They stopped being global com-
mons and instead became subject to the political powers of the Convention states, 
many of whom did not have and still do not have a clear stance on what are 
‘valuable’ AnGRs to them and on how they will enact their sovereign powers 
over access and benefit sharing for the valuable AnGRs. Definitional and legal 
disorientation followed. 
 The third reframing of AnGRs happened as they were presented through 
ideas derived from the plant and crop worlds. The FAO background study for 
the CBD on the ‘Exchange, Use and Conservation of Animal Genetic Resources’ 
acknowledged this as a major problem. It explained that, although current debates 
regarding agricultural genetic resources have largely had a crop/plant focus, these 
discussions and the international instruments or agreements that are emerging 
have tended to frame the debate for AnGR as well. At first sight, plant breeding 
does not differ much from animal breeding. The genetics of plants and animals 
are based on the same principles. Plant and animal breeders both need genetic 
diversity in order to advance, and the genetics determine adaptation to particular 
agro-ecological circumstances, as well as product qualities to a large extent. How-
ever, plant varieties can be protected by a plant breeder’s rights (UPOV), which 
is not the case for animal breeds/strains. Plant breeders aim at the development 
of new uniform varieties that are defined by certain phenotypic traits that can 
identify them from other varieties. Farm animal breeding is largely based on the 
selection of individuals within populations rather than selection between popula-
tions or strains. Farm animal breeders are interested in individual animals (within 
populations/breeds), while the whole population of a plant variety (clones) is the 
main focus of plant breeders ( Hiemstra et al. 2006 , 22). 
 The third reframing, then, pointed to the difference between animal and plant 
genetic resources as biological bred resource and as legal protected asset: ani-
mals might carry interesting genetic traits, but it is difficult to exploit one unique 
genetic characteristic. There are no large international breeding centres. Most 
breeding takes place on farms – except for poultry and, in some cases, pigs – 
and the centres of origin or diversity for AnGR are not as clearly defined as for 
plants. Most importantly, farmers are not protected by internationally binding 
rights frameworks, while plant breeders are, by the International Union for the 
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Protection of New Varieties of plants (UPOV). 4 The differences between PGRs 
and AnGRs make it hard to enforce a single system for the two; however, the CBD 
does exactly this by enforcing the sovereignty of the signatory states as its starting 
point for rights and obligations via discourses that are appropriate mostly for plant 
genetic resources. 
 These reframings of the AnGRs dictate much of how global action now unfolds. 
Fifteen years after the CBD, in 2007, the state representatives adopted the first 
GPA at the Interlaken Conference, held in Switzerland, in what was called a ‘his-
torical breakthrough’ by FAO Director-General Jacques Diouf ( FAO 2007 , iii). 
This GPA includes the ‘Interlaken Declaration on Animal Genetic Resources’, in 
which the sovereign right of states over their AnGRs for food and agriculture was 
restated (in declaration point 2). 
 In situ , transboundary, and domestic applications 
 The fact that animals can move across politically established boundaries created a 
potential problem with regard to these sovereign rights, however, and led to new 
politically innovated categories of AnGRs, such as ‘transboundary’ for species 
that criss-cross institutionalised national borders. The GPA explained:  
 Assessing the status of animal genetic resources on a global scale presents 
some methodo-logical difficulties. In the past, analysis of the Global Data-
bank to identify breeds that are globally at risk was hampered by the structure 
of the system, which is based on breed populations at the national level. To 
address this problem [. . .] a new breed classification system was developed. 
Breeds are now classified as either local or transboundary, and further as 
regional or international transboundary. 
 ( FAO 2007 , 13) 
 With these political documents, not only did animals considered to be genetic 
resources become ‘national’ (pertaining to a state), but some of them also became 
‘transboundary’, regionally and internationally. A result of this is that political 
categories are infused with conservation-science categories because of the politi-
cal economy involved in the ownership rights over the actually or potentially 
valuable genetic resources. 
 These categories are as much politically informed as they are scientifically 
valid. The definitions of ‘ in situ ’ or ‘transboundary’ are inherently related to the 
political cartographic demarcation of the natural ecologies of domesticated ani-
mals, pointing to the deep connection between politics of value and the science 
of conservation of farm animal genetic resources. This is what eventually created 
the incentive for nation-states to act on the issue of genetic erosion of animal 
populations, but it is now, at the same time, generating new challenges, which 
it is beyond the ability of animal scientists or even international organisations to 
resolve. 
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 This complexity is reflected in how national legislation has been drafted and 
implemented. Writing about the challenges in the implementation of the CBD, 
legal experts Matthias Buck and Clare Hamilton claim that 
 [t]he complex subject matter of ABS [Access and Benefit-Sharing] its poten-
tially far-reaching impact on uses of genetic resources and related informa-
tion as well as the lack of detail in [the] Articles [. . .] have all combined to 
result in a very low level of domestic implementation by Contracting Parties 
to the CBD. By 2007, only 39 of the then 189 Contracting Parties had estab-
lished domestic legislation or were in the process of doing so.  
 ( Buck and Hamilton 2011 , 48) 
 Recalling the negotiations for the Nagoya Protocol in Japan in 2010, the pro-
tocol that has been meant to clarify the initial CBD, they point out that the key to 
really ‘understanding’ the real effects of the CBD and Nagoya Protocol is depen-
dent on how national governments use their sovereign powers: 
 The adoption of the Nagoya Protocol was a major achievement in interna-
tional biodiversity policy making in 2010 [. . .]. Further international work 
preparing the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol will be needed. How-
ever, most efforts over the coming years will need to be at domestic level, 
developing implementing rules to prepare ratification. In all Parties with 
well-developed or emerging research and development systems this will 
require significant awareness-raising with stakeholders from research and 
industry and will result in quite some discussions. 
 (ibid., 60) 
 Most importantly, the national implementation has to take into account that access 
should take place on ‘mutually agreed terms’ and ‘be subject to prior informed 
consent’, conditions found in the original CBD and all subsequent treaties. How-
ever, other aspects of AnGRs can be regulated too, and some countries have 
already put in place requirements related to animal genetic material’s import and 
export. The FAO’s Technical Working Group on AnGR Access and Benefit Shar-
ing Issues explained in a recent report, released in 2014, that 
 [t]he sovereign right of states to determine access to genetic resources should 
not be confused with other categories of entitlement, such as the private own-
ership of an animal. A farmer’s ownership of an animal may be conditioned 
by certain laws. For example, animal welfare legislation may regulate the 
handling, husbandry, and transport of the animal. Other laws may require the 
animal to be vaccinated against specific diseases, and so on. In a similar way, 
ABS measures may require that, even though an animal is the private prop-
erty of a farmer or the collective property of a community, certain conditions 
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(e.g., related to the need for ‘prior informed consent’) must be met before it 
can be provided to a third party for research and development. 
 ( Commission on Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture 2014 , Item 18) 
 Indeed, some of the countries have already exercised their sovereign rights. For 
example, China adopted a set of rules on AnGRs, or ‘Measures of examination 
and approval of the entry and exit of animal genetic resources and the research 
in cooperation with foreign entities in their utilization’, in 2008. These include 
a set of import and export rules, such as prohibition of ‘the export of newly dis-
covered and unverified’ AnGRs in cooperation with ‘any foreign institution or 
individual’. Also, any research into and use of AnGRs involving foreign collabo-
rators requires permission from the Chinese authorities. As for flows in the other 
direction, South Africa requires a ‘genetic impact assessment’ before the import 
of new breeds. These studies need to be prepared by reputable South African ani-
mal scientists and submitted to the relevant authorities ( Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food Agriculture 2009 , 34). National implementation related to the 
sovereign rights over genetic resources can be carried out in many ways, not only 
via regulation of access or benefit sharing but also in terms of use and impact, as 
the examples from China and South Africa demonstrate. 
 Conclusion 
 The challenges are now located within the realm of national politics, the realm of 
the sovereign, where the  in situ condition for genetic resources is turning animals 
into collections of nationally valuable animals, governed not under the previous 
ideals of global commons but via the logic of ‘actual and potential’ value, with 
innovated political re-categorisation of natural beings, and by national restric-
tions to access, use, and benefit sharing linked with AnGRs. In other words, we 
have moved from a world in which animals once were part of a seamless univer-
sal nature without boundaries to a world that is a collection of discrete ‘national 
genetic landscapes’. These genetic landscapes are epistemologically fragmented 
spaces, where sovereignty, nature, and traditional models of ownership meet. 
 Over the course of the short history of AnGR conservation, the natural identi-
ties of farm animals have been refashioned. They have shifted from being objects 
of breeding to boost the productivity of individual animals and breeds to being 
objects that can be defined as actually or potentially valuable as nationally rec-
ognised genetic resources. The change in their identity is a creative output of the 
animal breeding and conservation sciences that have argued for the value of ani-
mals on the basis of scientific evidence as well as the global politics surrounding 
ownership rights over genetic resources considered valuable. AnGRs, including 
farm animals, are now as much political as they are scientific, as much ‘cultural’ 
as they are ‘natural’ in essence (see Table 5.1). 
 What becomes clear in looking at the key changes in the value system related 
to AnGRs is that AnGRs have become increasingly complex objects for breeders, 
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 Table 5.1 The historical changes in AnGR conceptualisation 










 •  Natural breeds or 
functional genetic 
components 
 •  Identification based 
on scientific definition 
and evaluation of 
conservation need 
 •  Natural-cultural objects 
 •  Identification based on the 
politically agreed  in-situ condition 
 •  Genetic material found within the 
geographically bounded territories 
of the nation-states, with the 
exception of politically innovated 
‘transboundary’ category of animals 
 ACCESS AND 
BENEFIT-
SHARING 
 •  Private access, or club 
commons 
 •  Freely usable for those 
who have physical 
access and local 
permission to use 
 •  No enforced benefit-
sharing system 
 •  National sovereignty: access and 
use only under the rule of the 
sovereign party to the conventions 
 •  Local political decision on access 
and benefit-sharing principles 




 •  Actual or potential 
value, no consensus in 
general 
 •  Actual AND potential value 
 •  Based on territorial  in-situ condition 
and local political valuation of 
important national genetic materials 
scientists, and politicians alike, with no easy answers for the balancing of rights, 
responsibilities, and benefit sharing in the near future. While AnGRs have finally 
become a global issue with high political priority and prompting action, so have 
the political conditions under which the animals live become inherently global 
entanglement of science and politics, culture, and nature. 
 At the same time, the status of AnGRs that reside outside the CBD system – 
owned by either private companies or breeding societies before the entry into 
force of the CBD, in 1993 – is unclear. Although they are not objects of the CBD’s 
articles, they might still be affected by and become targets of legal interventions – 
for instance, in the way in which China and South Africa have applied the sov-
ereignty over genetic resources within their respective AnGR regulations. This 
makes the global system even more complicated, and most likely we will see a 
number of unforeseen challenging cases in the future. 
 The CBD, the Global Plan of Action, and the Nagoya Protocol present a global 
value system framing AnGRs in a way that is finally generating conservation 
action at national level. But on the global level, the system is more muddled than 
ever, calling for a great deal of conceptual, political, and legal analysis to bring 
more clarity to the current condition, which requires the generation of discrete 
genetic landscapes and marks AnGRs with their nationally correct  in situ location 
as the political condition for their existence. Given the complex history of AnGRs 
as a global matter of concern, creating clarity to the present situation will not be 
easy. 
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 At least three key elements need to be clarified with regard to AnGRs and the 
various claims laid to them if we are to move on in the global politics, in the cre-
ation and implementation of legal frameworks at national level, and in reflection 
on the true impact of the CBD and Nagoya Protocol. 
 1 What is the true scope of the CBD and Nagoya Protocol in terms of AnGR 
types? Are there types of AnGRs that remain totally unaffected by and reside 
outside the scope of the global conventions? 
 2 Do the signatory parties (nation-states) have prototypical reactions to – or at 
least broadly identifiable patterns in – the implementation of their sovereign 
powers over AnGRs? 
 3 If the signatory parties do exhibit identifiable patterns, a guiding typology 
of CBD and Nagoya Protocol implementation at national level would aid in 
making sense of how governments are adopting the global agreements (types 
of entitlement claims, access regulations, etc.) at large. 
 Addressing these three points would give a much richer and much more coherent 
overview of AnGRs’ status in the post-CBD and post–Nagoya Protocol world 
than is currently available to the public. 
 Simultaneously, comparison with the material in the previous chapter, deal-
ing with crop diversity rather than animals, reveals the idealism of such reform 
proposals. The complexity of the status of AnGRs as a global subject is identi-
cal to that of plant genetic resources when considered in terms of a fragmented 
global bio-scape. Certainly this is a dynamic that remains closely tied to more 
established notions of sovereignty, albeit in the performance and governing of 
collections of nationally valuable animals. Yet it is exactly this affirmation of ‘the 
state’ in the context of AnGRs that recalls what we called a ‘zone of indecision’, 
following Agamben (2005). Our perspective is not simply one that affirms the 
need for greater coherency between the performance of a stable internal order and 
the global attempts at balancing rights, responsibilities, and benefit sharing. 
 Again, we point to a suspension of the relationship between law and life as a 
permanent feature of the forces shaping the reality of our bio-infused present: 
what we have called metacodes are, then, about the reality of AnGRs as a global 
entanglement of science and politics, culture and nature, and about its suspension 
outside the context of the nation as a heavily disciplined set of concerns to be 
acted on and interacted with. Of course, this argument remains incomplete. The 
next chapter takes us away from genetic resources and global treaties, establish-
ing the basis for a direct comparison in which our analysis of these subjects is 
considered alongside the rapid transformation of genetic engineering in the field 
of synthetic biology. 
 Notes 
 1 This chapter is adapted from a previous version which was published in Tamminen, S. 
(2015). Changing Values of Farm Animal Genomic Resources. From Historical Breeds 
to the Nagoya Protocol.  Frontiers in Genetics , 6, 279. doi:10.3389/fgene.2015.00279 
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 2 The text of the treaty can be found online via www.cbd.int/ (accessed on 1.12.2016). 
 3 There are several ways to maximise diversity. Conserving a sum of isolates of pure 
inbred populations will allow saving rare genetic combinations adapted to specific envi-
ronmental conditions but might result in losing overall diversity. Other options, such as 
maintaining a large outbred population resulting from crossbreeding, also would yield 
great diversity but do not usually fit the overall aim of conservation programmes. It is 
generally recognised today that a combination of  ex-situ and  in-situ measures applies 
complementary strategies. 
 4 The text of the UPOV treaties can be found via www.upov.int/portal/index.html.en 
(accessed on 1.12.2016). 
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 6  Recoding synthetic life  
 From openness to (free as in) freedom 
 It seems to me that in Cynicism, in Cynic practice, the requirement of an 
extremely distinctive form of life – with very characteristic, well defined rules, 
conditions, or modes – is strongly connected to the principle of truth-telling, of 
truth-telling without shame or fear, of unrestricted and courageous truth-telling, 
of truth-telling which pushes its courage and boldness to the point that it becomes 
intolerable insolence. 
 Foucault, the lectures on ‘the Courage of 
the Truth’,  2011 (1983/4): 165 
 Introduction 
 Some years ago, we were introduced to Synthia, which is the nickname for a syn-
thetic genome that was genetically engineered and patented by the J. Craig Venter 
Institute. While most attention was directed to the suggestion that an artificial life 
form had been created, the accompanying press release referred to the experiment 
as a step towards the ability to ‘activate’ and ‘boot up’ cells. 1 Here, we take this 
informatics metaphor as a starting point for examination of the field of synthetic 
biology, asking what a counterpart to the organism nicknamed Synthia might look 
like. Let us call her Cynthia, who leads an ‘Open Source’ kind of life and who 
might, if she so chooses, try to grow up to be free from influence, like the ancient 
Cynics, who renounced wealth, reputation, and power. 
 Synthia was announced in 2007 with this headline: ‘Goodbye Dolly . . . Hello 
Synthia!’ Hence, her personality was immediately cast in the same light as the 
controversies surrounding the cloning of animals, and, like the creation of Dolly 
the sheep, Venter’s experiments were challenged on ethical, social, and environ-
mental grounds ( ETC Group 2007a ,  2007b ; see also  Franklin 2007 ). The ETC 
Group, the civil society organisation that came up with the nickname, pointed 
out that there were patents on the sequenced and the synthesised version of the 
genome. To them the outcome of the experiment pointed in a familiar direction: 
one day soon, the strings of synthesised DNA that had been re-assembled in a 
living cell by Venter and colleagues could be put to work to create whatever syn-
thetic compound might be in demand on the world market – plastics, chemicals, 
oil, and the like. 
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 This chapter, in turn, asks what kind of alternative could take shape in synthetic 
biology. How could a counterpart to Synthia be imagined, again personified as a 
living embodiment of synthetic biology but simultaneously being a representative 
of the potential for another type of relationship to those who will have to live and 
work with the synthetic life forms under construction? We call her Cynthia – but 
not to brand her with crudeness, ignorance, and the lack of culture of the stereo-
typical cynic. She might be insolent in regard of conventional boundaries between 
life and technology, but she is simultaneously an ‘extremely distinctive form of 
life’ with a tendency towards ‘truth-telling’ and towards the search for what ‘is 
indispensable to human life or which constitute[s] its most elementary, rudimen-
tary essence’ ( Foucault 2011 , 171). 
 Before we introduce Cynthia properly, some observations are needed on the 
ownership of knowledge in the life sciences. The first section outlines how 
the ownership of knowledge is being re-established on the foundation of the 
dream of a world wherein sophisticated approaches to knowledge about life and 
genetic engineering are situated outside the complex rules and controversies 
for which the life sciences are notorious. To set the stage for the comparison 
requires a further intensification of our theoretical analysis, applied directly 
to ‘how’ the convergence with informatics has changed the status of the pat-
enting of DNA. Keeping the patent in its place requires a reconfiguration of 
practises, institutions, and forms of capitalisation that cut across the process of 
extracting information from living materials and its eventual re-materialisation 
as bioproducts – as food, medicine, energy, and so forth. 
 In the second section, we get to know Cynthia ‘in person’. On the surface we 
can reach out by discussing her affinity for the activities of the design community 
associated with the BioBricks Foundation (BBF), which has created a registry 
with thousands of biological parts that are accessible over the Internet. Our objec-
tive, however, is to see her for who she really is, which means going beyond 
the rhetorical difference between patenting and Open Source. We compare the 
minimal genome project (aka Synthia) to the minimal cell project (aka Cynthia), 
which involves many of the same protagonists as the BBF. This is also why there 
is a ‘copyleft’ symbol in the title of the chapter. This ‘reverse copyright’ sign 
points to a comparison between the ethics of Open Source in synthetic biology 
and the response in informatics to the accommodation of source code by the free 
software and Open Source movements. 
 Recoding life in common 
 Extracting information from oceanic bodies 
 Ah! sir, live – live in the bosom of the waters! There only is independence! There I 
recognise no masters! There I am free!’ Captain Nemo stopped at these last words, 
regretting perhaps that he had spoken so much. But I had guessed that, whatever 
the motive which had forced him to seek independence under the sea, it had left 
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him still a man, that his heart still beat for the sufferings of humanity, and that his 
immense charity was for oppressed races as well as individuals. 
 – Jules Verne,  Twenty Thousand Leagues under 
the Sea , (1992, written in  1870, Chapter 10) 
 More than a decade ago, Craig Venter went fishing, sampling microbial life from 
his yacht the  Sorcerer II as he travelled the world. His expeditions continued 
from 2004 until 2010, but it was the initial journey that got most publicity, reach-
ing a global audience through Discovery’s epic television specials. These showed 
Venter as a heroic individual driving forward the frontiers of science. Simulta-
neously Venter’s media-friendly genetic circumnavigation of the oceans on his 
yacht caused controversy through its symbolism, consciously calling to mind 
Charles Darwin’s explorations as well as the journeys of marine adventurers such 
as Jacques Cousteau. 
 It is in this regard that the citation recalls Captain Nemo, the outlaw submarine 
captain from the novel  Twenty Thousand Leagues under the Sea . Unlike the voy-
ages of Darwin and Cousteau, a comparison with Captain Nemo pinpoints the 
twisted manner wherein Venter became an unlikely champion of the ocean as a 
commons. The global audience of the expedition became witnesses of ‘Venter’s 
captain Nemo fantasy about the free seas’. What the citation shows is a fantasy 
wherein the ocean is a place without masters, of freedom and independence from 
society and its rules. Nemo searches for independence, and so did Venter and his 
supporters when they confounded their critics by making the data extracted from 
the oceanic samples they collected available in the public domain. 
 What was confusing was that Venter was expected, and not without cause, to 
behave in a way that had made him into a global celebrity as the CEO of Celara, 
which is the company that attempted to patent hundreds of genes in direct compe-
tition with the public universities and institutes that had started the human genome 
project. The latter even attempted to make such patenting more difficult by releas-
ing data into the public domain as quickly as they could and working with a higher 
accuracy. Unsurprisingly the countries with jurisdiction over the waters that his 
yacht came into contact with reacted on the assumption that he was after their 
valuable genetic resources. They maintained that such access requires benefit-
sharing in line with the Convention on BioDiversity (CBD) that had been in place 
for nearly a decade (as discussed in  Chapters 4 and  5 ). Who was to know what it 
was worth? Perhaps the data derived from the unsequenced microorganisms out 
of the ocean might – after being recomposed using bioinformatic technologies – 
turn out to be highly efficient in transforming sunlight into energy as Venter had 
announced (see  Delfanti et al. 2009 ;  Pottage 2006 ). 
 As Venter put it in a later interview: 
 [W]e’re sailing across the open ocean in international waters and there’s this 
current moving across the Pacific at 1 knot. So there are microbes in that 
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current that move from open ocean into the 200-mile limit of French Poly-
nesia, and suddenly the French call that French genetic heritage. Right? And 
they want to own it and capitalize on it. It takes months of paperwork to take 
200 litres of seawater now from the open ocean. Before we published our 
paper nobody cared, because nobody assumed anything was there. So I think 
it’s quite comical that we’re called pirates for describing the data and making 
it available for the world. 
 (quoted by  Rimmer 2009 , 171) 
 The citation shows that Venter realises that the oceans are hardly a common heri-
tage any longer. Moreover, those areas where they are still considered a global 
commons are not on the outside of international treaties or generally accepted sci-
entific procedures that marine biologists have to abide by. Nevertheless, Venter’s 
expedition easily deflected any accusation of ‘biopiracy’ of genetic materials. It 
is, after all, difficult to place a claim on something valuable when it is being given 
away for free. 
 This time, however, Venter did not attempt to patent the data, and neither was 
he charging for access to the information extracted from the samples. Yet the anal-
ogy with Captain Nemo still breaks down. Even when dealing with the oceans, 
the territories of this earth have been claimed: Robinson Crusoe does not get to 
live on the island, Frankenstein’s monster could not stay in the Arctic, John Sav-
age has left the Savage Reservation of the brave new world, and there is no ocean 
where synthetic biologists can work in perfect isolation. Each of these fictions is 
an example of Rousseau’s state of nature whose inhabitants are independent and 
free at a distance from the rules of the world’s civilisation, in this case featur-
ing the oceans as the exterior of the national world on the outside of sovereign 
jurisdictions. The same applies to Venter’s contribution to oceanography: his con-
cern was not the global commons, territorial or environmental; he was mapping 
the oceans’ genetic material in order to know the interior of the natural world. 
What he was after was to open up the natural world even further, this time around 
through its transformation into an informational horizon of infinite complexity, 
making visible for an instant the establishment of a frontier area that is not within 
the reach of patentability and state authority. 
 The comparison is, therefore, a different one. Rather than stopping with Cap-
tain Nemo or with Rousseau’s state of nature, we have to go further back in time: 
to Hugo Grotius, the author of  The Freedom of the Seas (1609). Grotius wrote on 
behalf of the Dutch companies who were opening up the passage to the East under 
the control of the Portuguese. The basic notion that Grotius defended was well 
known at the time, which is that there was a difference between states’ jurisdic-
tion over neighbouring waters and with land. Following a number of commercial 
conflicts in the Indies, Grotius began to defend the rights of the Dutch to seek 
trade and to choose whether to make agreements with its inhabitants or take by 
violence what they wished. What he argued was that no individual could own the 
oceans and therefore it is impossible for states to have comprehensive jurisdic-
tions over the high seas. 
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 Even though geneticists on highly publicised sailing expeditions might no lon-
ger need the compass and sextant of Grotius’s times, the dynamic of opening up 
a new terrain by claiming rights of passage and usage is the same. When Grotius 
granted natural rights to civilised/colonial men, this implies that they could make 
use of the natural world beyond their societies. This argument resurfaces with 
every natural philosopher with a state-of-nature theory afterwards until Rousseau: 
every right held by a state must be derived from an individual, and if an individual 
could not own something, then this right could not be transferred to a state of 
society ( Tuck 2003 , 82–92). Of course, Grotius was doing exactly what Rousseau 
later denounced as typical of how all who are ‘reasoning on the state of nature, 
always import into it ideas gathered in a state of society’ ( Harvey 1996 , 163; see 
 Rousseau 1993 , 65). For example, Grotius’s state of society mirrored the interests 
of Dutch naval companies as the main beneficiaries of his definition of the natu-
ral right to property and the right of self-defence. These companies, when going 
beyond the jurisdictions of ‘civilised’ states, were granted the ‘most far-reaching 
set of rights to make war which were available in the contemporary repertoire’ 
( Tuck 2003 , 108). 
 A generation later, Grotius’s rights to violence were integral to the work of 
Thomas Hobbes when he posited that it is only the sovereign who can guaran-
tee any right to property. This, however, suggests a very different comparison. 
A Hobbesian world view, extended to Venter’s fishing trip, is one wherein only 
states can guarantee the recognition of patents and compensations. In this case 
genetic resources might be within a sovereign jurisdiction or some states might be 
able to enforce their preferred ideas about intellectual property. To push the anal-
ogy, it is through the assertion of an oceanic genome to be catalogued and taken 
back home that Venter calls back to Grotius’s and Hobbes’s lack of knowledge 
of the inhabitants of the newly discovered territories. Neither Hobbes nor Grotius 
considered their state of nature a fiction; the former saw nothing but violence in 
the behaviour of those he considered to live outside civilised society, and Grotius 
describes the Americas and the Indies as being in a ‘primitive state [. . .] exempli-
fied in the community of property arising from extreme simplicity’ (Grotius 1993, 
Book II.II.2 as quoted by  Arneil 1996 , 49). 
 The comparison is not confined to sovereign claims on oceans or biodiversity. 
After all, there are contemporary candidates that can be seen as the inhabitants of 
an equivalent to the early-modern version of the natural world. The comparison 
is not about how people today continue to be reported and depicted in ways that 
resemble the ignorance of Hobbes and Grotius’s references to savages. Rather, 
their ignorance of the natural world can be followed to how the living entities 
sampled by Venter and his team were described without attention to environmen-
tal context – seasons, temperatures, salinity, and so on. What this does is assert an 
overly simplistic oceanic genome as an outside where the rules can be rewritten 
to establish the same familiar claims of property and authority. 
 Sometimes states plant flags, whether on genetic resources or where the melt-
ing of ice caps might leave oil in its wake. At other times, the map still has many 
blank spaces, whether it is in regard of the contemporary exploration of the 
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oceanic genome or the Dutch incursion into the colonial map of the world as 
the Portuguese saw it. Territory shaping and map remaking invariably implies a 
return of state-of-nature theories, and following the suggestion of natural founda-
tions, we arrive at contemporary notions of social contracts between science and 
society. Here a globalised frontier area is shaped through the collection of samples 
and through extraction of data to be made freely available. The question is who 
ends up featuring as the inhabitants of how this contemporary equivalent to the 
state-of-nature theories, taking their places alongside the natural foundations that 
are being re-imagined. With Venter it is the genetic wealth of the oceans, trans-
ferred from the outside of the jurisdictions of society over territory and resources 
to its inside, as freely available data. Along similar lines we turn to the multidi-
mensional representations and translations of genetic materials into complex bio-
logical entities that are at some unspecific point in the future to be re-materialised 
in the name of progress and all that’s good about contemporary societies. 
 To put it differently, it is through forms of life that sovereignty comes into being 
( Tamminen and Brown 2011 , 2). However, this leaves open ‘how’ exactly this 
coming to being occurs. What a comparison with Grotius’s view of the oceans 
demonstrates is that the controversy is not merely about a frontier in between 
nature and society or a new type of ‘border crossing’ for national claims on novel 
types of biological resources or for the free sampling of the oceans. Either posi-
tion is constitutive of a state of society, going along with the bioinformatic returns 
to the state of nature as a foundation myth. Biology’s return to the ocean as the 
mythical origins of all life, and of natural history as a field of knowledge, is mir-
rored in the life sciences as a setting that shows how sovereignty is ‘maximised’ 
through the mobilisation of corporealities. 
 Exchanging DNA as information 
 Unlike Rousseau’s state-of-nature theory and the fantasy of free seas, Grotius jus-
tified the opening up of the natural world as a necessary condition for establishing 
ownership and authority. The same applies to the life sciences in its relationship 
to the interior of the natural world. What lies between the life sciences and the 
ownership of knowledge is the extraction and recoding of information extracted 
from living materials, which has to be actively mobilised and redirected in order 
to consolidate the patenting of DNA. 
 The key step has already been taken. The footprint that Crusoe found in the 
sand ( Chapter 4 ) implied that the establishment of the patenting of DNA was a 
decisive event that opened the potential for numerous biological terrains to be 
opened up to private investments. The patent as an institution is expected to func-
tion as a reward for inventions that grants exclusive rights, enabling temporary 
monopolies that make it possible to recover the necessary investments. Patent-
ing was developed in response to advances in organic chemistry and the rise 
of related industries in the late nineteenth century, including the appearance of 
research laboratories in corporations ( Dutfield 2003 ). With the life sciences, how-
ever, this means that its introduction is based on an extension of the criteria for 
Recoding synthetic life 99
the patenting of chemical compounds. It is within this context that the patenting 
of DNA began, typically traced to the early 1980s US Supreme Court ruling estab-
lishing that DNA could be a ‘technical subject’. The implication of this decision 
was that legally speaking, certain types of DNA were designated as a ‘composi-
tion of matter’ and a ‘product of ingenuity’ rather than a ‘manifestation of nature’ 
( Parry 2004 , 85;  Calvert and Joly 2011 ). 
 Genes, like chemicals, were suddenly declared to be a product of human inge-
nuity rather than found in nature, an invention rather than a discovery as they 
had previously been ( van Dooren 2007 ). The same applies to the numerous other 
verdicts around the world that expanded the scope of patenting, thereby affirming 
the status of DNA as an invention and hence as ‘technical’ rather than biological 
or natural. For example, it became possible to patent the isolation of DNA in a 
purified form – as sequenced strings of DNA that can be considered useful and 
valuable enough to be subject to patent rights. In these cases the main condition is 
that the DNA was not purified before, and it makes no difference where the DNA 
was taken or that it might have already existed for some time (see Carolan 2010). 
 Simultaneously, the patenting of DNA should not be understood as a mere 
continuation of what happened in the early 1980s. Consider, for example, the 
US Supreme Court’s invalidation of the patents held by Myriad Genetics for two 
genes with mutations that cause cancer (BRCA1 and BRCA2) in 2013. The com-
pany had patented the two genes as diagnostic tools for the testing of breast can-
cer. Therefore Myriad would be able to ask higher prices for its tests and restrict 
access to medical information obtained through those tests. The case got wide-
spread publicity because of the suggestion that there may be stricter criteria for 
patenting in the US. What is significant, however, is not only whether the legal 
criteria for patenting are changing but that diagnostic tests, such as Myriad’s, are 
quintessentially about the invention and usage of informatic artefacts and related 
practises. The original ruling by a district court judge had invalidated the patents, 
with the observation that the DNA involved was known through its ‘informa-
tion content, its conveyance of the genetic code’. Similarly, the final ruling by 
the Supreme Court in 2013 explains that Myriad’s claims were not expressed in 
terms of chemical composition and did not create or alter the genetic information 
encoded in the genes or the genetic structure of the DNA (in the case  Association 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc .). 
 What matters here is not the invalidation of patents or the limitation of their 
scope out of concern over whether patents are the most appropriate means to 
facilitate the distribution of information. Either result simply underscores a prem-
ise shared by the advocates of patenting and the critics who advocate for openness 
(Lawrence Lessing, James Boyle, Yochai Benkler, etc.). The shared objective is 
the acceleration of the development and introduction of novel technologies (see 
 Hilgartner 2012 , 192). After all, the patented invention has to be described in the 
application, and the information is released to the public when the grant expires, 
thereby guaranteeing its reproducibility. 
 The case of these two genes illustrates how the biology requires that more 
legal work to be done for DNA to be turned into an object that can be patented. It 
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is only under certain conditions and with considerable difficulty that informatic 
practises can be identified with DNA that has stable chemical properties ( Calvert 
and Joly 2011 ;  Caulfield 2011 ). Hence, there will be patents and there will be pat-
ent controversies to be settled, as more legal work will be needed to separate DNA 
as a composition of matter from DNA as an informatic entity. Simultaneously, 
however, it is a biological object that requires cheap, efficient, and high-quality 
access to interactive databases, software, and hardware, to facilitate labour in the 
form of downloading, copying, and searching for information the world over via 
the Internet. 
 Many examples show that property rules, institutions, and practises are being 
reconfigured in a strategic relation with the patenting of DNA. For example 
purified DNA as a ‘composition of matter’ (by analogy to patenting in chemis-
try) is simultaneously an informatic entity. It might rely on databases with pre-
programmed homology searches of databases that make information available in 
the public domain. It might simultaneously have its DNA patented while copy-
rights are granted automatically for the programming source code. There are many 
possibilities, such as software patents on processes that make computers run faster, 
interfaces for better interaction, or other types of improvements in efficiency. 
 Similarly, we can look at the specially developed series of supercomputers 
called Blue Gene. Such supercomputers are necessary for any type of model that 
is based on tera- and peta-bytes of information, and this includes models that 
requires its processing power for the simulation of the complexity of the interac-
tions that take place in the context of cells. For example, the Blue Brain Project 
is one of several supercomputers in which Blue Gene is used: its objective is 
‘to reverse engineer the human brain and recreate it at the cellular level inside a 
computer simulation’ with the aim of developing treatments for brain disease. 2 
Furthermore, Blue Gene is Linux based: Linux has long been the key working 
example of open source as ‘a collective project that has been shared and worked 
on freely’ ( Berry 2004 , 80). This demonstrates the increasing likelihood of infor-
mation being released by using the licences that remove the possibility of restrict-
ing the usage of information, whether studying it, changing it, or redistributing it. 
 The choice between the two models is increasingly procedural, with the devel-
opment models (open vs. closed) seen as applicable in different circumstances. 
Openness is the option that guarantees the ability to modify programmes and mod-
els to allow for an increasingly wide variety of researchers with highly specialised 
knowledge and different levels of commitment to work together. The examples 
are numerous; there are many ‘open bio’ versions of programming languages like 
BioJava, BioPerl, BioSPICE, and so forth. Each has its own voluntary or public 
science support communities like the Open Bioinformatics Foundation. Similarly, 
there are different kinds of databases that use Creative Commons legal tools, such 
as the Material Transfer Agreement, or regular open licencing, for example in a 
protein database called the ‘neurocommons’ and the ‘hapmap’. 3 
 However, there is a further step to take, engaging directly with how the tension 
between patenting and openness has taken hold over life as a technological cre-
ation in synthetic biology. Again this is about ‘life in common’, although the issue 
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here is not the extraction of information from the environmental commons (e.g., 
the ocean) but a geopolitical claim on a natural world wherein living materials are 
being translated to digital formats. This sets the stage to get to know a new biolog-
ical form of existence – one that might be ‘radically other’ in how it is engineered 
and as a practical relationship to nature that informs what social life ought to be. 
 BioBricks™ or synthetic life  
 The process of extending engineering principles to biology and applying business 
principles to genome engineering were logical and indeed inevitable developments. 
 – George Church in  Regenesis: How Synthetic Biology 
Will Reinvent Nature and Ourselves , 2012,  75 
 BioBricks™ 
 Is the extension of engineering and business principles to synthetic biology  inevi-
table , as the opening citation suggests? Perhaps; after all, the costs of gene syn-
thesis and editing might very well continue to fall and mastery of these techniques 
will increase, possibly even exponentially as in the realm of computer processing. 
Yet application of business and engineering principles is not nearly as inevitable 
as suggested when followed in a different direction. Specifically the direction to 
go is the one indicated in the sign (‘  ’) in the heading of this section as well as 
the chapter’s title. 
 The sign for a ‘reverse copyright’ has a distinctive relationship to the extension 
of intellectual property to the life sciences. This is the principle and movement 
of copylefting, popularised by the Free Software Foundation (FSF), the Open 
Source movement and more recently adapted by the Creative Commons and vari-
ous other organisations and sectors. Its origin is the moment of copyright being 
extended from the texts of novels and newspaper articles to the ones and zeros of 
source code and information in datasets. Unlike patents, copyrights are automati-
cally granted to authors, and this is also true for a copyleft. The difference is that a 
copyleft implies that the right to restrict the distribution of data and modification 
therefore is given up. Accordingly BioPerl© and BioPerl  might refer to the same 
programming language that allows life scientist to write their own programmes 
and ask novel biological questions, but only the latter guarantees that the software 
can be modified and developed further by any of its users. This is a condition of 
the copyleft: other should be able to use, study, copy, modify, and redistribute the 
information in any of its forms. 
 The life sciences are one of many sectors wherein copylefting has become a 
regular occurrence, accompanying the usage of software and databases. Often 
there is little to indicate that such licences are in effect, since copylefting has 
become nearly taken for granted as a common-sense means of guaranteeing that 
information remains accessible and of facilitating sharing and collaboration on 
the gigabytes of data as well as the hardware and software that run models and 
simulations that are integral to interrogate the biological in its complexity and 
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interactivity ( Deibel 2013 ). Accordingly, Venter’s publicly released body of data 
on the oceanic genome and various bioinformatic tools co-exist with copylefting 
as a principle that is at least as inevitable as in the application of business and 
engineering principles that George Church mentions in the opening citation. Fur-
thermore, the copyleft principle can also be found in experimental settings where 
sophisticated approaches to genetic engineering are identified with the values of 
openness, collaboration, and the public domain. 
 The principal example is found, again, in the field of synthetic biology. In 
particular, the BBF has in a short time come to symbolise ‘the pragmatic yet 
speculative ethos of the growing discipline of synthetic biology’ (see  Mackenzie 
et al. 2013 , 709). The BBF revolves around a registry of thousands of biological 
parts that are accessible over the Internet, which is considered the principle plat-
form for the coordination and acceleration of the circulation of knowledge and 
the development of novel technologies. There is an open licence, the BioBricks ™ 
Public Agreement, which has as its aim that anyone can ‘make their standardised 
biological parts free for others to use’. This is what sets the BBF apart from most 
genetic engineering efforts. It is a front runner with its claim that genetic engi-
neering is an area of science that is inclusive, transparent, and open. Such values 
are what the BBF’s slogan is premised on: ‘the engineering of biology can be an 
ethical approach that benefits all people and the planet’. 4 The website of the BBF 
raises the expectation that synthetic biology will result in a genuine alternative to 
a closed model of genetic innovation. The insistence on such an ethical approach, 
however, remains largely examined in regard of the meaning of ‘free’ and ‘open’ 
in the context of the ‘inevitable’ extension of engineering and business principles. 
 The business of synthesising DNA 
 For some time now, many companies have been doing DNA synthesis, which is 
something that spares life scientists in various fields of specialisations the time-
consuming effort of doing DNA synthesis themselves and makes increasingly 
complicated projects possible ( Bügl et al. 2007 ). One notable example is the case 
of Codon Devices, which was a start-up company founded in 2004 with ven-
ture capital that specialised in the delivery of synthesised DNA and the design of 
related applications. Crucially, Codon went out of business in 2009 because there 
was little profit to be had in the synthesis of DNA, which is becoming cheaper. 
Also Codon was not successful in finding customers for the design of applica-
tions. This company was home to many of the key proponents of the BBF, and its 
failure is significant as an indication of the competition among companies doing 
DNA sequencing and synthesis. This is where the BioBricks Foundation is impor-
tant: genetic engineering as a field of activity ranges from the dramatic lowering 
of costs of the translation of DNA into informatic formats to the much more dif-
ficult re-materialisation of this information through DNA synthesis. 
 The function of the BioBricks™ registry is to guarantee access in the sense of 
allowing for any ‘useful purpose’ that synthetic biologists might have come up 
with. A frequently used basic definition of synthetic biology expresses it in these 
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terms: synthetic biology is a field that aims to design ‘biological parts, devices 
and systems for useful purposes’ (see  Rathenau 2006 ). This matches a way in which 
the distinctiveness of synthetic biology is frequently characterised on the basis 
of how the field has shifted from the behaviour of the whole genome and the 
understanding of biological systems as a whole to the ‘capacities for editing the 
interaction of the parts’ ( Brent 2004 , 1213–1214; see also  Knight 2005 ). These 
parts have been engineered ‘to meet specified design or performance require-
ments’. Accordingly ‘genetically encoded objects’ perform biological functions 
and can be connected as ‘functional inputs and outputs’ of different parts, which 
are sometimes referred to as biological equivalents of sensors, logic gates, and 
actuators. Each new sequence gives researchers reason to consider ‘additional 
natural genetic parts’, such as ‘protein coding sequences, regulatory elements for 
gene expression and signalling and other functional genetic elements’ ( Canton 
et al. 2008 , 787). The ethics of the BBF are derived from the principle of free 
distribution, or a licencing scheme that aims to prevent these biological parts from 
being patented, since that patenting would undermine any sense of a ‘freedom to 
operate’ for synthetic biology ( Henkel and Maurer 2007 ; see also  Rai and Boyle 
2007 ). Similarly, there is a strong emphasis on inclusion, which is exemplified by 
an annual competition for students called International Genetically Engineered 
Machine, or iGEM. Its size has grown vastly, to the point where teams are formed 
all over the world and the Web site describes the aim as being the development 
of an ‘open community and collaboration’. Examples of what the students con-
tribute are ‘biological devices to make cells blink’ and projects ranging from 
wintergreen-scented bacteria to the development of an arsenic biosensor to screen 
drinking water (see also  Baker et al. 2006 ). 5 
 The suggestion is that genetic engineering is becoming something that is easy 
to do. The most telling example is the teams of students coming up with novel 
applications that behave in accordance with protocol and that can be produced 
independently as biological parts that are then available for use in other projects. 
Conceptually, this has been called ‘modularity’, a term that Yochai Benkler has 
explained as ‘the number of people who can, in principle, participate in a project’, 
which ‘is inversely related to the size of the smallest scale contribution neces-
sary to produce a usable module’ ( Benkler 2006 , 101). From this standpoint the 
BBF and iGEM show that BioBricks™ design is modular enough to allow widely 
distributed and loosely connected individuals to cooperate with each other. More 
generally, the suggestion is then that synthetic biology should be conceived of in 
terms of a new type of economics that revolves around ‘sharing’ and ‘peer pro-
duction’ (see  Benkler 2006 ;  Kelty 2004 ,  2012 ). The problem, however, is the step 
from the modularity in bio-informatics, which is highly modular, and the design 
of functions, to a growing community of open, creative, motivated, and skilled 
contributors that has taken shape. 
 From a certain perspective this is in line with how DNA synthesis can be consid-
ered highly modular, in that the technique relies on software to facilitate a ‘multi-
plicity of techniques coordinated on an elevated surface (the screen)’ ( Mackenzie 
2010 , 189; see also  Newman 2012 ;  Deibel 2009 ). As Andrew Mackenzie has 
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explained with regard to DNA 2.0, another company involved in design of syn-
thetic DNA, the improvement and optimisation of its properties revolves around 
digital sequences that are: 
 flanked by various genetic promote, regulator, start and stop sequences. The 
actual codons that comprise the synthetic DNA construct can then be ‘opti-
mised’ by the software to confer optimum expression of the target protein 
construct in the chosen host. Once a design has been assembled using these 
components, Gene Designer can check it for errors, optimize it in various 
ways (for instance, for expression in different target organisms), check if for 
completeness and then provide an estimate of the cost of synthesis. 
 ( Mackenzie 2010 , 188, 189) 
 The suggestively named application (‘Gene Designer’) invokes the rhetoric about 
synthetic life being entirely artificial within a business model that is an example 
of how the expression of DNA in digital or electronic forms can be ‘acted upon 
and interacted with in ways that would not otherwise be possible’ ( Parry 2004 , 65; 
see also  Pottage 2006 ). Yet the ‘Lego-like’ characteristic of BioBricks™ appears 
exaggerated when its immateriality is accentuated. This is further illustrated by 
closer examination of the citation that began this book, from a company called 
‘Thermo Fisher’. 
 The new Invitrogen™ GeneArt™ CRISPR Search and Design Tool allows 
you to quickly search our database of >600,000 predesigned CRISPR guide 
RNAs (gRNAs) targeting human and mouse genes or analyse your sequence 
of interest for de novo gRNA designs using our proprietary algorithms. Up to 
25 gRNA sequences per gene are provided with recommendations based on 
potential off-target effects for each CRISPR sequence. Once you’ve selected 
the optimal gRNA designs, you may purchase your gRNAs and other recom-
mended products for genome editing directly from the Web tool. 
 (see www.thermofisher.com/ last checked in February 2016) 
 The citation refers to Thermo Fischer’s database, proprietary algorithms, and 
genome editing directly from the Web-based tool. This illustrates how the cap-
turing of value from the representation of DNA in a more ‘purely informational 
form’ – as data or images – will be ‘standing in for particular materials resources 
henceforth to be absent’ ( Parry 2004 , 65). What is absent is the kind of materi-
ality of scarce and valuable resources that disappear when priority is given to 
informatic ways of thinking about life and nature, which no longer represent the 
extraction of information from living materials. 
 Even more than with Venter’s micro-organisms, there is no need to engage in 
bio-prospecting or to negotiate ‘access and benefit-sharing agreements’ because 
the information is freely available in nearly infinite quantities (see  Hayden 2003a, 
2003 b ;  Hoare and Tarasofsky 2007 ). What this suggests is that the activities of the 
BBF are similarly detached from any suggestion of life as having value (as going 
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extinct, sacred, economically scarce, etc.). This is only the case, however, with 
regard to biological and cultural diversity, for recently the pendulum has swung 
back from a discourse that prioritises informatics towards chemistry. Several of 
the start-up companies have not been successful, showing, just as Codon did, that 
there is considerable competition between companies that specialise in efficient 
access information and its speedy delivery as synthesised DNA. The relation-
ship to chemical companies suggests a return to a model organised around the 
patenting of DNA and established market models. Work to mobilise specialised 
knowledge and involvement in the design of applications is no longer a reflection 
of the expectations that once were attached to the informatic basis of the genetic 
techniques. Instead the work is centred on the ability to add value to the nexus of 
(petro-)chemical industries as well as health and agriculture. 
 It remains to be seen whether these companies can deliver products that are able 
to compete with established industries, especially in light of raising these expec-
tations, which makes it increasingly difficult to identify ‘where it is in biology 
that value resides’ (see  Helmreich 2008 ). However, the emphasis on biochemistry 
implies that priority is given to exclusive ownership. On the one hand, we have 
seen how information has been extracted from the global commons (Venter/the 
ocean) and turned into a commons of freely available information and related 
techniques, some of which are found in synthetic biology. On the other hand, we 
have seen that the affirmation of such a boundary area was a strategic necessity 
that sits between informatic ways of thinking about life and the established rules 
of property, business, and commodity chains, whether as medicinal test, a geneti-
cally altered crop, a biofuel, or otherwise. 
 Minimal species of life™ 
 For life, like a machine, cannot be understood simply by studying it and its parts; 
life, to be understood, must also be put together from its parts. 
 ( see  Church and Regis 2012 ) 
 There is nothing ‘inevitable’ about how markets and technologies come together 
in synthetic biology, either in terms of markets or as an approach to the engineer-
ing of biology. What is inevitable, however, is the ‘mistake’ of interpreting ‘a form 
of life’ that is dynamic and multifaceted as ‘a life form’ (Mackenzie 2013, 712). 
 Let us consider two examples. The first is a project called Open Worm. Its aim 
is similar to the other types of software projects discussed; it seeks contributors to 
programme a complicated piece of Open Source software to simulate the behav-
iour of a microscopic roundworm with a low amount of cells. What is significant 
is the project’s tag line, which equates its efforts with: ‘building the first digital 
life form. Open Source’. This project makes the mistake that is mentioned ear-
lier. Its view of the ‘building of life’ is primarily discursive, presenting a digital 
model of a form of life as a life form, thereby mixing naturalistic and informatic 
language. The second example is found in a new start-up associated with the 
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Danish pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk called BioSynthia, which markets 
itself as a ‘catalyst for change’ with promises to produce synthetic counterparts to 
chemical synthesis in the name of a ‘greener tomorrow’. Here, naturalism is prior-
itised, depicting a green alliance between synthetic biology and the petrochemical 
industry as the agents of inevitable change that are realising the sustainable future. 
This time, however, the mistake is made by how its name refers to synthetic biol-
ogy and the minimal genome project. 
 Synthia as a life form is the embodiment of several forms of life that are the 
object of genetic engineering in a series of experiments. The first of these involved 
cloned smaller stretches of DNA that were re-assembled into a bacterial chromo-
some. To do this the repair mechanism of yeast was used to create the largest 
synthetic bacterium ever made inside a cell. The procedure revolves around sys-
tematically ‘knocking out’ the protein-encoding genes to find the smallest set of 
genetic material necessary for the genome to survive under controlled labora-
tory conditions. Venter and his colleagues chose a bacterium with the smallest 
known genome ( Mycoplasma Genitalium ) and showed that some 20% turned 
out to be ‘dispensable’. Subsequently they synthesised the entire genome ( Myco-
plasma Genitalium JCVI-1.0). The third experiment was the one that captured 
most media attention. Using two different types of bacterial species, they trans-
ferred one set of genomes into recipient cells, which thereby ‘turned themselves 
into members of the first’ (Church et al. 2012). Finally, they assembled another 
genome ( M. mycoides JCVI-syn1.0), which was transplanted into a recipient cell 
with the same result (ibid.). 
 In turn, we submit Cynthia as the nickname for a life form alongside Syn-
thia, Dolly the sheep, ‘terminator seeds’ and many other examples of ‘species 
of life™’, which are alive and invented ( Deibel 2009 ; see also  Haraway 1997 ; 
 Franklin 2007 ;  Van Dooren 2007 ). These are her relatives, with Cynthia as a new 
member of the family and another living embodiment of the various ways wherein 
possible alternatives are suggested by, for instance, associating digital models 
of life forms with open source or by combining experiments in synthetic biol-
ogy with the greening of chemical industries. What is particular about her? Cru-
cially, she seeks to remind us that there are different types of principles on which 
the design process could be based. She is not the materialistic type, nor does 
she believe that genetic engineering should be something easy and fun to do – 
something that is ‘modular’ enough to involve others. This is her most redeeming 
quality: she advocates openness and really does not think that her work belongs 
only to her. In other words, she is committed to lead an ‘open source’ kind of life. 
 As discussed, modularity in the life sciences is exaggerated. It might apply to 
bio-informatics but much less so to communities interested in genetic engineer-
ing. Therefore it is not so certain that she is really that different from her sister 
Synthia, who had few choices in life because of how debts and investments were 
made to bring her into this world. We don’t know yet: the story so far is rhetori-
cal: we’ve only made a quick attempt to give life to Cynthia by modelling her 
personality on the designs of the BBF. What we have to do is to bring into the dis-
cussion the kinds of experimentation that brought the two sisters into existence as 
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synthetic life forms. After all, Synthia is the living embodiment of the ‘minimum 
genome project’, which is how Venter and colleagues attempted to identify the 
essential genes of a minimal bacterium. In turn, we can get to know Cynthia better 
as her personality forms at the intersection of the life sciences and Open Source 
in informatics. Specifically, there is an attempt to build a minimal living cell ‘that 
we create ourselves, from the ground up’ (see Church et al. 2012). 
 Accordingly, Cynthia’s creators were critical of these experiments, pointing to 
how only a tiny portion of the cell is synthetic: a synthetic genome that depends 
on the recipient cell’s natural and native apparatus for its expression. In a coun-
terproposal they explained that the minimal genome continues to rely on com-
plex combinations of gene expressions and that removing these one by one leaves 
many ‘false essentials’, unnecessary elements that can be removed if one had 
taken overlap and interaction into account. Also many ‘essentials’ have unknown 
functions that leave much of the complexity of a bacterium or cell intact, and 
they suggest that this means that ‘[b]uilding a machine from mysterious parts can 
only create a mysterious machine’ ( Forster and Church 2006a , 1–2). As Church 
explains, if the first level is a minimal genome, then the second level is a liv-
ing entity put together from its constituent parts and ‘composed of the fewest 
components that can jointly carry out all the normal processes of life’ (ibid.). 
Accordingly the synthetic genome is one of many biochemical subsystems that 
are needed to ‘encode a near minimal, self-replicating system dependent only on 
small molecule substrates’ ( Forster and Church 2006b , 4). 
 Unlike  Synthia , who came into existence through experimentation, this 
‘minimal cell project’ has not yet been realised. Nevertheless it provides a fur-
ther glimpse, alongside the BBF and the ‘synbio’ business model, of  Cynthia ’s 
outlook on life. She will set out to minimise whatever is non-synthetic in her 
life. She actively questions how synthetic she really is, and, in all likelihood, 
she will be good whatever she puts her mind to. Furthermore, she seeks to 
collaborate, which reflects the BBF’s position as one of the preconditions for 
the proposal of biochemically defining each of the functional processes taking 
place in a cell. 
 Yet her ambition is likely to blind her to the way in which she represses her 
(biological) uncertainty, variation, and fragility whenever it is out of her control. 
After all, even the minimal cell project will not be as synthetic as her creators 
imagine it to be or to become. They know that inevitably some uncharacterised 
components will be ignored or removed that turn out to be needed under differ-
ent circumstances. Similarly biological variation continues: the biochemical cir-
cuitry of the bacterium will grow, replicate, and interact with the host cell, while 
pre-existing or synthetic pathways will bind together in unexpected ways. Even 
though there is the suggestion that in time fewer unknown or uncharacterised ele-
ments will be found in new versions and that this will allow greater control over 
the resulting performance, Cynthia retains a notable dislike for her wild relatives 
out there in nature. She, in contrast, has to remain in her place of birth, the labora-
tory, where she dreams of materialising her kind of virtual reality: one wherein her 
kind of control over life and nature takes the form of a world that is safe, secure, 
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and sustainable, with little sense of her own complexity or of the environments 
that she might come to inhabit. 
 Cynthia’s social life 
 Cynthia does not mind having her behaviour checked by whomever has the tech-
nical expertise and motivation to get involved, whether inside or outside the labo-
ratory. She expects to be watched over by others, which might even improve her 
designs by working bottom up and in ways that are transparent, co-operative, and 
decentralised. The problem is that it is mainly in a rhetorical sense that she gets 
to interact with the ‘users’ of her designs. This casts doubts on how ‘open’ she 
could become. 
 Consider the biosafety and bio-security of synthetic biology. These are the two 
themes that are most controversial, and an open community has been proposed 
as a more efficient means of dealing with the risks that accompany the ability to 
synthesise the DNA of polio, smallpox, extinct influenza strains, and dangerous 
pathogens (see  ETC group 2007a ,  2007b ). In this model, preventing the risks 
linked to dangerous organisms that might fall into the wrong hands or that that 
be created and used with malicious intentions is seen as a responsibility of the 
scientists involved. Collaboration within the design community is proposed as 
more efficient for the detection of misuse than is regulation. This matches the 
well-known slogan of the Open Source movement: there is the need ‘to create 
and maintain open networks of researchers at every level, thereby magnifying the 
number of eyes and ears keeping track of what is going on in the world’ ( Carlson 
2003 , 212). 
 The idea is that whenever there are enough contributors to a project, the prob-
lem must be easy to solve for someone. Following this viewpoint, resolving 
biosafety concerns depends on the availability of documentation and a transpar-
ent trial-and-error selection in the design process. Mistakes in the design of the 
BioBricks or other kinds of synthetic DNA being exchanged should be detected 
without the need to trust others not to make mistakes when using the technology 
(see  Schmidt 2008 ). The kind of Open Source philosophy that is being invoked 
in synthetic biology as well as when separating the responsible kind of biohack-
ing from possible misbehaviour is called Linus’s law. This ‘law’ is named after 
Linus Torvalds, the inventor of Linux, and derived from a book called  The Cathe-
dral and the Bazaar that states that ‘given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow’ 
( Raymond 1999 ) where ‘bugs’ is a jargon term for errors and problems. The best 
known examples of how such bugs are solved through the diversity of the network 
is Linux, which was originally developed for personal computers. While only a 
small percentage of these run on Linux, it has by now become the leading operat-
ing system on mainframe computers and servers. 
 When comparing the field of synthetic biology to Linux, the former very 
comfortably invokes a notion of ‘users’ as innovators in contrast to manufactur-
ers of various kinds, whether for software or for physical products ( von Hippel 
2005 ). The emphasis on a design community and a student competition closely 
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resembles the Open Source philosophy that was coined in the nineties when the 
term ‘open source’ replaced the idea that free software would be available without 
any costs, which was considered inappropriate in the corporate world (see  Berry 
2008 ). Similarly, the BioBricks approach prioritises the technical achievements 
of the engineers who, like the programmer of source code, chooses ‘open source’ 
or ‘closed source’ depending on which of the two development models is more 
or less efficient under different circumstances ( Berry 2004 , 81;  Raymond 1999 ). 
 Open source programming, however, is seldom easy, which is something that 
matters when taking the analogy with synthetic biology seriously. Linux is not 
necessarily that easy to use, and only recently are there versions that are no longer 
difficult to obtain, install, and operate for those without the necessary program-
ming skills. It is not the simplest approach that should have priority: the analogy 
between synthetic biology and open source breaks down when considering its 
limits on the involvement for those users who are not experts to be the ones setting 
the priorities about what is a stable release and what is not. As is well known, the 
programming of Open Source Code, such as that of Linux, is much less suscep-
tible to computer viruses than proprietary versions. For instance, the website of 
Ubuntu (a widely used implementation of Linux that is particularly user friendly) 
explains that it is necessary to be extremely careful in the design of a new version 
because ‘regression in a stable release is a catastrophe’. This does not apply to 
synthetic biology, where the priority is placed on the detection of possible errors 
and misuse of its technology. There is no review process wherein priorities about 
reliability and stability are identified by collaborating closely with the users of its 
inventions. These might have very different ideas about the detection of errors, 
risks, and measures to prevent that the operating system might become unreliable. 
 Is it not the least to expect from an Open Source philosophy that it does not 
exaggerate its capacities and its reliability? Synthetic biology characterises the 
system or programmes that are studied primarily in terms of performance accord-
ing to protocol. This reflects an exaggerated sense of control over the biological 
complexity of a synthetic construct that consists of mostly unknown and unstable 
biological processes. The analogy with Open Source that is being drawn in syn-
thetic biology makes few efforts at truly opening up and revealing the messiness 
of biological processes, which disappears from view within its informatic rheto-
ric. The same applies to pressing questions of safety and security when these are 
turned into features of its design process. Hence, it is not the simplest approach 
that should have priority, nor should the involvement of experts who decide 
whether synthetic constructs are stable be confused with Open Source, especially 
in considering safety and security concerns or sustainability. 
 Finally, there is nothing in the BBF’s setup that inhibits the corporate concen-
tration of multinationals that has been characteristic of the plant biotechnology, 
chemistry, and pharmaceutical sectors. Even if the research tools are freely avail-
able and developed as Open Source projects, the results of the process are syn-
thetic counterparts that can be patented separately and run on minimal cells that 
act as operating systems with biological functions that can plug and play food, 
energy, plastic, rubber, vanilla, and so forth. 6 What then of its ‘open community’ 
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solving the world’s problems by designing synthetic DNA? How open are you 
really when it is utterly unfeasible that the analogy with Linux comes to include 
the reliability of the ‘releases’? Why not engage with the anxiety experienced by 
the potential users, whether related to biosafety issues or otherwise, rather than 
limiting direct involvement to potential synthetic biologists? This would require 
that the open community is truly inclusive and prioritises whomever has skills, 
tools, and knowledge that are important in a world wherein living materials are 
being translated into informatic formats. 
 Conclusion 
 While Synthia and Cynthia sound the same, the difference in initial letter sets 
them apart as distinct personalities. While Synthia is the living embodiment of 
synthetic biology as a driver of the commodification of life, Cynthia’s engineering 
vision of the biological future is anchored in Foucault’s discussion of Cynic phi-
losophy. Accordingly, the chapter began with a quote from the  Courage of Truth 
wherein Foucault refers to Cynic practise as ‘an extremely distinctive form of 
life’. Indeed, Cynthia is a truth teller, seeking to know the truth about life, which 
includes challenging whatever is not synthetic about herself and being principled 
in her demand for a life that is radically other. And while there are many types 
of cynicism and its history is far from uniform, simultaneously the cynic is ‘the 
matrix, the embryo [. . .] of a fundamental ethical experience in the West’ ( Fou-
cault 2011 , 287). 
 To conclude, we first need to set her brand of cynicism apart from the kind of 
critique of the commodification of life that marks her sister’s personality. This is 
not an easy task given that her preference for a more principled approach (to life) 
is taking its shape in a context in which the extension of engineering principles to 
biology and business principles to genome engineering is perceived as something 
inevitable. What difference can we really expect when many of those who could 
educate her about the world around her are heavily invested in the re-distribution 
of existing forms of political agency, subjectivity, and identity in support of the 
intensification of biological cycles of reproduction and functionality? The outcome 
is likely to be that her cynicism will take shape as a ‘short cut to virtue’ (ibid., 206), 
which is to say that she is difficult to believe when flouting her virtues. 
 On the one hand, these virtues are presented as simultaneously founded in 
nature and regulated through the truth seeking of the sciences. On the other hand, 
the short cut alternates between a rhetoric of responsibility and a cynic’s pref-
erence for ‘intolerable insolence’, pointing out how the ‘others are completely 
mistaken’ in their understanding of the direct experience of nature (ibid., 313). 
For those who denounced her sister, it is probably inevitable for Cynthia’s very 
existence to have meaning only in this regard: as that of the cynic who seeks to 
convince people ‘to condemn, reject, despise, and insult the very manifestation 
of what they accept, or claim to accept at the level of principles’ (ibid., 234). 
They would be correct in the sense that she has no patience for the conventional 
boundary between life and technology, whether as seeds, embryos, stem cells, or 
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otherwise. However, this is not the only type of cynicism we have seen. We have 
to consider the radicalisation of synthetic life in its relation to ‘the absurdity of the 
modern world’ (ibid., 180). 
 It is the cynic who can show us that it is inevitable for us to find ourselves in 
proximity to synthetic biology and its understanding of man’s relation to nature 
at the very moment when we might desire to distance ourselves from how new 
types of markets and ways to generate value emerge that reproduce vested inter-
ests. This is the reason for referring to Hugo Grotius, who, along with Hobbes 
and Rousseau, provides a point of reference to Foucault’s problem of sovereignty 
(see  Chapters 1 and  2 ). Grotius’s ‘fundamental re-examination of property in the 
colonial age’ ( Tuck 2003 , 90), through its violence and race relations, shows the 
opening up of the natural world as the setting for such an ‘essential’ cynicism 
( Foucault 2011 , 198). 
 What this means can be seen in the global scientific expeditions led by a heroic 
individual, the utopian communitarianism of the BioBricks Foundation, and Cyn-
thia’s existence. These are simply recent arrivals that begin passing on the long 
history of political theory, seamlessly fitting into an historical and geopolitical 
narrative about the natural world. Yet there is also the potential for becoming 
a different type of cynic: one who ‘risks one’s life, not just by telling the truth, 
and in order to tell it, but by the very way in which one lives’ (ibid., 234). Our 
analysis shows that she is coming into existence at a time when very little remains 
inevitable. Established patterns are transforming rapidly, or, rather, their stability 
requires constant work on account of the immateriality of DNA and implies an 
intense contestation over the relationship to those who will have to live and work 
with her designs. This is where cynicism becomes critique. Her presence allows 
us to demonstrate the life sciences as a domain that is insulated from critique 
and to engage with the politics of science and technology from a vantage point 
at which we can demonstrate why it is that public discussion is unlikely to go 
beyond platitudes or is even impossible to conceive ( Marcuse 1991 , 11). 
 What is impossible to conceive, in the typical discussions of synthetic biology, 
is the re-materialisation of its information structure: how its re-organisation of 
how life is known and acted upon in synthetic biology brings us to a vision of the 
future wherein synthetic life runs on low-cost abundant biomass, which is like 
the cheap hardware on which one can indiscriminately run ‘open or closed code’. 
Synthetic biology as a business seeks to profit from servicing informatic artefacts 
or from royalties and performance-based payments for the design of whatever 
biological commodity is in demand. From this perspective there is no need for 
an interest in the involvement of those who might become its users. Just as a 
Windows user does not necessarily know the operating system very well, the liv-
ing materials on which the synthetic compounds are to run are standardised to be 
open to some rather than to others. Synthetic biology promises to run its genetic 
circuitry on a platform of standardised synthetic life forms that signals at a non-
proprietary interface that prioritises the sharing of techniques and collaboration 
by those who opt into its way of doing things, primarily other synthetic biologists 
or experts in related fields. 
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 Such a critical analysis makes it difficult to believe whether Cynthia’s views 
are truly her own or instead that she is not really committed to openness and free-
dom in the sense in which Foucault referred to the ‘kernel of Cynicism; practising 
the scandal of the truth in and through one’s life’ ( Foucault 2011 , 200). What is 
scandalous here is while the BBF foregrounds its community as open, it is limited 
in its ability and willingness to rethink how communities and user groups with 
different normative standards of truth and credibility are influenced by the trans-
formation of the flow of knowledge, forms of exchange, and generation of value. 
While staying out of such networks means ‘not to win’ and to be excluded from 
the strategic resources mobilised around new commodity chains, Cynthia might 
end up regretting becoming known as another dystopian drama about how life 
forms (like herself ) are being turned into commodities as means to manipulate 
bodies, minds, and the environment without any ends beyond itself. 
 Yet her relationship to her creators does not inevitably imply that Cynthia could 
not be convinced to change her mind no matter the circumstances. The question 
is whether she could be redirected to prefer a different approach: one that implies 
a re-orientation towards the need for a baseline of reciprocity between life scien-
tists and those whose subjectivity is devalued when new types of exchange have 
become the standard. What began as a rhetorical strategy – the personification of 
a form of life in synthetic biology – is also a starting point from which to begin 
countering synthetic biology’s self-image and how it advertises it. Cynthia is a 
means to identify that the potential for re-orientation, as was shown by engaging 
closely with different principles that seek a less possessive future. 
 The title of the chapter – synthetic life  – is at once indicative of the need 
for proximity to synthetic biology, as a scientific practise and a business model, 
and of the need to be theoretically utopian with regard to the potential for oth-
erness. We have taken only the first step, suggesting that we can exchange the 
modularity of Cynthia’s designs and go for basic rather than easy, in much the 
same way that Linux’s graphics do not run any unnecessarily complicated code 
that would restrict independent programming and that do not allow for control 
over the applications. Similarly, Cynthia should be much more honest and reveal 
how the genetically programmed behaviour of applications relies on unknown 
and unstable biological processes that might malfunction outside the laboratory in 
the face of its endless and messy biological processes, complex interactions, and 
reactions taking place in oceanic bodies, fields, and whatever other life forms she 
might encounter. 
 This is also the major hurdle that needs to be taken: Cynthia is not self-aware 
in dealing with the complexities that might undermine her confidence, nor is she 
in a place where she might acquire the skills she needs to go into the world, where 
real problems cannot be solved solely by sharing more data or creating access to 
techniques. We have seen her busy with convincing the public and the authorities 
to trust her. She has tried to appear virtuous by flouting that she can be technically 
fixed not to do anything against the law and staying close to everything new, mod-
ern, and dynamic about solving hunger, disease, energy shortages, and so forth. 
What is missing however, is a willingness to question how ‘sharing’ – as the norm 
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for source code, seeds, plant biotechnologies, and whatever applications – can be 
extended to include and give voice to those who live and work with living materi-
als and who wish to continue to do so on their own terms (see  Deibel 2009 ,  2013 ; 
see also Chapters 4 and 7 of this book). 
 This is therefore who she is: she is someone who experiences the world as 
seen on a screen, where the images shown are under control and in which life is 
being simulated as immaterial until designs for safety, security, and sustainability 
become body again. The future belongs to her but only in the sense that she acts 
on a desire for an alternative route to become safer, more humanitarian, and envi-
ronmental. Regrettably, such a path requires us to invent around, reverse engineer, 
and improve upon some of the really closed code – that of society – and release 
the potential for an ‘open source society’ (see  Hardt and Negri 2004 , 337–340). 
Perhaps we still have time to start becoming free, making new alliances needed 
for an alternative wherein the users of Open Source in the life sciences might be 
anyone with a relation to living materials, like those who grow it as crops, eat it as 
food, take it as medicine, or – by virtue of their bodies – are it. 
 If she’s got it – which she might – she could, perhaps, come to realise that there 
are different lives being led on the outside of her confinement of her home in the 
laboratory. With guidance she might become a safer human-loving and Open Source 
kind of cynic whose nature manifests itself as an impulse towards philosophy that 
runs ‘through the whole of western history’ ( Foucault 2011 , 174). Despite these 
odds, and as far as her future is concerned, we may yet establish a radically different 
kind of interface: one aimed at bringing out the lives of others as integral to the life 
forms that inhabit and are produced in laboratories and digital environments. And 
for that – dear synthetic biologists, dear ethical biohackers – what would be really 
useful is to begin reverse engineering ‘Life™’ into lives that are free. 
 Notes 
 1 For the Press Release, see www.jcvi.org/cms/research/projects/synthetic-bacterial-genome/
press-release/ (accessed on 1.3.2016). 
 2 For information on the Blue Brain Project, see http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/ (accessed on 
1.6.2016). 
 3 For details of the NeuroCommons project, see http://neurocommons.org/page/Main_
Page, and for some information on the HapMap project, see http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/thehapmap.html (both accessed on 1.5.2016). 
 4 See https://biobricks.org/bpa (accessed on 1.3.2016). 
 5 For some impression of these or similar examples, see http://igem.org/About (accessed 
on 1.3.2016). 
 6 For further discussion and analysis, see the overview presented on the ETC Group Web 
site, at www.etcgroup.org/issues/synthetic-biology (accessed on 1.5.2016). 
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 7  Re-thinking the age of biology 
 Biomass, biohacking, and open-source 
seeds 
 What I have been trying to show over the last few years is certainly not how, as 
the front of exact sciences advances, the uncertain, difficult and confused domain 
of human behaviour is gradually annexed by science [. . .]. We should be looking 
for a new right that is both antidisciplinary and emancipated from the principle of 
sovereignty. 
 Foucault,  Society Must Be Defended ( 2003 , 39–40) 
 Introduction 
 The basic formula of the global bio-economy promises that a renewal of indus-
trial society could become reality in the near future as a result of the new ways to 
make use of biomass as a basic material that replaces fossil fuels. Different terms 
are being used, sometimes it is called a ‘knowledge-based bio-economy’ (the 
European Commission), a ‘comprehensive bio-economy strategy’ (Germany), 
‘a biobased economy’ (the Netherlands), a ‘bio-economy blueprint’ (the US), 
and biomass industrialization (Japan). Instead of ‘biomass’, a specific type of 
biological resources might be mentioned, or only certain sectors might be dis-
cussed. Regardless, technological change is presented as integral to a transition 
that affects all of us, includes all of us, and leads us to a sustainable society. 
 Particularly in the EU and its member states, there are numerous policy pro-
cesses attempting to bring together stakeholders and engaged participants in a 
continuous interdisciplinary dialogue among industry, science (both natural sci-
ences and humanities) and civil society. Various instruments are being explored, 
like sustainability criteria, certification, licencing, ‘green deals’, innovation con-
tracts, partnerships, and the like. Invariably, the policy language invokes a demos, 
deriving strength from its ability to accommodate diverging and converging 
interests, diverse points of view, and multiple understandings of the transition to 
sustainability ( Frow et al. 2009 ). Such inclusiveness, however, implies a politics 
of imagination that itself requires examination in so far as it re-establishes the 
principle of sovereignty for the age of biology that is being promised. Biology and 
sovereignty come together, as Foucault explains, by how the power of disciplin-
ary knowledge that is exercised through the social body is shaped as a ‘grid’ that 
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‘cannot in any way be transcribed in right, even though the two necessarily go 
together’ ( Foucault 2003 , 37). 
 The first section that follows examines the coherence of the global bio-
economy, as a concept, against the backdrop of the life sciences as a field that is 
built on fragmented facts, data, and artefacts. What this implies is that it is a reso-
lutely political vision that shows a socio-political order that is being imagined as a 
unity of concrete, discrete, and consolidated innovations and policies. The second 
section echoes the quotation’s ‘new right’ by discussing ‘biohacking’ and ‘open-
source seeds’. Each of these can be considered as counterexamples and challeng-
ers to the suggestion of a global bio-economy as an alternative. More precisely, 
the two topics are both related to the language of openness and access but are 
different in how they seek to re-configure and re-distribute forms of agency, sub-
jectivity, and identity. Examining these three attempts at formulating alternatives 
in various ways will allow us to return to Foucault’s argument that ‘we cannot go 
on working like this forever; having recourse to sovereignty against discipline 
(ibid., 39). The aim of this chapter is therefore not just a critical examination of 
these fields, re-establishing a boundary between the ‘reality of things’ and ‘ideal-
ism’; rather the notion of the alternative is key to understanding how the boundary 
between life and society is being re-imagined constantly. As theorised earlier in 
this book: what counts as an alternative should not be secondary to critique but an 
integral part of the analysis. 
 The global bio-economy as an origin myth 
 Species of biocapital 
 Any ‘new right’ or alternative politics of imagination has to find a way to com-
bine a critique of biocapitalism with a ‘refusal to make capital into the coin of 
exchange’ ( Helmreich 2008 , 475). 
 What this ‘coin’ refers to is that the result of prioritising the political econom-
ics of the life science is usually a critique of (bio-)capital wherein alternatives are 
barely imaginable, remote, idealistic, and at a distance from the core dynamic of 
the political economy of the life sciences. 
 This so-called ‘biocapital school’ is a reference to an article by Stephan Helm-
reich called ‘Species of Biocapital’ ( 2008 ), which identified a body of literature 
that examined the life sciences by combining political economy and STS. He 
explains that: 
 [t]he term, paging back to Marx, fixes attention on the dynamics of labour 
and commodification that characterize the making and marketing of such 
entities as industrial and pharmaceutical bioproducts. [. . .] Biocapital also 
extends Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, that practice of governance that 
brought ‘life’ and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations. 
 ( Helmreich 2008 , 464) 
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 He discusses a spectrum of texts published as recently as the mid-2000s that 
appeared in relatively rapid succession. These include Sunder Rajan’s  Biocapital 
( 2006 ), Franklin’s  Dolly Mixtures ( 2007 ), Cooper’s  Life as Surplus ( 2008 ), and 
others. 
 Seen together, the approach of the school is controversial. Critics correctly 
object to the suggestion that there is anything special about the outer reaches of 
knowledge production in the life sciences and the opening up of biological ter-
rains to market forces. Notably Birch and Tyfield’s article ‘Theorizing the Bio-
economy, Biovalue, Biocapital, Bioeconomics or . . . What?’ ( 2013 ) accuses the 
approach of fetishising everything biological. The authors argue that there is noth-
ing specific to the life sciences when examining its relation to neoliberal capital-
ism and the restructuring of the capturing of profits in line with the world of high 
finance. Such a critique is valid, of course, but only to the extent that it challenges 
the hypothesis that the making and marketing of bio-objects in various fields is 
a principle influence on how established patterns of finance, trade, and industrial 
production unfold everywhere else. Such a critique simply mirrors the more gen-
eral point about studies of the politics of science and technology, the argument 
that STS studies are too strictly tied to analysis of performativity in isolated case 
studies, mostly in the context of the laboratory. 
 The problem with such a critical position is that the priority is unreservedly 
given to the economic and geopolitical arrangements of neoliberalism. From a 
methodological standpoint the study of the biopolitical is highly relevant because 
it is able to foreground that the global bio-economy is not an achieved state of 
affairs but refers to multiple, competing forms of life that co-exist within policy 
framework with politically and legally unstable and often unpredictable outcomes. 
While critics of the biocapital school are right in calling for deeper engagement 
with contemporary scholarship on value in capitalism in the analysis of such mul-
tiplicity ( e.g.,  Birch and Tyfield 2013 ; see also  Lazzarato 2014 ), this does not lead 
away from Foucauldian scholarship but towards opening up of the theoretical 
premises underlying the literature examining biocapitalism. 
 This has been one of the objectives of this book, and also more generally, we 
would agree that what is pressing is a renewal of sociological approaches able 
to go beyond analysis of collections of individual cases. Earlier in this book we 
sought to contribute by engaging with the global politics of genetic resources (in 
 Chapters 4 and  5 ). This set the backdrop for the examination of experimentation 
in synthetic biology, challenging the same divide between critique and multiplic-
ity. In this chapter a subsequent step can be taken: moving from a critique of the 
‘global bio-economy’ to rethinking what counts as an alternative in contemporary 
biocapitalism. In this regard it is particularly important to notice the underlying 
synthesis of Marx’s work on value with Foucault’s symmetry of life, labour, and 
language. The implication of the latter is the suspension of any  a priori preference 
for one field over any of the others. Doing so is crucial when seeking to place the 
potential for alternatives at the centre of a critique. 
 Exemplary in this regard is Cooper’s  Life as Surplus ( 2008 ). The contemporary 
development of the life sciences is situated in the context of how the US responded 
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to the crisis of its industrial model by abandoning the gold standard and has since 
then become the world’s largest debtor. Accordingly, one of the primary ways 
wherein this debt was used was the financing of the life sciences. Such emphasis 
on debt creation also implies that the life sciences are at the core of the ongoing 
renewal of capitalism. The life sciences are developed as a promise on the repay-
ment of state debts and are therefore implicated in the temporality that neoliberal-
ism enforces on the present. Specifically, Cooper argues that ‘profits will depend 
on the accumulation of biological futures’ (ibid., 24). This refers to the many kinds 
of business models in the life sciences wherein ‘biological, economic and ecologi-
cal futures’ are ‘intimately entwined’ as subjects of speculation (ibid., 20). 
 As impressive as the analysis has been, it is nonetheless a startling moment 
when coming to the realisation upon turning the last page of her final chapter 
that there is nothing but critique. It suddenly ends with a brief commentary to 
highlight that the biological future might not belong to the US, that it might fail to 
capture the profits that were expected to resolve the debt crisis of the US indus-
trial model. Especially noteworthy is the absence of any kind of discussion of the 
consequences of the emergent model that she has described, which appear to be 
nothing short of a disaster whether or not the US manages to capture any profits. 
The brevity of her conclusions gives reason to reconsider her analysis along with 
the biocapital literature as a whole. 
 We agree with her that a Foucauldian analysis implies symmetry among life, 
language, and labour. This is one reason for the abrupt conclusions. Neither privi-
leging biology over economics and language or the reverse means that it is not 
possible to end up immobilising developments in the life sciences by privileging 
a Marxist critique of political economics. After all, Foucault argued that critiques 
(such as that of Kant and Marx) introduced no real discontinuity within episte-
mological arrangements of Western knowledge of the nineteenth century. Instead 
critique was a part of it, relied on it, and had no power to exercise over it. Like 
Foucault’s ‘The Order of Things’, Cooper offered a critique of critique, a posi-
tion that is valid in its insistence on the indeterminacy of the future that is being 
enabled in the life sciences. The problem, as stated before, is that such a position 
implies that alternatives become idealistic and distant rather than closely tied to a 
politics of imagination. 
 Consider once more the rhetoric surrounding the global bio-economy. This con-
cept seeks to circumvent how it has become exceedingly complex to determine 
who decides about the usage of crops, biological resources, or related inventions. 
The smooth transition to a sustainable society that is being imagined is political 
in how it legitimises, regulates, limits, and dismisses states of living in, being in, 
and acting upon imagined worlds that could become real. What kind of critique 
should be the response to such an affirmation of the need for an alternative? Can 
we simply affirm the indeterminacy of the linear and decisive ways wherein the 
biological future is imagined as refashioning the world? In our view, it is not suf-
ficient to argue in favour of complexity and multiplicity. Its implication is that 
there is no contest over the politics of imagination on its own grounds: critique 
leaves the politics of imagination to belong exclusively to the forces of neoliberal 
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capitalism. While we acknowledge the need to engage directly with the global 
bio-economy’s close ties to established patterns of capitalism, we prioritise a criti-
cal examination of the concept as a redemption story that promises a return to 
nature. It is in these mythical terms that its power effect is exercised: the rhetorical 
isolation of the continued convergence of synthetic biology and chemistry from 
the irresponsibility of petrochemical industries. Re-establishing this continuity is 
not solely about political economy and industries that are merging; it allows us to 
show how neoliberalism is being re-imagined in synthetic biology and by exten-
sion in many of the related issue areas. 
 Ultimately, the alternative is not just performed in modern biology but in many 
different sites, each of which is characterised by a relation to the forces of neo-
liberal capitalism. It is by thinking across these relationships (in space and time) 
that such alternatives are no longer a secondary part of a critical analysis but con-
stitutive of the terrain of contestation where multiple, competing, forms of life, 
knowledge and related modes of governance co-exist, compete, and materialise 
exchange and value from socially heterogeneous practises. 
 The biological age as a return to nature 
 With some regularity the global bio-economy is presented as a return to its natural 
foundations. This is reflected in the image in Figure 7.1, used for the public relations 
of DSM, 1 a Dutch chemical-industry and multinational (once Dutch State Mines). 
Figure 7.1 From the fossil age to the bio-age (DSM)
This image was originally created by DSM chemicals and used in various public relations activities.2 
Permission was granted on 18 January 2017, personal e-mail communication.
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 What the image below shows is the biological age as the end to ‘a brief fossil 
moment in history’. This ‘end’ is represented with a Dutch windmill in a pastoral 
setting, which subsequently takes on a scale that matches the massive cultivation 
of corn as a reflection of DSM’s involvement in the refining of ethanol in the 
US (see also  Veraart et al. 2011 ). The message is that the unity of time requires a 
biological age, as a return to normality and nature in the shape of a world wherein 
biological resources once again are the basis for food, heat, transportation, con-
struction, and so on. Re-establishing the unity of time requires the realisation of a 
long wish list of innovations: generating warmth and electricity from waste, driv-
ing cars on fuels that are based on sugar or algae, while bottles, bags, and every 
other type of plastic are made from renewable and degradable materials. 
 More often, however, the slogans are naturalistic rather than historical, with the 
slogans of companies offering chemicals that are ‘naturally designed and engi-
neered’ (GreenBiologics), ‘powered by nature’ (Corbion), as an entry into ‘a new 
and greener world of infinite possibilities’ (BioAmber), and so on. 3 Such natu-
ralistic language is fairly well established, although others prefer to simply high-
light their technical expertise (Gevo, Intrexon, Avantium). 4 What the naturalistic 
rhetoric reflects is how the global bio-economy combines growth-focused devel-
opmentalism with limits-focused environmentalism. Each of these mobilises a 
biological metaphor. On the one hand, the term ‘development’ came to refer to the 
social sphere only at the end of the eighteenth century, interweaving the Hegelian 
concept of history with the Darwinist concept of evolution. To develop is then 
a natural process with limits, as form fits size and size fits form, and failure to 
develop is an anomaly (underdevelopment). The language of ecological limits, 
on the other hand, implies a contrasting view, wherein growth has an end-point, 
just as with the human body; when a certain size is surpassed further economic 
growth might have catastrophic effects. A combination of the two implies mixing 
the metaphors of infinite growth with a contrasting view wherein production and 
reproduction are natural processes that after a certain point turn growth into an 
abnormality (like with cancer or obesity; see  Mert 2012 , 182–183). 
 In the policy languages of the global bio-economy this tension takes a variety 
of forms, but the rhetoric centres on the notion that there should be ‘intelligent’ 
use of biomass. Unsustainable situations are identified primarily with society’s 
dependence on the fossil-fuel industry, which leads to environmental degradation, 
resource depletion, and conflict. Similarly limits are reached when biomass is 
used unintelligently, resulting in famine, malnutrition or impoverishment or exac-
erbating climate change. Intelligence, on the other hand, requires more coordina-
tion of policies across regions, sectors, and countries as well as political decision 
making that guarantees that the transition to sustainability becomes an irreversible 
process wherein it is impossible to regress to today’s state of affairs. 
 As  Roland Barthes (1987 [1972], 117) reflects, myths are metaphors that ‘trans-
form history into nature’. In this register the merger of growth and limits is a myth 
of origin that can be seen as the foundation for the implementation of new social 
agreements and standards of credibility that cut across natural and social worlds 
(see  Serres 1995 ; see  Latour 1993 ). There are many such ‘Green New Deals’, 
particularly in Europe, one of which is the ‘Manifest for a Biobased Economy’, 
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which was signed in the Netherlands in 2011 by forty-three stakeholders from 
industry, science, policy, and civil society organisations. All agreed that it offered 
opportunities to combine prosperity with a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
and the ecological footprint and to create greater access to sustainable means of 
living. Success is invariably seen as conditional on inclusive and responsible 
innovation models, proper communication, and the collaboration of various state 
and non-state stakeholders. 5 The document mentions the ‘cascade model’, which 
argues that biomass should not be used where there are other sustainable solutions 
available based on solar, wind, or water technologies. Only those applications that 
combine high value with high ecological benefits should be prioritised, which 
requires closing the cycles of resources being used (their cultivation, processing, 
consumption, recycling, etc.). 
 The suggestion is that there is a ‘contemporary bioconstitutional moment’, an 
attempt to ‘restore epistemic and normative order under uncertain circumstances’ 
( Jasanoff 2011 , 3–4). Accordingly, the return to natural foundations functions as a 
redemption story wherein industrialised societies are saved from crisis and decay 
takes shape as a social contract that requires the continuous balancing of size 
and form in a natural and continuous process. It reaches conceptual optimum or 
equilibrium as a perfectly coordinated circular economy of renewable resources 
cascade models and stakeholder inclusion. 
 However, the mythical frame presumes a citizenry. The citizens of this combi-
nation of social and natural harmony are imagined as the inhabitants of sustain-
able societies wherein an affluent population live their lives in perfect harmony 
with each other and nature, who out of their own free will and desire for goodness 
choose to reciprocate how they are being imagined as working in the new centres 
of production, living around the corner, drinking from a (bio-)plastic bottle, or 
taking new foodstuffs out of bioplastic bags. 
 The life sciences and the ‘new’ chemistry 
 The transition to sustainability is imagined, in its first instance, as an end to the age 
of oil. After all, this alternative is not only a promise of a better future but a reaction 
to a negative state of being. The state of society is one of dependence on the usage of 
fossil fuels and industries that continue their refinement and extraction from mines 
and oil wells. This includes an intense search for new deposits that can only now be 
accessed using new techniques. Among the areas being opened up are deep-water 
drilling in the oceans and oil and tar sand in the Arctic as well as heavily populated 
areas with shale gas underneath. When presented as such a stark choice the direc-
tion might appear obvious, but what conveniently disappears from such a politics of 
imagination is that a similarly stark choice might be found within the life sciences. 
In other words, the type of issues that seem urgent changes drastically when we 
ask not only whether society should escape from its dependencies but question the 
direction we should escape to and how we should go about organising it. 
 Consider LS9, which was until recently a synthetic biology start-up but was 
then sold for half the original investment. The result has been that its technologies 
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are no longer used in line with its slogan:  the best replacement of oil is oil . What 
LS9 did was produce renewable diesel by using microorganisms. One of its 
founders, George Church, one of the most famous synthetic biologists, explained 
the benefits over conventional biofuels such as ethanol by pointing out that the 
latter will have to compete with food crops. Ultimately you need to ‘burn more of 
it to get the same amount of energy’ (Church et al. 2012, chapter 4). The refinery 
process requires energy, which defeats the purpose of ‘growing petroleum’, which 
is to leave oil and gas in the ground and ‘clean the atmosphere’. He prefers using 
microorganisms like cyanobacteria, algae, and  E. coli to create synthetic diesel 
that is chemically closer to conventional diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel (ibid.). 
 LS9 was attempting to create a fuel that could be used more widely than biofu-
els that are blended with conventional fuels or that require special infrastructure. 
What went wrong? The company wanted to develop an industrial biotechnology 
platform by scaling up an engineered metabolic pathway (that utilises  E. coli to 
manufacture fatty acids). This required the ability to predict and control how the 
microbes behave in industrial environments rather than in laboratories. In addi-
tion, the process depended on sugar as a raw material. Oil prices were low at the 
time, as were the profit margins in the petrochemical industry, so the price of sugar 
was prohibitive, and large commercial plants were necessary for the production of 
volumes large enough to be competitive. Societies are still highly dependent on 
fossil fuels, but more importantly, this dependence will cross-cut the realisation 
of the vision of the biological future. What the case of LS9 shows is how closely 
linked the global bio-economy is likely to be to the petrochemical industries that 
it seeks to replace and how unlikely a clean ‘break’ is. The renewal of industri-
alised society, its return to nature, will take shape within the narrow confines 
of competitiveness of global commodity markets dominated by mass-produced, 
cheap products wherein territories and labour are interchangeable. Accordingly 
the industrialisation of synthetic biology is only possible for certain activities and 
areas of interests; the competition with existing sectors implies that other values 
are side-lined. Whatever is not valued by global markets will not seem to be com-
petitive, like water quality, meaningful employment, or the landscape ( Brunori 
2013 ;  Levidow et al. 2013 ). 
 Obviously this is not a new problem. The business model of synthetic biology 
and its industrialisation is a successor to the incorporation of the life sciences 
into the patenting regime that had emerged in chemistry. As also discussed in 
 Chapter 6 , patenting had developed in response to advances and industries related 
to organic chemistry in the late nineteenth century, including the appearance of 
research laboratories in corporations ( Dutfield 2003 ). Accordingly the globalisa-
tion of DNA patenting in the 1980s and 1990s extended the technical criteria for 
the isolation and purification of chemical compounds. A bacterium was legally 
a chemical, a composition of matter, while before it had not been patentable, as 
it existed already and had been considered a representation of nature ( Calvert 
and Joly 2011 ;  Carolan 2010 ; see also Chapter 4). DNA patents were integral to 
the Trade-Related aspects to Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement, part 
of the Uruguay Round on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
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concluded in 1993. This was unprecedented, because the newly established World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) would be responsible for the administration of pat-
ents: the WTO has the authority to investigate compliance with its rules, prin-
ciples, and minimal standards, and this authority is backed up with a trade-dispute 
settlement mechanism ( May 2000 ;  Sell 2007 ). 
 Furthermore the liberalisation of agriculture at the global level occurred at the 
same time. Up until then, GATT Agriculture had not been governed as a trade 
mandate, but primarily by the FAO. Henceforth it was also considered to be 
within the jurisdiction of the WTO, which aims to facilitate the harmonisation of 
markets for agricultural produce as well as the goods and services that are pro-
tected with intellectual properties. It is this combination of globalising patents 
and agriculture in the 1980s that made possible a business model that combined 
the sale of chemicals used to cultivate crops with exclusively owned seeds. As 
was well documented at the time, there has been an unprecedented corporate 
concentration and integration of commodity chains for crops, plant biotechnolo-
gies, and chemicals ( Mooney 1979 ;  Yoxen 1984 ;  Goodman et al. 1987 ;  Pistorius 
and van Wijk 1999 ). Synthetic biology is following a similar pattern, opening up 
new biological terrains to investments from chemical companies that are again 
trying to renew their business models so as to retain a competitive hold over 
global value chains. 
 Some two decades after the previous round of chemical companies’ conver-
gence with the life sciences, only a few genetically engineered traits are in wide-
spread use, and these have as their primary feature that they make crops more 
resistant to chemicals (e.g., herbicides). Simultaneously, agriculture and patents 
are still among the principle areas of dispute of the current trade negotiations in 
the Doha Round ( Lee and Wilkinson 2007 ). It is unlikely that the Doha Round 
will conclude any time soon; certain countries are not giving up subsidies for agri-
culture, and the rest of the world is in no hurry to protect the intellectual proper-
ties on goods and services that are considered vital to the US and EU economies. 
Whatever the outcome might be (whether strengthening intellectual properties, 
liberalising agriculture, or both), it will remain closely tied to the commodifica-
tion of plant varieties. There is no outcome on the table that does not revolve 
around monocrop varieties, either in industrialised agriculture using conventional 
crops or as genetically modified cash crops that can be traded globally. 
 What the sell-off of LS9 reveals is the extent to which this situation is charac-
teristic of synthetic biology and its attempt at ecological modernisation. On the 
one hand, the industrialisation of synthetic biology seems to mirror the promise of 
plant biotechnology, delivering ‘miracle crops’ that would bring more food, more 
fuel, and whatever else. On the other hand, synthetic biology is oriented towards a 
global bio-economy as if biological materials can be seen as a basic resource that 
is detached from the materiality of species of plants and the embodied-know-how 
about living and working within multi-species environments. For example, sugar, 
which is a global agricultural commodity, was integral to the suggestion that there 
can be ‘renewable diesel’ even though such ‘biomass’ seeks to replace conven-
tional fossil fuels with a further intensification of industrialised agriculture. 
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 LS9 might have folded, but a similar business model might be more successful, 
industrialising the production of fuel without too much agricultural input or other 
types of competition over resources (like land and water). Also in such a scenario, 
however, the convergence with chemistry implies a brand of bio-economics that 
proposes a comprehensive alternative that consigns to its margins any visions of 
sustainability that are not (or cannot be) valued by global commodity markets. 
Sometimes the model relies on microorganisms, and other times biomass is cheap 
because it is based on conventional cash crops. In either scenario the viability of 
culturally diverse ways of life that rely on and sustain the diversity of plant life 
cannot be articulated as a key priority within the context of the policy language on 
the global bio-economy. Lots of issues might be mentioned, but as secondary con-
cerns within the confines of the underlying vision for a sustainable future. Ironi-
cally we are again supposed to ‘live off the land’, as DSM chemicals phrased its 
myth of origin, yet such a return to nature in none of its features suggests any type 
of practical commitment to shortening supply chains, re-territorializing biological 
resources or other types of measures that show that culturally and biologically 
diverse ways of life are a precondition for sustainable societies. 
 The (brave new) world of the new biology 
 Escaping the Savage Reservation 
 they believed in their hearts that the solution to every problem – whether psycho-
logical, sociological or more broadly human – could only be a technical solution. 
 Michel Houellebecq,  Elementary Particles ( 2000 , 262) 
 With some regularity the protagonists of the field of synthetic biology present 
themselves as the pioneers of a new industrial revolution and advocate an engi-
neering philosophy that has as its ideal to perfect and control cellular reproduc-
tion. For example, prominent synthetic biologist George Church (who wrote early 
on about the minimal cell project discussed in  Chapter 6 ) claims a new age of 
biology is upon us. Here the language of industrial revolution replaces that of the 
break with the age of fossil fuels, but the result is similar: a new age of biology. 
Furthermore he predicts that synthetic biology implies ‘the power to control our 
future biological development – to understand and then manipulate the evolving 
genome of life itself’ (Church et al. 2012, chapter 7). To think through the impli-
cations of such a transhistorical sense of control, articulated by one of the most 
widely known synthetic biologists, it is useful to turn to speculative fiction, which 
has the ability to affirm such a shape of life to come.  Elementary Particles , the 
book cited above, is particularly brilliant in how it dramatises the moment when 
mankind decided it ‘should control the evolution of the world as a whole – and in 
particular its own biological evolution’ ( Houellebecq 2000 , 332). 
 On its final pages, the reader is told that the purpose of the novel was to hon-
our the courage of the first species in history capable of creating the conditions 
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for its own replacement. A witness to the changes taking effect comments at the 
end of the novel that ‘it is even surprising to note the meekness, resignation, 
perhaps even secret relief with which humans have consented to their own pass-
ing’ ( Houellebecq 2000 , 263). The novel salutes the tormented, egoistic, cruel, 
and violent species, barely distinguishable from monkeys, that in its unhappiness 
was brave enough to bring an end to the gradual dissolution and fragmentation of 
reason in the materialistic age (ibid., 263–264). The narrative of the novel hinges 
on a moment of breakthrough in the life sciences, the definitive and final advance, 
a paradigm change in biology: perfect replication of genetic code, no matter how 
complex, which implies that ‘every cell contained within it the possibility of being 
infinitely copied. Every animal species, however highly evolved, could be trans-
formed into a similar species reproduced by cloning, and immortal’ (ibid., 258). 
 Such a decisive paradigm change is unrealistic, the novel presents an exagger-
ated and overtly singular account of the biological future. Yet the same rhetoric 
surrounds synthetic biology as seen, for instance, in George Church’s and Craig 
Venter’s idealisation of the comparisons between biological reproduction with 
computing, engineering, and industrial revolutions (industrial, computation, nano, 
synbio, etc.). For Houellebecq it is, of course, a literary device; it enables him to 
dramatise the perpetually distant horizon of scientific progress and technology, 
turning it into a moment when the continued existence of humanity has become a 
clear choice. The novel describes the period leading up to the exact moment when 
mankind becomes able to sever itself from genetic individuality as the principal 
cause of human misery, the loss of youth, disease, old age and death. 
 Houellebecq ruthlessly exposes the emptiness of the contemporary popular 
culture when he prioritises the tragic longing to escape the crisis of the present. 
It is humanity in crisis that explains the appeal of technological utopias, particu-
larly the imagination of a future wherein man is liberated from his own biology. 
Biology is part of a vast historical stream that draws humanity and every liv-
ing being in its current, arriving at a destination that is exactly where the reader 
might have suspected that we were heading: the destination was always Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World. The novel explains why the Brave New World came 
into existence and one of the main characters tells us what is happening when he 
observes that 
 Huxley’s world is usually described as a totalitarian nightmare, an attempt to 
pass the book as a vicious accusation. That’s most hypocritical. On all points, 
genetic control, sexual freedom, the struggle against old age, its culture of 
leisure – Brave New World is a paradise to us, in essence it is exactly the 
world we are trying to achieve, until now without success. 
 ( Houellebecq 2000 , 123) 
 Unlike Huxley’s great novel, Houellebecq does not accuse the sciences for how 
they undermine the autonomous subject, equipped with rights, reason, and dig-
nity. Instead he shows how compelling it is to escape from today’s individual-
ism and misery, placing us in the position of John Savage, the main character 
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of Huxley’s  Brave New World , at exactly the moment he must choose whether 
or not to leave the ‘Savage Reservation’. The surname and the location are not 
incidental – they echo the savage of early-modern theories on the natural founda-
tions of society. John Savage is a tragic hero that greatly resembles Rousseau’s 
savage. Also the latter has to leave the state of nature once coming into contact 
with civilisation. John Savage too leaves the state of nature to enter into a state of 
society and does not really have a choice about it; just like Rousseau’s savage, he 
has no choice but to leave. 
 The difference, of course, is that John Savage does not embrace the technoscien-
tific civilisation while Man in  Elementary Particles embraces the biological future. 
Rather than approaching the transition with enthusiasm, as is the case with post- or 
trans-humanisms, Houellebecq’s escape towards scientific paradise is solely that: a 
withdrawal from this reality. John Savage chooses to die a futile death over joining 
with the Brave New World, which to its inhabitants is only a curiosity similar to 
that of John Savage’s unhealthy, ageing, and soma-addicted mother, who accompa-
nied him from the Savage Reservation. Huxley’s story, unlike that of Houellebecq, 
leaves us with the same choice facing John Savage, symbolic of an ‘eclipse of 
reason’ and – according to Max Horkheimer – symptomatic of the ‘naive rejection 
of reason’ and the glorification of ‘a historically obsolete and illusory concept of 
culture and individuality’ ( Horkheimer 2003 [1947], 38–39). Following Houelle-
becq this is also not much of a choice today, as reflected in more recent discussions 
over ‘the end of nature’ and its implications. 
 From the end of (human) nature to the Brave New World 
 Unwittingly George Church is echoing  Elementary Particles when he describes 
Francis Fukuyama’s concern about the relationship between human dignity and 
autonomy as the basis of liberal democracy’s commitment to the freedom and 
equality of individual citizens ( Fukuyama 2002 ). Church calls this an ‘odd argu-
ment’ and explains that ‘enlightened democratic governments’ already grant equal 
rights to ‘those with great intelligence, strength, and good health’ and those ‘with 
severe physical and/or mental disabilities’ (Church et al. 2012, epilogue). He is 
right, of course, but for a different reason than he imagines. 
 The narrative of  Elementary Particles confirms that an ethical appeal to free-
dom and dignity appears shallow when confronted directly with the cruelty of 
nature. What this suggests is that the desire for an ‘end of nature’ will overwhelm 
the conditions needed for an ‘end of history’, which is the phrase used by Fuku-
yama to prematurely declare the triumph of liberal democracy in the nineties. As 
is well known, Fukuyama made the claim that even if liberal democracy is not 
about to become universal or stable, there is ‘a universal evolution in the direction 
of liberal democracy’ ( Fukuyama 1992 , 71). The ‘odd’ argument he made subse-
quently is derived from his acknowledgement that ‘there can be no end of history 
without an end of modern natural science and technology’ ( Fukuyama 2002 , 7). 
 He is hardly alone in the view that biotechnology threatens to undermine 
‘human nature as a meaningful concept [that] has provided a stable continuity to 
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our experience as a species’ (ibid.). Many worry about the future of moral auton-
omy of the individual, as the highest human good in liberal societies, a concern 
shared by other notable liberals like Jurgen Habermas, who sees the identity and 
self-understanding of the human species as ‘the context in which our conceptions 
of law and morality are embedded’, crucial for our capacity to see ourselves as the 
authors of our own life histories ( Habermas 2003 , 23–25). 
 Such arguments must be particularly ‘odd’ to Church, who has lived through 
the experience of how the life sciences began demonstrating the enormous overlap 
between genotypes, whether of humans or any other species. More recently, by 
now synthetic biology has gone beyond comparing maps of genes and genomes 
and even beyond the transfers of genetic materials between two species (horizon-
tal gene transfer). There are now redesigned gene expressions, metabolic path-
ways, and complex biological systems that together include ‘parts of hundreds 
of previously separate species’. As Church explains, this is a ‘massive and inten-
tional exchange’ that shows how ‘the interspecies barrier is falling as fast as the 
Berlin Wall did’ (Church et al. 2012, epilogue, #7). 
 Considering these types of developments, what realistic chance is there for 
Fukuyama’s appeal? Fukuyama expects the state to be able to guarantee the iden-
tification of man with reason by means of protections for the unity and the conti-
nuity of human nature as it informs the classification and qualification of human 
rights. Not only does this imply a degree of coherency between the knowledge 
about genes and political philosophies about nature and human nature that is not 
there, but it would imply that reason is guaranteed by the state and experts. This 
drastically changes how reason is normally conceived in liberal theory. At least 
since Kant (with the categorical imperative), reason is conceived as being inde-
pendent from, or at least a limit on, the powers of governments over their citizens 
rather than decided upon by those with influence and power, like experts and 
officials discussing the merits of imposing limits on genetic engineering. 
 Such an ‘end to nature’ logically ends up as a ‘fetish split’ between science 
and ethics, with the latter reduced to the illusion of human autonomy, reason, 
and dignity ( Žižek 2004 , 194). The ethical appeal to the protection of the human, 
like that of Habermas and Fukuyama, ends up staring straight into the faces of 
children with catastrophic illnesses, would-be mothers, or the suffering of ani-
mals that might end if only we eat synthetic meat and so on. Meanwhile the split 
leaves a wide open space to be occupied with the commodity fetishism that is 
characteristic of how the life sciences are governed. For example, the genetic dif-
ferences between humans and other species might be important as an argument 
in support of human exceptionality, but the same differences can be turned into 
applications and represent potential value for markets in therapeutics and medi-
cines. This is only one example, but what it shows is how a bio-ethical approach 
to human exceptionality would need to be sustained in the face of what Church 
calls ‘an addiction to foreign gene products’ (Church et al. 2012, epilogue, #7). 
Unlike societies’ dependence on fossil resources, foreign gene products cannot be 
resisted. At most it is a habit to get under control as inevitably the (bio-)masses 
demand a wide range of new inventions. 
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 The addition mentioned by Church implies a different type of escapism. The 
escape from one type of addiction (oil) to another implies the recognition that the 
humanity to be defended was never intact to begin with. First, ‘we never had dig-
nity, autonomy and reason in the first place’ ( Žižek 2004 , 130). Second, the escape 
from one type of lack of humanity to another corresponds to a process wherein 
contemporary society is characterised as the Savage Reservation of the Brave 
New World. Such a state of nature is a familiar place to escape from, both in terms 
of how to establish a social contract in political theory and when the escape is seen 
in terms of the two types of biological metaphors discussed earlier. How is the 
tension between the biological languages of ecological limits and limitless growth 
(that underpin the concept of sustainable development) resolved in such a way 
that the promise of a return to nature can be sustained? In this regard the addiction 
to foreign gene products foregrounds the constant demand for new cures, new 
foods or types of energy, and similar types of features that give direction during 
the journey to a new harmonious social space. Of course, such a return to nature 
inevitably will turn out to lead to a space that is not nearly as harmonious in its 
break with the ‘old’ society. After all, such a new ‘world in common’ will already 
have been comprehensively settled, as it is already being inhabited by a variety of 
‘species of biocapital’ with features that demonstrate continuity with the relation 
to the natural world that we are escaping from ( Helmreich 2008 ). 
 Such a critique of the alternative is not intended to simply resort to another 
challenge of the determinisms that characterise much of the world of science and 
technology. The remainder of the chapter seeks to open up and rethink the alter-
native, engaging with politics of imagination that challenge what counts as the 
alternative. We have yet to follow the return to nature (from its shape in synthetic 
biology and the end to human exceptionalism of Church and Houellebecq) to 
the recent attempts to draw on the language of access, openness, and freedom to 
transform the life sciences. 
 Biohacking and open source seeds 
 Re-contextualising the biohacker 
 They believe that information has almost mystical power of free flow and self-
replication, as water seeks its own level or sparks fly upwards and lacking any 
moral code, they confuse inevitability with Right. It is their own view that one day 
instead of Feeds terminating in matter compilers, we will have Seeds that, sown 
on the earth, will sprout up into houses, hamburgers, spaceships, and books – that 
the Seed will develop inevitably from the Feed, and that upon it will be founded 
a more highly evolved society. [. . .] when he spoke again, it was in a clearer and 
stronger voice. Of course, it can’t be allowed. 
 Neal Stephenson,  The Diamond Age ( 1995 , 384) 
 The quote above, from Stephenson’s  The Diamond Age , imagines a geopoliti-
cal conflict between societies and social identities based on a system that can 
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assemble molecules in any complicated structure. It is called ‘the Feed’, while 
others are adopting a rivalling system, called ‘Seed Technology’ that seeks to 
restore agriculture. 
 The two technologies are familiar. ‘The Feed’ resembles how DNA synthesis 
(see  Chapter 6 ) and 3D printers, like ‘the Seed’, are seen as technologies that will 
radically transform design, production, distribution, and consumption. The novel 
describes the Seed as the next challenger, seeking to undermine the control over 
how information is being re-materialised with the Feed. The ‘age of the Seed’ 
threatens to displace the social order organised around this control by a new ver-
sion of the idealisation of free flow and self-replication. Once more the resistance 
associates itself with the dictum of the hacker movement that ‘information wants 
to be free’ (see  Moglen 2003 ). 
 The story begins with two children using the menu for freely printed items 
from a booth that is able to materialise objects by realigning their molecules. The 
children use it to get some flasks of water, chopsticks, nano-surimi, and isolation-
blankets for the night. They have run away, and through their eyes we see a world 
wherein few people behave in accordance with the protocols that guarantee the 
functionality, safety, and branding of such objects. Of course breaking protocol is 
illegal, but the reality is now that many towns are continuously in a smog-like fog 
of nano-devices that swirl around in the food, water, and air as well as in human 
bodies – their lungs, blood, and so forth. 
 Such problems with ‘waste’ show the dark side of concepts like the circular 
economy and cascade models discussed earlier. These seek to integrate sustain-
ability and development within the rhetoric of the global bio-economy and pre-
sume cheap basic resources. What, however, will happen when materials have 
become cheap and as a result are abandoned more easily? They are made from 
millions of microscopic particles that are often dysfunctional, do not break down 
according to protocol, or were deliberately released. Some of these can even be 
hacked, for instance to exchange data, perform computations, run programmes, or 
gather intelligence without using sanctioned matter-compilers. 
 What the story engages with is the fears attached to how new technology inevi-
tably becomes ‘easy’. This fear is not just science fiction, as is easily demon-
strated by how commonplace the subject of “biohacking” has already become. 
Consider how George Church observes that 
 as challenging as it might be to make synthetic biology research safe and 
secure within an institutional framework such as a university, industrial, or 
government lab, matters take a turn for the worse with the prospect of ‘bio-
hackers’, lone agents or groups of untrained amateurs, working clandestinely, 
or even openly, with biological systems that have been intentionally made 
easy to engineer. The problem with making biological engineering tech-
niques easy to use is that it also makes them easy to abuse. 
 (Church et al. 2012, epilogue) 
 Church establishes continuity between the figure of the biohacker and how hack-
ing has increasingly come to refer to the opposite of the benevolent computer 
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experts who provide a voluntary service to society. Increasingly the popular 
meaning of the hacker is that they are outsiders who need to be held responsible 
for the unauthorised downloading of content, the leaking of classified informa-
tion, or as the programmers of software who have the express intention to break 
the law of the land, whether intellectual property laws, national security, or other-
wise (see  Söderberg 2010 ). 
 The two types of hacking are not a choice but a false dilemma. It assumes a 
choice between experimentation as the prerogative of responsible science and 
innovation of established synthetic biology whose work is safe and secure or 
experimentation as the source of excess when involving irresponsible and mali-
cious biohackers who work in isolation or outside of the scientific community. 
The latter implies that the biohacker turns into a living embodiment of the outside, 
a threat rather than a challenger who seeks to constructively transform laborato-
ries into social spaces that need to be as inclusive and communitarian as possible 
as a condition for technological change to be beneficial for society. Simultane-
ously the biohacker turns back into a desirable object of identification in the sense 
that it affirms a fascination with experimentation as an object that should take 
place out of the reach of conventional political differences as well as the tangle of 
rules, regulations, and codes of conduct adhered to by the professionals. 
 There is no choice: the biohacker shows how difficult it has become to criti-
cally engage the life sciences constructively. The proximity of the figure of the 
biohacker to synthetic biology inevitably ends up undermining its challenge in 
the conventional antagonisms that surround genetic engineering. Let’s consider 
this outcome in light of how the future is imagined in  The Diamond Age . What is 
instructive in considering this version of the alternative is how Stephenson’s nar-
rative shows us how ‘Feed technology’ has made the farming of rice paddies into 
something superfluous. 
 This echoes a familiar crisis of identity, how contemporary technology plays a 
major part in the undermining of farming systems as based on the human hand in 
seed selection and crop diversity. 
 The novel turns to agriculture as a domain in which the distinction between 
nature and technology never held to begin with. What happens in the novel, how-
ever, is that certain societies are hit hardest by the new technological paradigm 
and have to adjust to the geopolitical consequences of how production results in a 
dysfunctional and fragmented biological body. Such societies no longer have the 
luxury of debating their preference for advanced genetic engineering (as a means 
to liberate biology from social constraints) or for saving nature and society from 
the commodification of life (by rejecting patents, corporate concentration, etc.). 
They have to combine both, having no option but to challenge how flows of infor-
mation and materials are being controlled through ‘the Feed’, searching for and 
embracing a new relationship to the land wherein every harvest combines crops 
for food, fruits for medicine, and trees that produce ‘synthetic rubber and pellets 
of clean safe fuel’ ( Stephenson 1995 , 258). 
 Returning to the figure of the ‘biohacker’, the challenge to the laboratory can 
be given shape by its discussion alongside the emerging movement for ‘open-
source seeds’. Both draw on the rhetoric of access, openness, and freedom and 
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might find some agreement in the diagnoses of laboratories as asocial spaces in 
the sense that experimentation is too often exclusively performed by researchers 
in white coats with multiple degrees, working with branded and patented equip-
ment. However, open-source seeds are discussed because of how they are at once 
pragmatic and principled in its attempt to transform the life sciences. Rather than 
liberating biology from social constraints (in the Diamond Age, through biohack-
ing, or as an escape towards the biological age), it provides a rare example of an 
alternative that hinges on a politics of imagination that seeks to ‘renormalize what 
counts as biological’ ( Thacker 2003 , 76). 
 Biohacking 
 The arrival on the scene of the figure of the biohacker, in the last decade, suggests 
that there might be significant continuity between recent developments in the 
life sciences and the hacker movement. Biohackers are, like almost all of us, the 
inhabitants of digital environments, but more significantly, like all types of hack-
ers, they are politically and aesthetically invested in technical practises related to 
information technologies. Unsurprisingly there is therefore a strong identification 
with the rhetoric of freedom and openness that derives from the open-source and 
free software movements. Yet the term biohacking is typically used interchange-
ably with ‘do-it-yourself biologist’ and ‘garage biology’, which is an indication 
that the experiment is the locus of the hackers dream of programming for its own 
sake – out of curiosity, playfulness, and as an exploration of the limits of the pos-
sible (see  Grushkin et al. 2013 ;  Wohlsen 2011 ). 
 Accordingly the analogy between the hacker movement and the contemporary 
transformation of the life sciences is not simply about the engagement with infor-
mation technologies. The shared epistemological position does include coding 
and programming but as part of a ‘remix of cultures that update a more traditional 
science ethos’ ( Delfanti 2013 , 12;  Penders 2011 ). The ideal-typical ‘biohacker 
space’ will most likely show a familiar array of computer equipment, perhaps in 
an old warehouse that might be demolished soon or in an inner-city basement. 
Surrounding old hardware will be the rudimentary tools of biology, which might 
be lying around, piled up, or visibly in use and under construction. Other hacker 
spaces, however, will be very different, with housing facilitated by prestigious 
institutes and with clear financial prospects. Irrespective of these differences, 
however, there will be microscopes, centrifuges, incubators, and spectrometers 
as well as the more mundane vials, refrigerators, and microwaves that might have 
been acquired for next to nothing. The instruments could be self-made, cheaply 
acquired, or obsolete in the eyes of most experts, but the key feature is that their 
usage takes place in laboratories designed to be social spaces that are as inclusive 
as possible and seek to realise the promise of lowering the required level of skills 
and knowledge. 6 This scenario suggests that it is not solely the irresponsibility 
of hackers that should be examined as a challenge to the life sciences. Quite the 
opposite, it is the priority given to playfulness, curiosity, and creativity that unset-
tles both the advocates and the critics of genetic engineering. 
Re-thinking the age of biology 133
 The case of the Glowing Plant project demonstrates this. In the summer of 
2013 this project raised nearly half a million dollars on Kickstarter by promising 
backers who pledged more than $40 a packet of fifty to one hundred genetically 
altered seeds of an  Arabidopsis plant ( Calaway 2013 ). There is nothing particu-
larly shocking about plants that glow in the dark, which is a genetically engi-
neered trait that has been around since the mid-eighties as a research tool. In this 
regard it was helpful that  Arabidopsis is a model organism that is widely used 
and studied. This includes the ability to produce a fluorescent protein that causes 
emission of a green-blue light, using the enzyme  Luciferase , which is known for 
making fireflies and some fungi and bacteria glow (ibid.). Therefore it was not 
the promise of creating genetically modified plants that was controversial but the 
promise of its distribution at low cost and to anyone who asked. 
 Eventually it turned out to be complicated to create such plants as products that 
can be shipped to consumers, but the combination of promising a glow-in-the-dark 
plant with the provocative rhetoric worked. It quickly attracted around 8,000 con-
tributors interested in having their own glowing plants wherever they wished and 
to be replicated by anyone with only the most basic types of laboratory equipment 
(ibid.). The project asked, ‘What if we used trees to light our streets, instead of 
street lamps?’ and what if ‘ Avatar ’s Glowing Garden Becomes a Reality?’ 7 This 
strategy divided the community of biohackers and DIY biologists. For example, 
Bio-Curious, a well-known group in the US, were involved in the early stages 
of the project but withdrew because their code of conduct forbade the release of 
genetically modified organisms from their laboratories. Nonetheless there are few 
legal obstacles in the US, where the distribution of glowing plants is not forbidden 
or regulated by law, as the plants that are distributed are neither food nor micro-
organisms. Moreover, the European and US codes of conduct for biohackers are 
usually not very specific in their appeal to principles like safety, security, access, 
responsibility, care for the environment, and so on. 8 
 While the project was not illegal and was being marketed with some success, 
the controversy quickly escaped the confines of the community of biohackers and 
the participants in the project. Soon the Glowing Plant project had been reframed 
in terms of the familiar contours of the GM controversy. Once again the risks of 
genetic engineering were the topic of discussion rather than the merits of lower-
ing the threshold to experimentation in improvised laboratories. The ETC Group 
drew attention by renaming the Kickstarter campaign Kickstopper, including 
the glowing plant in its campaign to regulate the release of synthetic DNA into 
the environment. Soon Kickstarter decided to withdraw its support for projects 
that reward backers with genetically modified organisms. As a result the crowd-
funding–based marketing strategy could no longer rely on the principle website 
used by biologists and biology enthusiasts to post their projects and funding tar-
gets online. 
 What is significant about the project’s launch is that it reveals the figure of 
the biohacker as a dream of an outside, imagined as a space wherein creativity 
flows unchecked because the normal rules do not apply. This dream might be 
shared with many professionals engaged in genetic engineering but only as long 
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as biohacking refers to a few experimental spaces, amateurish, artistic, or at most 
as improvised labs closely associated with professionals. Here the discussion of 
the risks are not those prioritised by George Church, who is concerned about aso-
cial loners and the inventions of amateur communities disconnected from respon-
sible professionals. The potential for abuse is then about biosecurity risks, while 
concern over the environmental risks of plant biotechnology motivated the push 
back in the case of the Glowing Plant project. Therefore the perspective is not 
that of the professional and established synthetic biology community but of those 
who identify the seed as a symbol of the struggle against the neoliberal project 
of restructuring the social and natural worlds around the narrow logic of the mar-
ket. Rather than affirming the counter-cultural identity of biohackers or a shared 
oppositional stance in regard to experimentation in the life sciences, the biohacker 
projects are interpreted as emblematic for the speculative subjectivity that drives 
the commodification of life. 
 Mistrust of biohacker politics is not limited to Kickstarter campaigns, even 
though this medium can be seen as illustrative of new styles of marketing and 
the branding of the usage of genetically modified seeds. In this sense the dream 
of biohacking as invention situated outside of established spaces that are heavily 
regulated is not seen as an alternative to the life science but as an intensifica-
tion of genetic engineering and by extension the field of synthetic biology. While 
there are many examples that might not fall into such a characterization, most of 
the more or less confrontational practises of biohackers that include civil soci-
ety, activists, and bioartists take place in the ‘out program’ of synthetic biology 
( Tocchetti 2012 , 1). For example Christopher Kelty has commented that synthetic 
biology is the source of ‘much of the hype and excitement around DIY Bio, Open 
Source science, bio-hacking and so forth’ ( Kelty 2010 , 4). Considering the close 
ties between the figure of the biohacker and synthetic biology, it was always likely 
that controversy would follow. Perhaps it was even nearly guaranteed by the divi-
siveness of the genetic modification of seeds and how synthetic biology is seen as 
exacerbating the situation by designing new monocrops and related chemicals to 
be cultivated as a resource that can be transformed into energy or materials (e.g., 
bio-plastics). However, the point here is not that the outcome was predictable. 
Rather, the continuation of the status quo in the shape of the same diametrically 
opposed viewpoints on genetic engineering shows how comfortable either side is 
with a fantasy about the others as fully responsible for things that go wrong (as 
the cause of friction, why things are bad, as an agent of conspiracy and so on; see 
 Žižek 1997 , 210). Such paranoia is reaffirmed in the case of the Glowing Plant 
project, either as an example of irresponsible biohackers who intentionally let 
synthetic life forms go out of control or exaggerating environmentalists. The story 
works to establish a boundary around the work of a responsible community of 
synthetic biologists who were already beset on all side by social pressure. Alterna-
tively the same sweeping and dramatic epic might as easily have these biohackers 
as agents of the synthetic biology establishment, opening up new frontiers for the 
manipulation of minds, bodies, and the environment. 
 Like many biotech start-ups, the Glowing Plant project ran out of money in 
2017, and it never managed to insert all the six genes that were needed to grow 
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plants that glow brightly. Simpler projects were launched, most notably one that 
aimed to create and distribute fragrant moss, a less complicated organism. Also 
this project turned out to be more challenging than expected, and when delivery 
had to be postponed the entire programme was ended. 9 Such failure is not surpris-
ing considering how often biotech start-ups fail, but it shows something relevant 
about the inflated rhetoric that accompanies many experimental set-ups’ results. 
High expectations lead to disappointing results, and more relevantly it shows a 
politics of imagination wherein the obstacles and boundaries that are inevitably 
encountered into a basis for resuming the debate over the risks of GMOs. In this 
case the project was defined to provoke and marginalise dissenting understand-
ings of the conventional boundaries between life and technology. Its sought to 
demonstrate that there is no need to reach out to find a basis in society for innova-
tions in genetic engineering beyond the ability to attract funding. Such an inter-
pretation of the biohacker as an oppositional figure is unwilling to break away 
from the established dynamic of insiders and outsiders, the social antagonistic 
relationship that synthetic biology seeks to escape. Like with GMOs, the result is 
that multiple values are constantly attaching themselves to new biological entities 
(and knowledge of such entities), making it highly likely that they take on a con-
troversial meaning depending on the context they were introduced to ( Vermeulen 
et al. 2012 ). 
 From the dramatic and even epic perspectives that surround synthetic biology, 
adversaries will appear to be everywhere. As we saw, some of its main protago-
nists are advocating a step beyond ‘human exceptionality’, and the transition that 
it presents to policy makers is promised to be a seamless socio-technical arrange-
ment that spans the globe and has the life span of an industrial revolution. Ironi-
cally, however, this means that even an engaged audience that is most genuinely 
enthusiastic about developments in genetic engineering will end up seeming like 
a threat, even if in reality these are simply enthusiasts experimenting without 
provoking anyone. The question is therefore what to expect of the promise of 
liberating experimentation from the enclosed spaces of universities, governments, 
and companies. The attention for this project and the figure of the biohacker in 
general shows us that there is a desire for a transformation of the life sciences but 
also that such a promise seeks its realisation in direct relationship to how rela-
tively new fields like synbio have invested in their own politics of imagination. 
While already limited and constrained in its ability to realise an alternative that 
seeks to ‘open up’ the life sciences, the emerging combination of synbio with the 
figure of the biohacker is discursively powerful as a claim on ‘futures of change, 
openness and horizontality’ that are distinguishable from those that characterised 
‘20th century research and the related distribution of power’ in the life sciences 
(see Delfanti 2011, 3–4). 
 Open-source seeds 
 For quite a while now there has been a diverse alliance of advocacy groups, 
including farmers, indigenous people, and civil society advocacy groups, who 
have tried to slow the project of corporate ‘globalisation’ in agriculture. The 
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aim is to challenge the control over plant genetic resources by corporations and 
governments that support their monopolisation. Success, however, requires an 
approach that empowers social groups and/or institutions with the mandate to 
sustain them and to facilitate their equitable use. There are therefore two strategic 
tasks: to effectively resist the project of neoliberalisation and to create space for 
the construction of alternatives. Both are linked and complementary as strategies, 
but the latter has only recently been realised in the shape of an alternative that ties 
the rhetoric of freedom to the usage of seeds ( Kloppenburg 2010a ,  2010b ;  Deibel 
and Kloppenburg 2015 ). 
 First, ‘free seed’ would be one of many examples in agriculture that distinguish 
themselves from the corporate appropriation of plant genetic resources, develop-
ment of transgenic crops, and the global imposition of intellectual property rights. 
Whatever their many differences, agricultural producers of all types are faced 
with serious constraints on the free exchange of seeds. This undermines the devel-
opment of new cultivars by farmers, public breeders, and small seed companies 
as well as community-based seed distribution or various types of farming that 
seek alternative agro-ecological paths. Globally this is the result of the influence 
of IP laws on the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Interna-
tional Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Agriculture. These treaties function 
in ways that bind farmers and indigenous peoples more closely to the existing 
markets rather than to construct new and positive spaces for alternative action. 
For example, the call for farmers’ rights diverts activist energies into protracted 
discussions about its juridical status in relation to the authorisation of patenting 
and the system for the management of genetic materials. This includes access 
and benefit sharing, as there is little to suggest that these types of mechanisms of 
global governance could ever turn into means of defending, much less reasserting 
or enlarging, farmer- or community-based sharing of seeds (see  chapter 4 for a 
detailed discussion of the international situation). 
 By contrast, the ‘free and open-source software’ movement (FOSS) is exem-
plary as a response to the extension of the various forms of intellectual property 
to the source code of computer programming in the early eighties (copyright, 
software patents, etc.). Specifically Richard Stallman, the founder of the Free 
Software Foundation, made available the source code that he had programmed, 
using the newly introduced copyright to guarantee its availability. Anyone could 
make use of it (to study, modify, distribute, improve, etc.) on condition that the 
source code would remain available. Rather than renounce copyright, he began 
using it to prevent programmers of source code and users of software from losing 
the freedom to control part of their lives. By now there are thousands of projects 
and tens of thousands of software developers doing work on the basis of open 
licencing. Most exemplary is the case of Linux, which is free of charge, renowned 
as more stable and reliable than equivalents based on IP protection, and its mil-
lions of lines of source code can be shared, modified, and improved by anyone. 
 Against this backdrop a sustained effort was started in the early 2000s to think 
through the notion of ‘open-source seeds’. The aim was to look for new ways to 
support those policies and initiatives that affirm that plant materials are a public 
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good, freely available, while resisting others that are focused on plants as inven-
tions and as exclusively owned by a few corporations and institutions (see  Kipp 
2005 ; Aoki 2008;  Kloppenburg 2010a, 2010 b ;  Kloppenburg and Deibel 2011 ;  Dei-
bel 2018 ). Crucially the analogy with informatics does not mean that seeds and 
software are somehow the same at the level of code. Quite the opposite; an alter-
native is needed as a way of anticipating markets and technologies that are trans-
forming the usage and exchange of plant materials, which includes the expression 
of DNA in digital or electronic forms. 
 The example is therefore not about plant materials that will somehow become 
disembodied or decontextualised or be instantly transmissible across the globe 
as a digital technology. Instead an alternative is needed to how the language of 
‘freedom’, ‘openness’, and ‘access’ is well on its way to being shaped in support 
of how the commodification of plants involves a wide array of exclusive rights 
over many different kinds of resources and types of knowledge – on genetic traits, 
sequences, databases, source code, and so forth. It is this fragmentation of the 
concepts of access and openness that requires an alternative that is given meaning 
and shaped at the intersection of the life sciences and informatics ( Deibel 2013 ). 
It in this respect that the example of the Open Source Seed Initiative (OSSI) is 
exemplary for the potential of what is called a ‘protected commons’. In the case of 
OSSI this concept refers to how plant materials are made available to those who 
will reciprocally share, while those who will not are excluded (see  Kloppenburg 
2010a ,  2010b ;  Deibel 2018 ). The notion of ‘free seed’ as presented by OSSI aims 
to distinguish itself from various mechanisms that reflect how global treaties have 
affirmed the principle of  exclusion – rather than  sharing – as their constitutive 
basis. 
 The basic idea is that symmetry in flows of crop germplasm will be restored 
not by arranging payment for access to genetic resources but by working practi-
cally towards a reconstitution of the commons for plant materials used by breed-
ers as well as farmers. Importantly this does not mean that peasants’ landraces 
should be freely accessed and mined for genetic resources, as was the case under 
the common heritage regime (see  Chapter 4 ). It should not be confused with the 
 open-access commons , wherein it is unclear whether breeding with seeds is legal 
or whether farmers can replant seeds (see  Chapter 4 ). Nor is it a feasible strategy 
to rely on governments to restore the public domain, which is unlikely consider-
ing the globalisation of intellectual property rules as well as industrialised agri-
culture. Of course states could simplify the various ways wherein working with 
seeds has become highly complex, but this is a different discussion. The protected 
commons, on the other hand, relies on open licencing, also known as copyleft, as 
a simple, elegant, and effective mechanism that requires no new law. In turn, the 
licence is the mechanism to support the collaboration of breeders and farmers who 
are intended to be the primary beneficiaries of the protected commons. 
 This is notably different than an earlier example, which was Biological Innova-
tion for Open Source (BiOS). The initiative is interesting because it aimed to make 
available a package of patented plant biotechnologies. The package included a 
method for transferring plant genes, an alternative to the Agrobacterium technique 
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that is owned by Monsanto. This technology is available on condition that any 
follow-up inventions are returned to the common pool. Anyone who builds upon 
the contributions of others must make available any improvements that are made 
to the other participants. The idea is that no one can enforce intellectual property 
rights against other members who have signed up on the same terms ( Benkler 
2006 , 342;  Kloppenburg 2010a ,  2010b ). BiOS’s technologies have been used in 
various places, including in a joint venture with the International Rice Research 
Institute, and got a lot of attention in the press. However, the initial enthusiasm 
has not translated into the freedom to operate in plant biotechnology that was 
the aim. BiOS in its approach goes beyond a critique of the patent system by 
affirming the need for an alternative. It also restricted the potential users of the 
technologies that it made available by considering the users of any new seeds as 
passive beneficiaries of what is invented by others. In this respect, BiOS is similar 
to biohacking with its orientation towards opening up science, aiming to make 
experimental work easier for plant geneticists around the world. 
 This is much less the case when considering OSSI as the first example of an 
open-source model dedicated to maintaining fair and open access to plant genetic 
resources in order to ensure the availability of germplasm to farmers, gardeners, 
breeders, and their communities in future generations. Consider the OSSI pledge: 
 You have the freedom to use these OSSI-Pledged seeds in any way you 
choose. In return, you pledge not to restrict others’ use of these seeds or their 
derivatives by patents or other means, and to include this Pledge with any 
transfer of these seeds or their derivatives. 
 (see http://osseeds.org/) 
 OSSI’s website shows plant breeders and seed companies that the seeds that have 
been pledged can be used for further breeding without restrictions on condition 
that the OSSI pledge is included in ‘any transfer of these seeds or their deriva-
tives’. This is intended to ensure that the pledge remains in force for any crop vari-
ety bred from the pledged original. The pledge is simple and short, as its purpose 
is to remove as much of the complexity of the claims that might undermine the 
usage of seeds as possible. 
 In 2017 there were 375 varieties of seed shown on the website. These are not 
sold by OSSI but have been pledged by those who bred the varieties, registered 
them, and submitted the requisite materials (designation, information about the 
variety, a statement that affirms the pledge, etc.). Mostly these seeds involve plant 
material that was in the public domain and not legally restricted, although in a few 
cases there were contributions from breeders working for public institutions who 
had to receive permission. While it has a modest scope, the various plant variet-
ies being offered are described as  freed seed . What the letter ‘d’ adds is emphasis 
on how these seeds are free in comparison to the seeds previous relation to the 
enclosure of the plant genetic public domain and the decline of public breeding 
programmes. This is another reference to freedom as an alternative to the global 
dissemination of crop varieties that do not meet the needs of most farmers, that 
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often cannot be legally saved, and that reinforce the expansion of unsustainable 
monocultures in conventional breeding and as the product of plant biotechnology. 
 A pledge as an alternative 
 OSSI can be understood as another response to the decades of strengthening of the 
intellectual properties, but more important is that it establishes a different type of 
relationship to the language of access, openness, and freedom. A protected com-
mons is given shape as a relation between life forms (crops, plant materials, etc.) 
and ways of living (farming, breeding, eating, etc.). 
 A protected commons is a requirement because of how breeders’ rights, also 
called variety rights, have changed as a result of the authorization of patent-
ing. For example, there used to be a straightforward norm called the ‘breeding 
exemption’, which used to forbid that a variety was protected with other kinds 
of intellectual property that conflicted with its guarantee of the availability of the 
variety for further breeding. The breeders’ exemption guaranteed the accessibility 
of even the most competitive high-yielding conventional varieties that required 
great investments, which could be crossed without permission of another breeder. 
Hereby a wider range of genetic diversity would be incorporated into new variet-
ies, and also it was considered useful because of discouraging monopoly breeding 
lines and eliminating the possibility that many different claims would apply to 
a new crop species with a combination of traits that are based on various other 
protected varieties. This is no longer the case. Around the world, a combination of 
plant variety rights and patents is no longer forbidden. The international Union for 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plant (UPOV) in UPOV91, unlike UPOV78, 
lifted its criteria in respect of patents and no longer guarantees that farmers can 
save seeds after a harvest, using these for replanting and redistribution to other 
farmers. The exact combinations that are possible as a consequence vary greatly 
across countries, but the result is often an expanded ability to restrict the saving of 
seeds by farmers, to enforce the payment of royalties, or otherwise impose restric-
tions on the usage of seeds. 
 It’s not news that the patentability of living things has greatly altered the situ-
ation in regard of plant breeding and farming. This has complicated the situation 
to such an extent that OSSI-pledged seed does not rely directly on plant breeders’ 
rights, for example by adding a clause to guarantee the breeders’ exemption fol-
lowing the example of other types of open licencing. Such a clause would have a 
status that is legally speaking difficult to enforce, and even the pledge might be 
challenged in court, as OSSI states on its website. This legal situation was to be 
expected, because even the original copyleft licence (the GPL) continues to be chal-
lenged even though it is widely used and integrated into many different fields. The 
initial reaction to copylefting in any new field is often to declare that it is not legal. 
Legal controversy has accompanied GNU licencing in informatics and elsewhere. 
For example it was never completely settled whether open licencing of source 
code is legal, but this no longer matters because the users of Linux did not only 
turn out to be innovative but as a result made powerful allies with a strong interest 
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in undermining the position in the software market of Microsoft. Similarly it 
might be argued that the terms of the OSSI pledge are not legally binding. After 
all, there are many conflicting types of intellectual property-related restrictions in 
place, whether through TRIPs, UPOV, CBD, or national laws. Everywhere condi-
tions vary slightly, and there are conflicting laws and constant pressures on the 
availability of plant materials. As a result, it is never self-evident whether variet-
ies that are not yet enclosed will remain available for further breeding or for farm-
ers ( Hughes and Deibel 2006 ; cf.  Ghijsen 2007 ). 
 The legal dimensions might be interpreted cynically as a demonstration of how 
difficult it might be to establish the pledge. However, it could also be argued 
that this is not what matters most. The legal mechanism of OSSI exists already 
in many domains where similar issues exist. Why would there be a reason to 
expect that the release of seed is legally less feasible than the open licencing that 
is already widely recognised elsewhere? What is a more serious objection is that 
the control over the seed might be difficult to establish through legal struggle 
alone, and it is no easy task to establish an alternative network that includes farm-
ers, progressive plant scientists as well as anybody else who hold relevant skills, 
tools, and knowledge to sustain and develop the biological and cultural diversity 
of plant varieties. 
 Many farmers and public scientists are frequently deeply embedded in exist-
ing norms and practises. While this might suggest a profound path dependency 
that makes radical change appear implausible, it could also be seen in terms of 
a potential for change. It implies that millions or even billions of farmers are 
trapped in a narrowing corporate seed market wherein there should be plenty of 
space for a few niches for public varieties and plant products that provide farmers 
and their crops a little of the support they need. Within this context nothing is free 
of charge, and neither are OSSI pledged seeds, which costs money as usual when 
ordered from those that do the multiplication of seeds commercially. Ordinary 
contracts apply in this case, which includes the sharing of benefits to whomever 
developed the variety and pledged it with OSSI. This does not violate the pledge 
as long as there are no restrictions on the usage of the seed that is passed on to 
breeders, farmers, or customers. The same applies to OSSI-pledged hybrid crops 
that do not reproduce their seeds as long as these remain free to use for any other 
purpose, including as a parent in breeding. 
 Seeds as an open-source movement 
 Payments for open-source seeds should not be surprising when considering the 
analogy with other examples in other sectors. Freed seeds are not code, as was 
already explained, but neither are all the features of seeds so unique that they are 
incomparable to established fields elsewhere, whether as code, hardware, machin-
ery, or otherwise. 
 For example the commercial multiplication of OSSI-pledged seeds resembles 
how any regular open-source programme or operating system will run on some 
device that is bought and sold commercially. These devices might sometimes be 
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less expensive or less powerful, as is often the case with Linux-based desktop 
operating systems, and the most powerful supercomputers that overwhelmingly 
run on Linux. The point is that there are niches in which open source has been 
established that are involved directly with industries that are highly commercial 
without relying on restrictive practises possible because of IP protection. The 
same is true when a breeder pledges a hybrid variety that needs to be ordered each 
harvest. There is not necessarily any conflict, because there are established ways 
of earning an income or additional contracts, for example those that establish pay-
ment for commercial multiplication. 
 Similarly we can compare the orientation of OSSI to how a specialist or service 
company specialised in Linux might earn income based on its reputation rather 
than any exclusive claim over the building or maintaining of servers, supercomput-
ers, or other devices running Linux. Income is in this case not based directly on the 
open licencing of Linux or other types of open-source programmes. The situation 
is the same when a breeder using OSSI-pledged seed will depend on an engaged 
community to find ways of getting direct commercial returns on a ‘new’ variety 
incorporating pledged plant materials. Valuing expertise and reputation turns the 
licence into a practical mechanism to reward engaged contributors to the protected 
commons. In this case that support would imply finding new ways to support those 
who seek to make a living based on the need to constantly adapt seeds to changing 
circumstances. It is the constant reciprocity of this process that characterises the 
protected commons. In this respect OSSI is exemplary, as it seeks the involvement 
of a wide range of practitioners as a community that can establish the licence as a 
working model towards supporting how the diversity of seeds requires their con-
stant adaptation to resistance against viruses, its relation to soil, require irrigation, 
particular soil types, specific climatic conditions, and so on. 
 Obviously this is a challenging task that goes beyond the first consideration 
of OSSI, which is to establish a working relation with and between breeders and 
farmers using OSSI-pledged seeds. This step is the premise on which it becomes 
possible to begin scaling up the mechanism, linking it with participatory plant 
breeding and community-based marketing. For instance, the OSSI website men-
tions that it seeks food partnership, including restaurants and supermarkets, and 
mentions the possibilities for seed companies to benefit by showing that they care 
about the sustainability of the food system and potentially open up a new market 
with ethical consumers and even gardeners. As complicated as such scaling up 
might be practically, it is also simple like its pledge and basic like Linux. The 
latter has thrived because of the way global markets have turned software into an 
exclusive and expensive commodity, while hardware is now a cheap commodity 
that can be duplicated easily and reconstructed. Similarly, the type of agriculture 
OSSI can be considered as more basic, in that it starts out as a niche and that it 
promises a type of stability that is not available within the confines of commodi-
fied seed and working with the few crops that represent sizeable world markets 
and require cultivation under heavily controlled conditions. 
 Challenging the control over something of great value that has been commodi-
fied, like seeds, is never going to be easy. This is especially true when referring 
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to local innovation trajectories, wherein seeds are used, which oftentimes are 
emblematic for the diversity of natural and cultural histories. What is unique, how-
ever, is that OSSI attempts to formulate an alternative that is based on the restoration 
of a baseline of reciprocity in regard of the sharing of the natural resources rather 
than information, knowledge, or equipment. There is already a small but growing 
number of open-source seed initiatives under way around the world; while each 
is different, the various ways wherein they present a challenge to enclosures and 
anticommons derived from intellectual property rights mirrors the diversity that is 
characteristic of open source models. Some might not succeed, while others might 
find sufficient support to consolidate a protected commons, beginning with being 
effective at site-specific problem solving. Its consequence, however, would be that 
something occurs of a wider significance, which is that the hierarchy between what 
counts as innovation begins to change as a result of having created room for cre-
ative capacity of individuals, universities, and variously sized firms as opposed 
to the handful of companies that have attained a dominant market position. It is 
at this point that we can speak of an alternative, one that is practical because of 
being principled in taking back control over the language of access, sharing, and 
openness that is otherwise becoming a feature of the ongoing estrangement of the 
environmental and technological commons (as shown in  Chapters 4 and  6 ). 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter brings together many different strands of thinking that were elab-
orated throughout the book, and this conclusion shows how the discussions of 
this chapter help elaborate further Foucault’s understanding of the problem of 
sovereignty. This was the theoretical framework that structures both this chap-
ter, which in the citation that started this chapter was about the need for ‘a new 
right’, which suggested there is a potential to ‘bypass or get around’ the problem 
of sovereignty ( Foucault 2003 , 27; see chapter 2). This chapter approached the 
relationship between nature and society as a comparison of different examples of 
alternatives, each with its own politics of imagination whether as a proposal for 
a global bio-economy, the figure of the biohacker, or an emerging movement for 
open-source seeds. 
 Crucially these examples are not solely presented as exceptions. Each time, the 
politics of imagination is different, and this could be established strictly in empiri-
cal terms, contextual, complex, and unique as examples of innovation. Instead 
the aim was to establish a critical relation to the theoretical framework, and to 
that end we need to briefly recall Foucault’s problem of sovereignty. We began 
by tracing the problem of sovereignty to how the doctrine of right derives from 
monarchical power and originally focused on contracting individuals that form 
a social body. Over time the theory of right is redirected from its application 
to ‘man-as-body’ and ‘man-as-species’ and more recently towards the dissolu-
tion of a coherent conception of nature and human nature intensified today by 
‘tearing down the Berlin Wall between the world of objects and the world of 
subjects’ ( Haraway 1997 , 270). The political theory for this historical trajectory 
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was developed throughout the book, for example discussing the state-of-nature 
theories of Grotius and Hobbes (in  Chapters 2 ,  4 and  6 ), Locke’s labour theory (in 
 Chapter 2 ), and Marx’s ‘species-being’ commented on by Arendt (in  Chapter 2 ). 
Against this backdrop it becomes possible to engage with the life sciences in natu-
ralistic terms that do not revolve around ‘reason’ or ‘dignity’ as features that can 
be lost decisively as a result of how the life sciences undermine ‘human excep-
tionality’. Rather, we begin to examine how particular conceptions of reason and 
dignity are threatened because they are based on specific political theories, each 
of which is an illustration of the problem of sovereignty. 
 The theory of right was not uniform at any point. An example is the move from 
the Hobbesian view of the state to the limitations on monarchical power in early 
liberal theory. Many of the theories that were highly influential in this period are 
rarely discussed today. Take the work of Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94), who wrote 
‘the first philosophically serious discussion of Hobbes’. In it he rejected Hobbes’s 
notion of a natural right of life and Grotius’s ideas about property in a state of 
nature ( Tuck 1999 , 156). While not often discussed today, he was among the more 
famous political theorists of early modernity for generations because he was the 
principle figure to argue that natural men often live in peace, as do sovereigns 
and citizens. In the period of early colonisation he advocated that the right to life 
and self-preservation does not imply a right to war, as most natural philosophers 
accepted. Rather, all property is contractual and the result of individuals having 
claims on each other ( Pufendorf 1991 ;  Krieger 1965 ;  Tuck 1999 ; see  Tully 1991 ). 
Today it is Rousseau’s natural philosophy that is erroneously seen as the origin of 
the view of man as a social being (the noble savage), even though he argued that 
natural men are isolated and alone. The archetype has been carried over directly 
to the interpretation of ‘human nature’ in a technical world (John Savage or the 
‘invalid’ Vincent Freeman in  Gattaca ) as well as to the violent monsters created 
through technology (monster of Frankenstein, Godzilla, etc.). 
 Pufendorf, on the other hand, was already aware of the close relation between 
the insecurity of nature and the colonial ambitions of sovereign individuals and 
sovereign societies, which is most often discussed in the context of the English 
school of international relations that studies the international system in terms 
of the expansion of the relations between ‘civilized’ societies. Taking seriously 
Pufendorf’s relation to the problem of sovereignty implies that there is little that 
is ‘new’ about a ‘new right’ that Foucault proposed. The opposite of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan can be found already at that very moment within the doctrine of right 
and can be followed along with the historical arc of the problem of sovereignty. 
First, it is quite obvious Pufendorf’s contribution was marginalised: his natural 
philosophy challenged the need for a clear distinction between a state of nature 
and a state of society. That means there is no basis for the origin myth of the lib-
eral agent, which is to say for the sovereign state and sovereign individual with 
rights of war and property. As James Tully explains, if it is the duty of every man 
‘to cultivate and preserve sociality’ then there are also no perfectly isolated prin-
ciples of reason and no mythical contract uniting the sovereign with society ( Tully 
1991 , xxvi). Second, the arc of our argument about the problem of sovereignty 
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can be followed further, bringing us directly to the Foucauldian idea of power: 
how ‘multiple relations of power traverse, characterize, and constitute the social 
body’ ( Foucault 2003 , 48, see chapter 2). 
 The point is therefore not to defend the entirety of Pufendorf’s idea about the 
social contract. In his view, it was founded on the ‘moral compulsion on men to 
unify further their convergent wills towards mutual safety, and (. . .) submit their 
wills to definition and execution by a single authority’ ( Krieger 1965 , 125, see 
also  Oestreich 2002 ). This has strong moralist and even absolutist overtones from 
a contemporary standpoint if read literally as a model for how a state should func-
tion. As a theory of right, however, it seeks to explain what unifies the social body 
and is exceptional among theories of right that ‘basically knew only the individual 
and society’ ( Foucault 2003 , 245). What matters here is that Pufendorf’s theory 
can be interpreted along with the more familiar emphasis in Foucault’s work on 
interventions in the life of populations, from birth to reproduction and death. The 
problem of sovereignty is sufficiently heterogeneous in its historical origin to 
rethink the ways wherein bio-objects are being reconfigured in distinctly early-
modern terms, for example as a return to nature or as mandated by a series of 
social contracts –and, of course, as a domain outside of the state of society that is 
to be inhabited by species of biocapitalism. 
 So what than can we do to solve the problem of sovereignty? What does it 
mean to do ‘precisely the opposite of what Hobbes was trying to do in Leviathan’ 
(ibid., 28)? Step one is to take a similar position, a critique of the principle of 
sovereignty as realised through the constant mobilisation of knowledge and tech-
nology to mend its relation to the body politic. Step two, however, is to affirm the 
co-existence of a ‘new right’ on politically contested terrain, which is what the 
synthesis that follows represents in terms of the language of openness and free-
dom. The table 7.1 distinguishes the relationship between (im-)materiality and 
different types of commons (or rather ‘life in common’). The X-axis contrasts 
life as information (virtual life) to its materiality (living matter); the Y-axis dis-
tinguishes a rhetoric of freedom that primarily refers to technology (freedom to 
operate) from the protected commons (free as in freedom). 
 In the top-left quadrant is the BioBricks Foundation. This example from syn-
thetic biology prioritises ‘life as information’ in its approach to experimentation. 
DNA synthesis relies heavily on open access to data in the life sciences and its 
integration with more established types of biological experimentation. The upper-
right top quadrant is where ‘biohacking’ and ‘BiOS’ reside. They combine an 
emphasis on technology that is readily available and easy to use with genetic 
engineering. OSSI is in the quadrant on the low right and applies a principled 
approach, combining an emphasis on freedom with working with seeds as the 
material embodiment of farming and agriculture. 
 Most significantly, however, the low-left quadrant is, in effect, empty. There 
are currently no significant examples of combining a protected commons like that 
of OSSI with an interface that connects to the life sciences directly. In this box 
there should be equivalents to the attempt to remove restrictions from the usage of 
source code, extending it to the removal of the restrictions on the usage of DNA 
as information and its re-materialisation as the products that are the result of the 
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new chemistry. The empty quadrant on purpose has the title of  Chapter 6 . This 
chapter sought to pursue what an open-source alternative might mean within the 
confines of synbio. The table takes a step further, suggesting an alternative that 
takes the analogy with informatics to a next level, integrating ‘openness’ in the 
life sciences (left top) with emphasis on materiality in the right side of the table. 
Can we imagine a protected commons approach that draws on both categories? 
 Perhaps this appears extremely unlikely from the vantage point of their politi-
cal differences today, as it presumes that those involved will at long last find 
ways of acting in common. From a more theoretical vantage point, however, 
taking the idea of the ‘protected commons’ provides a means of being concrete 
about Foucault’s ‘new right’. As just mentioned, this is not so much ‘new’ in 
the sense of doing something that does not exist; instead it refers to taking as a 
starting point the differences from within the doctrine of right in how to affirm 
the mythical contract uniting the sovereign with society and, today, the natu-
ral world. This contract includes the suggestion that it is only a fully sovereign 
individual that can make use of reason and dignity, which is a conception of 
freedom that mirrors the self-image of those who had ‘the wealth, power, and 
leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings’. Rather, the notion of 
a ‘new right’ challenges the underlying myths as they are performed today with 
the ‘exhilarating prospect of getting out of some of the old boxes’ that limit our 
thinking about what being human means ( Hayles 1999 , 285–288). The idea of a 
‘protected commons’ ties the theory and the analysis together. Unlike technologi-
cally deterministic ideas that hinge on the unity of time (such as the naturalistic 
and historical rhetoric of the global bio-economy), this concept extends the poli-
tics of imagination that derives from the basic logic of the OSSI pledge. 
 The theoretical perspective is obviously no longer solely about plant materials 
but shifts focus to the relation between life forms as bio-objects and ways of liv-
ing as illustrations of the biopolitical. 
 In this context the availability of resources and types of knowledge in general 
can be considered in terms of a protected commons. Each possible example should 
be accessible on condition of the absence of restrictions. Such an extension of the 
protected commons is quite easy to imagine because it simply mirrors the exten-
sion of intellectual properties to new domains, intensifying the already established 
logic of the free and open-source movements as well as commons theory. 
 This applies not only to the life sciences, whether synbio, nanotech or other-
wise, but also to many examples that would more easily be seen as localist or 
environmentalist. For example, there are now regional products and traditional 
knowledge that is protected. Why not make pledge products that somehow involve 
 Table 7.1 Virtual life/living matter 
 Virtual Life  Living Matter 
 Freedom to operate  The BioBricks Foundation  Biohacking 
 BiOS 
 Free as in Freedom  Recoding Synthetic Life   OSSI 
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local or regional appreciation of the taste of crops or their colour? And similarly 
there are countless agronomic qualities and other aspects to local, regional or tra-
ditional varieties, crop landraces, and native breeds that can be identified. There 
are numerous examples, like traditional methods for breeding, food processing, 
tillage, conservation, and storage as well as the design of farmsteads, animal hus-
bandry, land use systems, and the like. Rather than claiming them, they would 
be shared with those who similarly appreciate the relation between the product 
and its place of origin or innovations that are tied to local and cultural practises. 
Furthermore the model would work in the opposite direction as well. The creation 
of new and positive spaces for alternative action that are committed to a renewal 
of the public domain could include the release, access, and sharing of information 
in the life sciences provided this is no longer optional in regard of how it has been 
extracted from living materials and how it is being rematerialized as food, fuel, 
medicine, and so on. This is as simple as the OSSI pledge, which is basically con-
tract law being reinterpreted in one of the many domains that might be turned into 
vehicles whereby to critically engage with experimentation in the life sciences in 
its relation to agriculture and the food system. It can easily include genetic engi-
neering, because whether or not it should be the solution to a practical problem 
depends on a baseline of reciprocity. Its development would be conditional on a 
‘non-proprietary interface’ freed from the restrictions that characterise the lan-
guage of access and openness almost everywhere. 
 Such examples merely aim to show that there is no limit on the number of 
inventions that could be made available under a copyleft in alliance with a range 
of social movements and in support of a greater variety of causes. What is impor-
tant is that in such a context there is little space for the naturalistic myths that 
promise seamless and effortless combination of growth with limits to growth, 
such as those that characterise the global bio-economy and sustainable develop-
ment in general. Technically one could argue that languages of naturalism would 
continue, and therefore a type of bio-constitutionalism remains at work in such 
an alternative. This is true, but as a naturalism that is fully invested in the many 
shapes given to the escape from the crisis of the present, each of which attempt to 
vocally re-assert political traditions of creativity, free exchange, and reciprocity 
as a last chance to populate the entanglement of natures and societies of the future 
with engaged interpreters, histories, networks, forums, agoras, parliaments, and 
other instruments needed ‘to compose a common world progressively’ ( Latour 
1993 ). Such multiplicity, however, does not simply find its feet, become a move-
ment, or have the many different types of activities take on the intended meaning. 
The puzzle has many pieces, some of which require us to ‘recode life in common’ 
as biohackers should, while others show how urgent it is to free seeds as the 
biological- and organic-minded crowd should, and even – why not? – one or two 
that show attempts to rethink the meaning of critique, as (bio-)sociologists should. 
 Notes 
 1 The image can be found on: www.dsm.com/content/dam/dsm/cworld/en_US/documents/
backgrounder-bio-based-economy.pdf (accessed on 1.03.2016). 
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 2 For example, the image can be found here www.dsm.com/content/dam/dsm/cworld/en_
US/documents/bio-based-business-seminar-from-a-technology-point-of-view.pdf 
(accessed on 22.01.2018). 
 3 See www.greenbiologics.com/index.php, www.corbion,com, www.bio-amber.com 
(accessed on March 2016). 
 4 See www.gevo.com, www.dna.com and www.avantium.com (accessed on 01.03.2016). 
 5 See http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/manifesto_bbe_english_02.pdf (accessed on 
01.03.2016). 
 6 Actual biohacker spaces in Europe are being referred to: the warehouse is the former 
location of the hack-lab of La Pailasse in the outskirts of Paris (see www.lapaillasse.
org/, last checked December 2016), the basement refers to the ‘biologigaragen’ in 
Copenhagen (see http://biologigaragen.org/), and ‘de Waag Society’ (http://waag.org/en) 
has a highly visible location in the centre of Amsterdam in a fifteenth-century city gate, 
known for the anatomical theatre painted by Rembrandt as the ‘The Anatomy Lesson of 
Dr. Nicolaes Tulp’ (accessed on 8.09.2017). 
 7 See www.kickstarter.com/projects/antonyevans/glowing-plants-natural-lighting-with-no-
electricit (accessed on 17.11.2017). 
 8 Reporting on the event includes: V. Postrel, The Kickstarter Culture Wars at: http://content.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2149613,00.html. See also Dan Hozowitz, Is Kick-
starter Hostile To Science? At www.popsci.com/science/article/2013-08/kickstarter-anti-
science. For the EU and US codes of conduct see http://diybio.org/codes/ (accessed on 
01.03.2016). 
 9 See www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/04/whatever-happened-to-the-glowing-
plant-kickstarter/523551/ (accessed on 23.11.2017). 
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 8  The re-articulation of biopolitical 
theory in an era of informatics 
 
This book started out with observations that demonstrated how the informatic 
understanding of life invariably implies its management through biopolitical 
techniques. Such an approach implies engaging with diverse visions, claims, 
and social theories, which allows to some extent for a decoding of contemporary 
life and living. This is, however, not sufficient on its own. While this book does 
exactly this throughout its chapters, it holds simultaneously that many aspects of 
the current theorisation of our biological present should pay much closer attention 
to the interplay of the old and new, the dead and the alive, the structures and legiti-
misation of power, and ultimately notions involving the order of things, disorder, 
chaos, and the void of life. 
 Accordingly, the book has been structured in a way that combines a quick tour 
of modern categories of life and their conceptual, political, and material trans-
formations with an analysis that could unpack the changes happening within the 
realms of the natural – the human realm as well as the animal and plant kingdoms. 
We aimed to take a position that enables us to engage directly with how the making 
of new forms of life has become less easily intelligible to theory and manageable 
for political power. This requires not only that different spheres of life – involving 
human, animal, and plant materials – be discussed across the body of current 
literature in the social sciences (as we do) but also that they are considered as 
comparable and as deeply intertwined in the dynamic of their development as 
examples of the biopolitical. 
 For example, we prioritised how some key ‘new’ figures of the living are being 
made up, invented, and imagined as we speak. Indeed, this happens in a wide 
variety of settings, including those of new digital languages and platforms, politi-
cal infrastructures, new life forms as seen with Synthia or Cynthiya, the hacker, 
and programmable biomass. Together, they form an array of modern and post-
modern figures, practises, and visions of the future that we claim would not be 
fully captured by contemporary theorisations within the biopolitical theory today, 
thereby falling short in their attempts to provide more clarity on our recent past 
and the near future. From the very start the book has discussed why current the-
ories remain asymmetrical and partial in their treatment of biological, genetic, 
or synthetic life and also in their relation to politics, economics, and technique. 
We have frequently referenced key texts of the ‘Bioeconomy School’ and their 
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theorisation about key concepts such as bio-economy, biovalue, or biocapital 
(e.g.,  Sunder Rajan 2006 ;  Thacker 2005 ;  Cooper 2008 ) as a demonstration of the 
modern mindset that many post-modern (including post-Marxist) theories have 
adopted, which demonstrate an unnecessarily restricted species-centric view (e.g., 
limited to a particular category of plants, animals, humans, etc.). Thus the poten-
tial for application of their argument is limited to particular cases and theoretical 
points of view. 
 This does not solely apply to the ‘Biocapital School’, which we appreciate for 
its attempt to engage with social theory; it is valid similarly for various Foucault-
inspired writers today to the extent that they tend to either focus on micro-level 
governance practises of certain species or seek a global perspective on the living 
as a bewildering multiplicity. More generally, this is a predicament that does not 
originate with an overly narrow nexus of social theory and science and technology 
studies focused on biology; quite the opposite – these are attempts to conceptualise 
within a suffocating context wherein it is increasingly hard to suspend the notion 
that ontological priority should continuously and at every point in social scientific 
or philosophical research be assigned to the radical heterogeneity of reality. This 
position implies that the reliance on concepts in theoretical approaches is sus-
pect because the empirical world cannot be grasped fully by them (see Söderberg 
2017). It is beyond the scope of this book to develop the latter point, but we find 
(with Söderberg) that such a position is restrictive and wish to add weight to the 
call for opening such theoretical tensions to debate and inquiry. 
 To methodologically and empirically understand the rapidly shifting connec-
tions between living beings or living materials, along with the politics surround-
ing them, we cannot just be critical of distinctively modern ways of understanding 
life and politics and implications such as the lack of more general reflection on 
categories of life as conceptualised in the modern era. The point is not merely 
to establish that life forms are transforming and dissolving through technologi-
cal advances and interests in mixing previously distinct categorization schemes 
for living, nor is it sufficient to point out how the management and governing 
of living in general today and in the near future (life forms and their control) 
are becoming more and more heterogeneous and patchy. Instead, the specifics of 
our position are visible in our opening up of what we called the Foucault-Marx 
synthesis – discussed theoretically in  Chapter 2 and then in  Chapter 7 – and we 
have presented case studies in this book to show how similar kinds of forces are at 
play in different power struggles over the definition, the institutional governance, 
and the practises and practical conditions that govern the access to the materials 
of life. We did this while engaging closely with the underlying heterogeneity of 
the current taxa that characterise the informatic content or biomaterial at hand. 
 It is by theorising the biopolitical that we sought to delineate the problem. 
While the remaining chapters demonstrated the implications of our position, our 
aim was to ultimately reach an understanding of a larger cultural context wherein 
the various topics we examined together underline the necessity of such theoriza-
tion. We will not repeat the full theoretical argument or summarise it here. Instead, 
we will rather underscore the main subjects as illustrations of our perspective. We 
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began by discussing how digital platforms and standardised languages are built to 
gather biological samples of humans for coordinated biomedical research ( Chap-
ter 3 ) and demonstrated how various geographical, territory-bound challenges in 
finding a common natural- language representation, digital codification, and legal 
structures need to be re-considered and efforts to address them re-worked if next-
generation research is going to take place beyond nationalised territories and pop-
ulations inhabiting them. The European-wide biomedical infrastructure discussed 
(BBMRI) is a good example of how infrastructural ‘back-ends’ (scientific collec-
tions and standardised platforms of representation similar to what  Parry, 2004 , 
observed earlier) are crucial in shaping our understanding of life in the life sci-
ences at many levels. The EU’s scientific bodies themselves are calling the build-
ing and coordination of these structures ‘metasciences’ – and in the case of the 
BBMRI it is these metasciences of the life sciences that act as the grounding for 
re-organising representations and power over living beings. This chapter therefore 
stands out as exemplary for the significance of species of epistemic platforms that 
drive numerous bioscientific innovations today: it is a global information-driven 
biomedia platform that shows how metacodes operate, shape and transform what 
counts as data, information, and knowledge in the life sciences. 
 In the two chapters that followed, we showed how the historical, institutional 
trajectory has shaped the way in which plants and animals are transformed into 
new political beings, ‘genetic resources’ in agricultural spheres, and how global 
biopolitics is pitted against the claims to sovereign ownership and access to these 
newly found genetic beings. While both are governed as national resources, there 
are significant differences. For example, species of plants are more frequently 
governed through a global language of access that allows performative boundary 
crossings where the conservation of nature becomes premised on new technologi-
cal developments, transforming the very idea of agriculture and food at the global 
level. In turn, political conventions and conceptual redefinitions have reframed 
animals from biological beings into global agricultural informatics stock, genetic 
pools to be herded and defended against excessively narrow-focused optimisa-
tion of biological properties and production capacities. All of these redefinitions 
and recoding actions in the overarching global conventions point to the revival of 
the sovereign as the counter-force to homogenised, simplistic, and short-sighted 
references to either global economic powers or an abstract notion of the authority 
of states. 
 Certainly, the historical trajectory leading to the re-emergence of the sovereign 
implies tracing a global history of neo-liberalisation of nature and its commodifi-
cation. Yet the global setting closely mirrors the discussion in  Chapter 6 , wherein 
access rights to synthetic biology were examined. In consequence of this close 
reading of access rights, ‘openness’ was presented as an alternative to exclusivity 
as a universal norm and to the dominant corporate-led biopolitical model for man-
aging life today. In particular, the idea of Open Source, derived from collaboration 
models that entered computer programming in the late twentieth century, illustrate 
that the understanding of biology now relies fundamentally on informatics and 
visions centred on the capability to decode- and recode life as if it were computer 
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software. The cases in that chapter included an analysis of how the BioBricks 
of synthetic biology work on some of the premises of Open Source and how the 
‘minimal cell’ and ‘minimal genome’ initiatives allow us to rethink the implica-
tions of the idea of Open Source at the global level. 
 In  Chapter 7 , we analysed the emergence of the ‘biohacker’ in relation to the 
new ‘synthetic organisms’, situating both in the context of the framework of the 
‘global bio-economy’, a vision for a comprehensive transition to a more sustain-
able world. Accordingly, one of the key goals with regard to this vision is to 
engineer malleable biomass that can become a sustainable and renewable source 
of energy, food, and materials (e.g., bio-plastics), all at the will of the designer. 
These discursive platforms are paving the way for a continuation of the prior-
ity given to chemical industries within the context of the large-scale biological 
restructuring of the realities of living, with their own spaces of meaning for life 
and living. This analysis also points towards the emergence of a new type of plat-
form where hackers operate independently within whichever realm of power they 
choose to – at the kitchen sink, in an improvised laboratory, or in ways that engage 
directly with the materiality of experimentation as a necessary component of any 
type of alternative to the status quo of global biological realities. We took a further 
look at the Open Source Seed Initiative, which aims at removing the restrictions 
imposed on the usage of plants in agriculture, and at extending open licencing for 
seeds. Thereby we examined the question of whether a counter-economy is possi-
ble for agricultural seeds and how such an idea might apply to living and working 
with genetic materials in other formats and spheres of bio-economy too. Con-
sider together how this demonstrates that the multiplication of ‘new enclosures’, 
based on restrictive interpretations of intellectual property, is being extended to 
the promise of an alternative (in the case of the global bio-economy), challenged 
partially (in biohacker practises) and actively resisted by discursively tying agro-
ecological practises to the bioinformatic platforms. 
 Throughout these chapters, we have claimed that a one-sided contemporary 
reading of Foucault’s biopolitical arguments is unable to grasp the resurrec-
tion of the sovereign as a major force shaping bioeconomies at global level. We 
explained how old theories of sovereignty are not obsolete but, in fact, necessary 
when thinking about what we call ‘metacodes’. Each subject can be traced back 
to natural philosophy, either to Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, Rousseau, and Marx or 
to closely related literary figures whose work can be used heuristically. The point 
is not simply that they are interesting or relevant but that they are grounded in 
intricate debates about sovereignty as it is imagined as both natural and social. 
Thus, the chapters reveal the underlying bias of recent discussions and analyses 
of contemporary life. Borrowing from Foucault, there is a disappearing founda-
tion, one that results in a cultural and theoretical predicament of the biopolitical 
theories, as they account for only part of the story about what’s happening to life 
and its politics today. 
 To overcome these shortcomings, we reach back into theory in order to be able 
to look more closely at the forces shaping life today. Doing this implies reaching 
an understanding of the ‘metacodes’ that saturate what in  Chapter 2 we called an 
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extended nervous system – in a metaphor that captures how we have been wear-
ing the whole of humankind as our skin already while information about us is 
increasingly intimate, ventures beneath our skin and inside our bodies, infiltrates 
our mother tongue, and saturates the world we even a few years ago still called 
natural (and certainly not informatics or ‘Big Data’). 
 Metacodes of life 
 Throughout these pages, we have shown the various forces that we see working 
in conjunction in shaping the idea, materiality, and process of living today. These 
are the ‘metacodes of life’. These metacodes form particular matrices for under-
standing life either through the modern paradigm of the sovereign (what we might 
call the  matrix of the recent past ) or through novel configurations of power and 
representation (the  matrix of the near future ). When considered as particular 
cultural epistemic platforms we moved from our theoretical position (opening up 
the concept of sovereignty) to a variety of historical trajectories that instruct our 
identification and approach of key technical and social processes and sites that 
can be analysed empirically. In these, we can identify various valuations of life 
and of living and related attributes coming to the fore. We can also see key idioms 
through which particular aspects of biological materialities and their bioinformatic 
renderings are conceptualised and brought to life, surrounded by contested politics 
of access and openness that are configured in relation to potential circulation and 
exchange. Finally, we can bring together our observations in a summary of how 
each subject is guided by utopian discourses that tie all of these elements together. 
 As a summary, Table 8.1 presents the various topics addressed by this book, 
each of which shows a specific side to the many-faceted space of metacodes that 
inhabit the physical human – world interface that seems to be scripted to absorb 
life into a ‘new order of the real’ that is composed of a different set of quasi-
transcendentals (e.g., ‘circulation’, ‘connectivity’, and ‘complexity’) (Dillon et al. 
2009). In this regard, each of these epistemic platforms represents and performs 
old and new modes of power and configurations of life that cut across taxa and 
contexts. We think that each epistemic platform forms its own metacode of life. 
Every time, a different configuration of actors, idioms, power dynamics, prin-
ciples of access and ownership, and framing of utopias can be observed. The point 
is not, however, simply that heterogeneity is characteristic of each case. Rather, 
the book has been our attempt to point the way to a different type of analysis. 
Before lies an urgent task: to begin opening up social theory and the concepts 
used thus far, and to put them to use in ways that do the work of seeking empiri-
cal experimentation as essential, a temporary suspension of both the need for a 
critical position and engagement with empirical realities for their own sake with 
as its purpose to find again a view of an horizon from where to think across the 
complexity of the field of relations. This is where we conclude: recognising the 
analytical work that is required for an understanding of how the metacodes of life 
transform our sense of living, along with how these epistemic platforms reinforce 
each other and are going to continue mutating with their very real, material, and 
virtual meanings and power-effects as our emerging twenty-first century unfolds. 
 Table 8.1 The metacodes of life and their epistemic platforms 
 Realms of 
sovereignty and 
biopower 
 Actors  Values and 
Meaning of life or 
living 
 Key idioms  Access and 
enclosure 
 Guiding utopian 
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